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Abstract 
While the literature provides numerous and often competing rationales for the 
introduction of employee ownership and control, a common theme is one of greater 
organisational harmony, brought about through the establishment of common worker 
and management goals. However, evidence suggests that this hannonisation 
assumption is over simplistic and that conflict is apparent in employee owned and 
controlled organisations. This contradictory evidence arises since the harmonisation 
thesis ignores both the wider social and economic context within which organisations 
are situated, and also the social generation of conflict even once the unequal 
distribution of ownership and control is removed. The impact of social networks on 
decision-making, control and conflict within employee owned and controlled firms is 
therefore hypothesised to be more significant than in conventionally organised 
enterprises. 
The conceptual framework on which this study is based contends that identities at 
work are formed by and embedded within social network relations. Therefore, a 
contextualised social network methodology is applied to the study of identity 
alteration processes in employee owned and controlled organisations. In order to 
ensure access to those aspects of network relations that exist beyond the surface 
observable event, a qualitative participative method was adopted. 
In case study one, NurseryCo -a small childcare ESOP conversion - it was found 
that, while the function of the ESOPwas presented as a mechanism to secure the 
harmonisation of working relations, employee ownership and control itself gave rise 
to a number of conflicts. 
In the second case study, BusCo -a large bus transport ESOP conversion - the issues 
of harmonisation and conflict are dealt with through the examination of the collective 
identity transformations of the management and union collective bargaining groups. 
It was found that, in addition to the continuation of established conflicts, new areas of 
conflict had been introduced into the collective bargaining process through the added 
dimension of the ESOP social networks. 
The evidence from the case studies demonstrates both that established conflicts 
remain unaffected by employee ownership and control and that new tensions are 
created by the conversion into ESOPs. 
iii 
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Chapter One 
Employee Participation and Attitude Change 
1. Introduction 
Employee participation as an expression is a very broad term under which a wide 
range of practices can be found. In order for any exploration of employee 
participation in the UK to capture the full picture it has to encompass terms as 
wide ranging as industrial democracy, co-operatives, Employee Share Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs), employee involvement, HRM, collective bargaining, employee 
empowerment, Profit Related Pay and Total Quality Management. There are 
however, obvious problems associated with having so many diverse definitions, 
not least that these terms are frequently used interchangeably and have different 
meanings for different disciplines and authors. 
However, employee participation can be simply broken down into two principal 
components: employee ownership and employee control. Employee ownership 
and control are linked in many literatures (and also in popular thought) to attitude 
changes at work in favour of organisational harmony. This harmonisation is 
premised upon the assumed unification of attitudes between employees and 
management. In effect, identity alterations are expected as a result of such 
organisational changes in favour of employee ownership and control. 
I 
However, before attitude alterations at work can be considered, an explanation 
and exploration of employee ownership and control measures is required. 
2 
2. Forms of Employee Ownership and Control 
The concept of employee participation in organisational. ownership and control 
can be divided into two primary categories: financial ownership and work-related 
control. 
2.1 Financial Ownership 
Financial ownership schemes take two main forms: individualised and collective 
employee ownership 
Individualised Ownership 
Individual financial ownership schemes are typified by employee share schemes, 
which involve the distribution of shares to organisational employees. While in the 
UK, the first Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) were given statutory 
approval in 1989; these ran alongside ESOPs that had been founded on a blend of 
earlier legislation and common law examples (Pendleton et al. 1995; Pendleton et 
al. 1998). 1 
The ESOP, and other forms of employee share ownership schemes, constitute an 
I Numerous studies have been conducted in the USA on the effects of financial 
ownership, particularly ownership via the ESOP system. The spread of the UK 
ESOP movement, with an estimated 100 approved schemes (Pendleton et al, 1995), 
is in marked contrast to the USA, where upwards of 10,000 schemes are estimated to be in operation, covering more than ten million employees (Allen et al, 1991; Hyman 
and Mason, 1995: 109-112). 
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individualised approach to employee ownership, where ownership is held and can 
be disposed of individually and is not the property, or under the control, of a 
collective body. In addition, there is no minimum level of employee ownership 
under the ESOP form, and ESOPs in the UK have varied from 100% employee 
ownership to largely insignificant levels of worker ownership (Pendleton, 1995). 
Collective Ownership 
The second financial ownership approach is collective ownership. Possibly the 
most obvious example of traditional collective employee ownership is the co- 
operative, where participation includes both ownership and control elements. 
Here, ownership is held by the collective for the collective and can only be 
disposed of by the collective. For this definitional reason, organisations with 
100% employee share ownership cannot be said to be collectively owned. Of 
these firms, the ESOP most closely approximates the co-operative with its 
emphasis on employee ownership. However, unlike the co-operative the ESOP 
form does not guarantee collective employee ownership because ownership is 
atomised, i. e. held individually. 
2.2 Work-Related Control 
Employee control can be either individual-unitarist or collective-pluralist. Within 
either category, work-related control is also apparent as direct (i. e. face-to-face) or 
indirect (i. e. via a representative) employee participation. 
4 
Collective Control 
Collective control can be apparent in organisations either with or without 
collective ownership. It can be defined as the collective ability of organisational 
employees to control elements of their working lives. Unlike most other forms of 
collective control, co-operatives, due to the small size of the majority of co- 
operatives in the UK (an average of fewer than 10 workers) tend to use a direct 
fonn of collective participation, where each individual has direct access and input 
to decision-making. However, cooperative employment accounts for a relatively 
small proportion of the UK labour force and consequently the bulk of the 
literature on collective control deals with the more conventionally organised and 
owned firms which have employee control measures. 
In addition, due to the small number of workers employed in cooperative forms of 
collective ownership and control, indirect collective participation is the principal 
collective control form in the UK. Indirect collective control is associated with 
representative democracy - where only a small percentage of the workforce have 
direct access and input into organisational decision-making. For the majority of 
employees their access to decision-making is therefore indirect, via their 
representatives. Collective bargaining, for instance, covers 45 per cent of 
enterprises in the UK (WERS, 1998). It permits a level of control over 
organisational decision-making via an elected representative or full-time official, 
usually as part of a trade union network. Other forms of indirect collective 
participation include social partnership agreements with trade unions, works 
councils, co-determination agreements, the appointment of worker directors, and 
joint consultation committees. 
5 
By and large the labour relations literature focuses on these indirect forms of 
collective control, with an emphasis on large, unionised institutions, and the 
'them-us' psychology of collective bargaining. There is a noticeable lack of 
analysis of direct collective control measures - and most attempts at analysis of 
direct collective control are confined to the specialist cooperative literature. When 
work-related control is considered, it is often therefore done through the 
framework of industrial relations. While this is an appropriate literature for 
oppositional bargaining under conventional ownership conditions, it is 
inappropriate on its own for organisations with worker ownership rights. 
The literature assumes a number of aspects about the work situation that are not 
pertinent to employee ownership, either in its collective or individualised forms. 
Firstly, Hyman (1975) defines industrial relations as "the process of control over 
work relations" (cited in Hartley, 1992: 9), and in a similar vein, Keenoy's 
definition encompasses "the administration and control of employment relations" 
(1992: 21). Further definitions of the same sort can easily be found (for example 
Walker, 1979; Hartley, 1992), describing collective control but not, employee 
ownership. Secondly, much that is published in the industrial relations literature is 
based on the assumption that the employee enters into a contractual relationship 
with an employer who is socially separate, whereas in employee-owned 
organisations the employer and employee are in effect one and the same, that is a 
contractual relationship with oneself. 
The industrial relations literature also assumes that labour relations are principally 
concerned with interactions between opposing groups within the workplace. 
6 
However, employee ownership means that employees represent (to varying 
degrees) both labour and capital, and therefore the theoretical basis for 
oppositional relations is removed. It would appear, therefore that the traditional 
labour relations model sits uneasily with employee ownership models. 
Individualised Control 
Individualised control comprises those 'new' forms of participation, which come 
under and have tended to grow out of the management strategy known as Human 
Resource Management (HRM). These new forms of employee control comprise 
more direct (such as briefings groups) and individualised (e. g. attitude surveys or 
suggestion schemes) forms of employee work-related control. Most of these 
fonns are conflated in the literature into the terrns employee involvement or 
employee empowerment. These participation measures may seek to bypass 
traditional collective control mechanisms, such as trade unions, to run parallel 
with them, or operate as a route giving access to employee voice where unions are 
not present. One such alternative to collective bargaining offered by the literature 
is 'Japanese-style' management and production techniques, which are typified by 
low levels of unionisation, low levels of apparent conflict and relatively high 
levels of individualised worker participation in local (i. e. work station) decision- 
making. 2 
' Labour relations of tMs form are purported to lead to increased employee and 
organisational flexibility. 'Merefore 'Japanese-style' employment relations "flies in the face of efforts to formalise, stabilise and bureaucratise employment relations" (Hardey, 1992: 6) and as such is distinct from the more structured and collective 
traditional collective bargaining. 
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2.3 Degree of Work-Related Control 
In addition to the forms of work-related control outlined above, employee control 
exhibits varying levels of influence. Employee participation in conventionally 
owned and organised firms can vary from task-related (i. e. at the workstation) to 
strategic level (i. e. at board or corporate level), and the degree of control at either 
of these levels also varies greatly from information sharing, through consultation 
to negotiation. 
High-Degree Influence 
High degrees of employee control occur when employees, either directly or 
indirectly, acquire significant control at strategic decision-making level. To 
qualify as high-level control, this input into organisational decision-making must 
be more than merely consultative, employees must be able to actively control 
strategic organisational decisions. In some cases this is commensurate with 
employee ownership -a cooperative for instance may exhibit high levels of 
employee control over decision-making at strategic levels. However, a 3% ESOP 
for instance would not be able to have significant, input into organisational 
decision-making through the share ownership route alone. 
Studies of the ESOP form in the USA have demonstrated that in this context there 
is little effective high-level work-related control in these firms (D'Art, 1992) and 
little evidence for "strong and statistically significant effects of employee 
ownership on performance" (Blasi et al, 1996: 63). This could be because the 
8 
most notable purpose for USA ESOPs is as retirement plans rather than as means 
to involve employees. 3 
Therefore, employee ownership does not automatically qualify an organisation as 
having high-level employee control. However, employees may possess high-level 
decision-making rights without ownership - for example through worker directors 
or collective bargaining processes, or via externally enforced strategic-level 
employee control, e. g. co-detennination legislation. 
Low-Degree Influence 
Low-degrees of employee influence occur where workers possess decision- 
making rights, but where these rights are operated at a low level,, e. g. the right to 
take task-related decisions only without input into strategic organisational 
decision-making. Alternatively, low-level control occurs where input into 
strategic decision-making is merely consultative with no active control 
mechanisms. 
Low level influence can also be expressed where organisational influence runs 
only in one direction. Where influence runs from the top down (e. g. through 
briefing meetings), then employees have no opportunity or right to have active 
input into managerial decisions. One-way communication from the bottom up, for 
example through suggestion schemes or attitude surveys, can also qualify as low- 
level if there is no compulsion for management to act on these employee 
suggestions or survey results. 
'Hanford and Grasso, 199 1. 
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2.4 Socio-Political Context 
These different models of employee ownership and control have tended to reflect 
the political and economic climate in which they are situated (Ramsay, 1977). 
I The first significant appearance of employee ownership and control on the UK 
political agenda was the 1977 Bullock Report, shortly followed by the then Labour 
Gownunent's 1978 White Paper on Industrial Democracy. Both papers 
emphasised high-level, indirect collective and representative forms of employee 
control; the Bullock Report suggested the introduction of worker directors and 
emphasised the "essential role of trade union organisations in the process of 
industrial democracy". However the CBI and TUC failed to agree over the 
contents of the report (Cressey at al, 1981: 2) and a year later the Industrial 
Democracy White Paper, while stressing the role of employee involvement in "the 
development of corporate strategy" (67), glossed over the role of collective 
bargaining. 
Deregulation and Privatisation 
With the arrival of a Conservative Government in 1979, policies took a different 
turn, from collective to individualised participation, with deregulation and 
privatisation under successive Conservative administrations (1979-1997) 
significantly altering the industrial relations climate in the UK. The political 
i 
philosophy of 'market liberalisation' provided the agenda for deregulation of the 
labour market accompanied by the privatisation of many state-controlled 
10 
industries. 4 As a result of these policies, major changes were experienced in the 
forms and levels of employee ownership and control. Employee ownership and 
control became focused on individualised and direct ownership schemes with no 
guarantee of high-level control. This occurred particularly through individual 
shareholding, which was helped along by the momentum of privatisations during 
the 1980s and by governmental tax incentive support. A substantial component of 
the political agenda of 'market liberalism' therefore involved the encouragement 
of individual employee share ownership in order to facilitate the sell-off of 
publicly owned companies. 
The Government's unenthusiastic attitude towards trade unions at this time meant 
that the traditional collective route to employee control was progressively 
weakened while management-led efforts were encouraged, especially those 
directed at task-level decision-making. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s 
there was a growth in unitarist forms of work-related participation (WERS 1998), 
most often promoted under the banner of HRM (e. g. teamwork), and the emerging 
assumption was of organisational harmony. 
However, while for many trade unions the government's neo-liberal market 
philosophy brought about significant reductions in their influence and 
I Bunkm on Businm PTI 1985) argued that regulations had seriously curtailed 
business growth. In the same year a White Paper Liftig the Burnkn (1985) facilitated 
wide scale deregulation. M4 Busixzm.. Not Barrkn (White Paper, 1986) put 
forward further proposals for deregulation. Special Deregulation Units were also 
established to monitor those regulations still in place. 
11 
membership, some local union branches embraced privatisation as a means to 
5 
securing employee control through employee ownership. 
European Union Policy 
On a wider scale than UK legislative attempts, the EU has established a long- 
standing interest in employee participation. In 1975, it published a Green Paper 
on Employee Participation in Company Structure, which emphasised that 
"decisions taken by or in the enterprise can have a substantial effect on [workers'] 
economic circumstances". More recently, in 1994 it passed a Directive, resulting 
from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, on 'The Establishment of 
European Committees or Procedures in Community-scale Undertakings and 
Community-scale Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and 
Consulting Employees', i. e., European Works Councils. However in the UK, the 
growth in individualised ownership and control was used by successive 
Conservative administrations, opposed to the European Union's Social Chapter, 
as a buffer against the external imposition of collective forms of employee 
control, such as the European Works Councils. 
5 NUM at Tower Coffiery and TGWU throughout the bus industry. 
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3. Harmonisation of Industrial Relations: Theory and Evidence 
a 
While there may appear to be numerous different and often competing rationales 
cited in the literature for the introduction of employee participation, the common 
theme is one of greater organisational harmony. This may either be in the 
direction of greater worker association with the goals of management - the 
economic rationale - or with greater management association with the ideals of 
employees - the social rationale. 
3.1 Economic Rationale 
The economic rationale for the introduction of employee ownership and control is 
based on the assumption that workers will be willing to work harder and better 
than before as a result of the greater organisational. commitment generated by 
alterations in organisational structure and operation. Financial ownership for 
instance promises to remove or obscure the boundaries between employer and 
employee by offering workers a stake in the firm (Creigh et al, 1981). Employee 
share ownership, and a stake in company profitability (profit-related pay) are 
claimed to produce feelings of ownership (Pendleton et al, 1998) amongst 
workers 6_ and this is purported to lead to positive employee orientations towards 
work alongside high levels of commitment. In this way, shareholder status is 
believed to positively influence the attitudes and behaviours of individual 
employees towards the organisation (Bradley and Nejad, 1989), while at the same 
'Achieving this without either 100% or collective employee ownership. 
13 
time loosening collectivist ties, thus generating a swing from a collective 
identification with worker organisations to a more individualised work identity 
orientated towards the enterprise. The claim by Fernie and Metcalf (1995) that 
union presence adversely effects productivity represents this view of 
individualised participative measures as a means to increase worker identification 
with the organisation and thus improve productivity. One such example of 
individualised participation is Japanese-style management, which is often 
presented as an alternative to adversarial collective bargaining. This form of 
employee involvement is purported to lead to increased levels of functional 
flexibility (Cressey and Williarns, 1990). However, many observers challenge this 
view. 
Work-related control on the other hand is alleged to alter employee attitudes 
through increased involvement in organisational decision-making and, through 
this means, to align employee values with management goals. Decision-making 
participation may enhance employee-employer co-operation through team- 
working, communication (Levine, 1995) and other "supportive human resource 
polices" (Blasi et al, 1996: 67). It is frequently assumed in the literature that the 
informational effects of participative forms of work organisation lead not only to 
more worker participation in organisational decision-making, but as a 
consequence to greater job satisfaction and employee motivation, which 
7 engenders a harmonious labour relations climate. In further support of this 
argument, Cressey and Williams' study (1990) of the effects of participation on 
the acceptance of organisational change found that while 25 per cent of employee 
7 Oakshott, 1978; Cressey and Williams, 1990; Bradley and Gelb, 1983; norrley, 198 1. 
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representatives thought organisational relations had improved, only 4 per cent 
believed that industrial relations had worsened. When the opinion of management 
was calculated only 1 per cent thought relations had deteriorated compared to 27 
per cent who were of the opinion that they had improved. However, the literature 
is not specific about thresholds for degrees of employee control or whether 
different levels and types of employee control influence this result. 
Employee ownership and control is claimed to result in organisational benefits of 
greater worker flexibility (associated with organisational practices of removal of 
demarcation and of multiskilling) and improved quality and quantity of output. 
The incorporation of employees into organisational decision-making is also 
associated with benefits generated by opportimities to harness workers' 
knowledge - based on the assumption that through employee ownership and 
control workers will be willing to share this information openly with management. 
Workers are assumed to know the most efficient way of organising their work, 
resulting in maximum productivity (Cooke, 1994) and thus management benefits 
from the addition of "valuable information about work tasks" (Bryson and 
Millward, 1997: 29) and the ability to access worker talents in decision-making 
(Jones, 1987). The sum of these changes in employee orientation is perceived as 
an improvement in employee productivity and flexibility, and thus in company 
perforinance. 8 
While the literature provides ample evidence of the successful use of employee 
' Kersley and Metcalf, 1997; Keller, 1995; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Mahoney and 
Watson, 1993. 
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ownership and control in efforts to improve overall company performance, ' it is 
the means by which participation influences company performance that provides 
the crucial explanatory factor. The association has been made, based on specific 
evidence, that participation alters employee attitudes to work and to 
management. 10 Thus, employee association with management values is brought 
about alongside employee self-motivation to work towards achieving these goals. 
As the economic rationale assumes that participation will induce attitudinal and 
behavioural. changes in employees, thus increasing their association with 
management values and goals, this literature is making an association between 
attitudinal changes in favour of management goals and increased worker 
motivation to achieve these goals. However, as the focus of these studies is 
changes to employee attitudes and behaviours, the attitudes and identities of 
management are unremarked and thus may well remain unaltered. Ramsay et al 
(1998) maintain in support of this thesis, that employee participation, and the 
consequential changes in employee behaviour, are based on the growing emphasis 
placed on customer service. This, 
"requires employee internalisation of a management-designed 
culture of commitment if it is not to be based on exhausting and 
expensive supervision" (Ramsay et al, 1998: 3). 
9 Bryson and MiUward, 1997; Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993; Cohen and 
Quarrey, 1986; Cotton, 1993; Defoumey, Estrin and Jones, 1985; Estrin, Jones and 
Svejnar, 1987; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Jones, 1987; Levine and Tyson, 1990. " Cooke, 1994; Estrin et al, 1987; Guest et al, 1993; Mowday et al, 1982; Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1995; Kruse and Blasi, 1995; Long, 1978; Ohver, 1984. 
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Apart from the indirect effects of employee attitude change on organisational 
value added, there is also evidence that both financial and work-related 
participation, through improvcmcnts in employce satisfaction and organisational 
harmony, can reduce organisational. costs directly by deterring or delaying quits 
from the company and by lowering absenteeism rates. Wilson and Peel (1990) for 
example found that share schemes were associated with reduced labour turnover. 
Such a decrease in labour turnover reduces recruitment and training costs for the 
organisation (Kessler and Purcell, 1992) and cost savings also result from 
reductions in absenteeism rates. Furthermore, a more harmonious labour relations 
climate is also claimed to reduce the costs to the company of industrial 
disagreements and to permit the swifter acceptance and implementation of 
organisational change (Schein, 1985). 
Management can therefore be seen to have a compelling economic rationale for 
the introduction of fonns of employee ownership and control into the workplace. 
It appears favourably to alter employee attitudes towards achieving management- 
set goals while at the same time leaving the management function and ideology 
unchallenged. However, the clarity of the claims for improved economic 
performance and a contented workforce is somewhat obscured by the lack of 
precision in this literature over which forms and measures of employee ownership 
and control are being implemented. " 
" Such as collective or individual, direct or indirect, and high or low-level. 
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3.2 Social Rationale 
11 
Not all employee ownership and control initiatives have economic goals as their 
sole or primary focus; it is clear that certain managers and employers introduce 
participation in order also to improve working conditions (Osterman, 1994), while 
the rare few are willing to hand ownership and control of their finns to the 
workforce. 12 
It follows that the social needs of employees, as expressed in ownership rights, 
democratic processes and quality of working life debates, represent an end in 
itself Employee ownership and control therefore promises to improve the quality 
of the work experience for all organisational. members - management and workers 
- for example through improved job security and job satisfaction. In this respect, 
it is not only attitude change in employees that is anticipated, it is attitude and 
identity alterations at all organisational levels. 
Unlike the economic rationale for introducing employee ownership and control, 
socially focused efforts centre on the democratic and equal opportunities (between 
workers, and between workers and management) basis for participation. In 
contrast to many of the economically inspired attempts at employee ownership 
and control, a large number of the socially motivated participation schemes have 
been generated by and have relied on union support (for example social 
partnership arrangements and also employee buy-outs). These forms of 
participation are often the result of bargained outcomes between the main interest 
For example the Scott Bader Commonwealth and Tullis Russell paper mills. 
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groups and therefore predictably combine the social with the economic rationale. 
Employee-led buyouts in the UK in their most recent form have for the most part 
been established as ESOPs, the majority of which in recent decades have been the 
result of the privatisation of the bus industry (Pendleton, 1995). Union 
involvement in 'new' forms of participation, without ownership, tends to fall into 
the category of social partnership arrangements. However, for schemes with a 
social rationale to succeed, attitude changes are crucial among all levels of 
management, as well as among workers and their representatives. 
3.3 Summary 
While the economic rationale for employee ownership and control concentrates 
exclusively on changing employee attitudes to management-set goals, the social 
rationale equates ownership and control rights with equal opportunities at work, 
since management and employees have the same status as owners and decision- 
makers. Therefore management attitude change is a crucial assumption under the 
social rationale for employee ownership and control. This management identity 
change is implicitly assumed to increase harmony within the organisation as 
workers and management will share a common organisational identity. 
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4. Disharmony: Theories and Evidence 
It is frequently assumed in the literature that employee ownership and control 
leads not only to greater job satisfaction and motivation, but as a consequence 
engenders a harmonious labour relations climate. 13 However, analytic evidence 
has suggested that these poplar assumptions are over simplistic 14 and that conflict 
is apparent in employee owned and controlled organisations. Despite the 
theoretical and empirical claims for improved organisational harmony with 
employee ownership and control, a body of literature claims that participation 
actually increases the level of disharmony within organisations. 15 
While participation may be used to build on and improve existing employment 
relations to the benefit of both parties (e. g. social partnership programmes) there is 
some evidence that certain types of employee ownership and control schemes and 
the way they are implemented can produce or increase worker dissatisfaction. In 
fact, evidence suggests that there is no necessary causal connection between 
participation and changes to industrial relations climates. If this is in fact the case, 
then the causal assumption found in much of the literature - that participation 
induces a more harmonious labour relations climate - is called into serious doubt. 
This indicates that some form of labour regulation is likely to be practiced in 
employee owned and controlled organisations, even if its purpose is simply to 
maintain and promote this mythical harmony. 
" Oakshott, 1978 &1990; Cressey&VAHanis, 1990; Bradley& Gelb, 1983; 
Thomley, 198 1; PA Management Consultants, 1985. 
14 Bell, 1979; Paton, 1989; Comforth, Thomas, Lewis & Spear, 1988. 
15 Gamson and Levin, 1984; Mellor et al, 1988; Tynan, 1980; Forsyth, 199o. 
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4.1 Conflict in Employee Owned and Controlled Organisations 
The literature supplies an impressive body of work that has found no association, 
or even a negative association, between participation and company performance, 16 
suggesting that changes to employee behaviours were not in the direction 
anticipated. Even some of the literature endorsing participation as a means to 
improved employee performance offers qualified support. For example, Estrin et 
al (1987) found that the productivity effects of participation varied between 
industrial sectors. VAiile they found that participation had an overall positive 
economic effect, the effect was not significant for the footwear industry and only 
slight for the clothing sector. This variation in outcome also seems to depend 
somewhat on the type of participation investigated. Defourney et al (1985) found 
that the productivity enhancement results of co-operation were strongest in 
converted firms and less so in organisations founded as co-operatives. This may 
suggest that the relative increase in employee ownership and control is an 
important explanatory factor and therefore, length of time since the establishment 
of employee ownership and control should be considered when analysing 
evidence. However, Doucouliagos (1995), who also found different outcomes for 
different forms of participation, found that labour-managed firms demonstrated a 
(small) rise in productivity, whereas participation had no discernible effect on 
productivity in 'participatory capitalist firms'. This suggests that, in addition, the 
absolute degree of employee control and ownership explains some of the 
economic successes and failures of participation schemes. 
16 Kelly and Kelly, 1991; Kochan et al, 1984; juravich et al, 1993; jones, 1987; 
Loveridge, 1980; Bartlett, 1994; Ben-Ner andjones, 1995; Lucas, 1995. 
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Such unexpected outcomes of employee ownership and control have been 
investigated by Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) who suggest that employee control 
without financial rewards for workers could mean that employees do not take care 
when taking decisions, which could therefore adversely affect company 
perfonnance. Jones (1987) and Defourney et al (1985) agree that worker 
involvement in decision-making could result in poorer decisions, but suggest this 
is because workers are assumed to be less skilled or competent in this task. 
However, this argument is flawed since the competencies of workers are not 
necessarily the issue, as it may simply be that the employee does not understand 
or agree with management's goals. 
There is also the contention that where employees have decision-making rights 
their decisions will be income-maximising and not profit-oriented (Bartlett, 1994), 
though Bonin et al (1993) consider this view over simplistic. Ben-Ner and Jones 
(1995), (supporting the social rationale) contend that where workers have control 
rights but no financial return rights, they will seek to improve working conditions. 
This, Ben-Ner and Jones assume,, will adversely affect company efficiency. 
Furthermore, employee involvement in decision-making may increase the amount 
of time decision-making takes, thus disadvantaging firms in highly competitive 
markets (Loveridge, 1980). Jones (1987) takes a different tack and warns that 
with externally enforced strategic-level employee control, e. g. legislation for co- 
determination, managers may reduce their input and effort in decision-making, 
resulting in poorer company performance. However, Jones goes on to add that 
worker involvement in and acceptance of decisions can reduce implementation 
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problems, therefore lowering costs (through improved organisational harmony) 
and improving adaptability. 
Claims have also been made for negative effects of individual financial 
participation schemes, such as all-employee share schemes. Managers may feel 
less incentive to supervise, if they feel that they are not receiving the full 
remunerative benefits of this activity; 17 unless employees co-operate, there may be 
individual tendency to shirk as all employees receive an equal proportion of gain 
irrespective of individual contribution. 18 
Hartley (1992: 302) makes a case for the 'problems' associated with employee 
ownership and control from a traditional labour relations standpoint. She 
maintains that employees would be unwilling to "take orders", "make hard 
decisions" or "discipline colleagues", in employee owned and controlled 
enterprises, that factionalism would develop and that "Workers will be incapable 
of managing themselves". However, he fails to consider that the employment 
relationship within employee owned and controlled organisations is not 
necessarily one of superior-subordinate and that such organisations may have a 
radically different distribution of power to conventional firms and therefore a 
different system of relations, controls and exchange. 
" Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Blasi et al 1996: 63. 
" The Chief Financial Officer for Microsoft has identified some negative effects of 
share ownership through the acknowledgement that a fall in share price would make 
it much harder to recruit the "bright young graduates", as share options form a 
significant proportion of IvIicrosofts benefits package (Hyman and Summers, 1998, ). 
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As a consequence of their different organisational structures, Keenoy (1992: 106) 
concludes that within collectively owned enterprises (cooperatives) "the 
management process is a veritable minefield ... with no clear-cut 
lines of 
authority", therefore still persisting in using a traditional labour relations 
framework for the analysis. However, Keenoy does make an interesting point 
when he maintains that the 'them-us' attitudes often "carry over from previous 
work socialisation" (1992: 107), Therefore adversarial relations, established 
suspicions and mistrust can remain intact, while the resolution of problems may 
be hindered by a lack of appropriate structures. 
Within the specialist cooperatives literature, Paton (1978) outlines a number of 
issues associated with employment relations within collectively owned and 
controlled organisations. Allowing members to "raise any question in meetings" 
will mean that labour relations are "closer to the practice of collective bargaining" 
(28) in that they become confrontational. However, rather than the group 
solidarity traditionally expected, "employees' concerns are promoted in a 
I fragmented and negative way" with the result that "it may appear to employees 
that they are listened to, lectured and then ignored" (28). In addition, this system 
of decision-making does not pen-nit employee competence and confidence to grow 
and, as a premium is put on oratory and social skills and access to information, 
"managers almost always 'win the argument... (1978: 28). Paton also maintains 
that conflict may be amplified in cooperatives due to employee expectations of 
influence, the entitlement to question decisions which elsewhere would be 
accepted without comment, the multiple objectives of cooperatives and the close 
identification of members with the cooperative. These characteristics aggregate to 
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make grievances more personal. Thus cooperatives "take the lid off many areas of 
potential disagreement" (1978: 48). However, Paton also offers no empirical 
support for these conclusions. In conclusion, Paton states that the productive 
expression of conflict is lacking within cooperatives, therefore implying that there 
is no system of labour relations which can resolve conflict within collectively 
owned organisations. While other authors also acknowledge that cooperatives are 
likely to posses a different employment relations structure to conventionally 
owned firms (Bell, 1979; Comforth et al, 1988; Paton, 1989; Oakshott, 1990, 
Hartley, 1992) they do not demonstrate what this alternative form of relations is or 
how it works. A gap in the literature can therefore be identified concerning the 
type and functioning of labour relations within collectively owned and controlled 
organisations. 
Conflict -between employees and between employee groups is also often 
overlooked in the literature (Ramsay et al, 1998; McNabb and Whitfield, 1998). 
Part of the reason for this is the unquestioned assumption that employees are by 
and large a homogenous group with similar interests, responses and behaviours. 
Scarce attention has been given to the problems encountered by teams or groups 
working together, particularly the problems participation schemes can introduce. 
For example, where a workgroup has been informally established, a participation 
scheme may alter the team makeup and its internal dynamics by dictating who 
belongs to the group and their role within it (Ramsay et al, 1998). Therefore 
demployee empowerment' measures can actually reduce employee autonomy and 
efficiency and increase discontent, thereby decreasing workers' propensity to co- 
operate with management and their projects. 
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This literature therefore argues for both greater debate and unresolved dissent in 
worker-owned companies, relative to conventionally owned firms, due to the 
increased freedom of expression and participation in decision-making. However, 
as Gamson and Levin (1984) point out, "such conflict is actually an integral part 
of the democratic decision-making process" (cited in Mellor et al, 1988: 115). 
4.2 Investigation of Disharmony 
One explanation for these results, which run contrary to theoretical expectation, is 
that employee ownership and control schemes may be introduced as part of 
restructuring packages. When employees are faced with an insecure environment, 
participation may induce employee compliance and not the attitude changes 
necessary for employee commitment to the enterprise. If this is the case, 
behavioural changes may not be of the order anticipated. Furthermore, there are 
indications that when schemes are externally generated and required of 
organisations by legislation, results are unpredictable. Jones' (1987) finding, that 
externally enforced co-determination had a negative effect on productivity, 
provides evidence that coerced participation may not be an effective lever for 
organisational attitude or value change. 
A further explanatory aspect is the degree of influence afforded to employees 
under different participation schemes. The literature clearly indicates that the 
introduction of some forms of employee control can adversely affect company 
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performance, thus indicating that while the schemes may be successful in securing 
behavioural. changes in employees, this is not in the direction predicted by theory - 
where the hannonisation of relations is expected to increase worker effort and 
commitment. Where employee performance worsens, harmonisation is therefore 
either absent or is not influencing employee behaviour in the manner expected. 
Part of the explanation for this is the level of control offered to employees: 
whether this involves consultation or decision-making rights, and at what level 
this operates, board or work station. 
Low-Degree Influence 
Low degrees of employee control with little employee autonomy have been 
identified as reasons for such unexpected participation outcomes. This has been 
observed in some organisations, where after an initial 'honeymoon' period the 
workforce has expressed more dissatisfaction (and thus less harmony at work) 
than before the introduction of employee control measures, due to the raised and 
unmet expectations of employee influence (Kruse and Blasi, 1995). The scope of 
employee control schemes may be so limited as to simply frustrate the workforce, 
I thus failing to meet their expectations. Where control is only in one direction, i. e. 
from the top down, workers may feel that their views are not being considered or 
p 
given any weight. Therefore, while increased communication within the 
organisation is evident, this may be accompanied by increased hostility towards 
management. A workforce may also feel resentful about the amount of time, 
effort and increased responsibility involved in a participation scheme, 19 especially 
if they see little return from management. Where one-way communication is from 
" Bryson and MiRward, 1997; McNabb and VAiitfield, 1998. 
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the bottom up, through suggestion schemes for example, workers may then feel 
that management is using their suggestions with no rewards seen by employees. 
Overall disillusionment within the workforce (and within management) could 
therefore rebound on management plans. In other circumstances, where schemes 
have beeii introduced without prior worker consideration, resentment may be the 
over-riding attitudinal change, not contentment. 
Sisson and Frohlich's (1998) results support the thesis that low-degree influence is 
unlikely to effect behaviour changes. In this analysis of the Employee 
Participation in Organisational Change (EPOC) survey, 20 they found that where 
employees were expected to take on more autonomy and responsibility without 
any increases in employee influence, then participation had no significant 
organisational impact. They also found that the effects of participation on 
increases in output were strongest where employee participation involved a high 
dcgrcc of influcnce. Of particular intcrcst is thcir conclusion that tcamwork only 
has a significant effect when associated with high degrees of employee influence. 
One possible explanation for these discrepancies can be gleaned from views from 
the shop floor, which suggest that low-level employee control schemes have had 
little effect on communications between employees and management. Paterson et 
al's 1996 study found that employees felt that within employee ownership and 
control schemes, while management placed emphasis on quality goods and 
services, little emphasis was placed on participation and communication with 
" European survey of employee participation co-ordinated by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Worldng Conditions, Dublin. 
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employees. Ackroyd and Procter (1998) support this view of the UK situation 
with their contention that in fact very little has actually changed in employee 
relations. They find that employee relations have not moved towards 'softer' 
measures, such as communications and employee motivation, but have moved 
towards 'harder' measures (labour regulation). This hypothesis is supported by 
the WERS98 findings: employees were less likely to report improvements in 
communications with management than their managers were. This suggests that 
the role of the trade unions remains significant (Krieger and O'Kelly, 1998). 
High-Degree Influence 
Where employee control occurs at strategic decision-making level, and is more 
than merely consultative, many of the problems associated with low-degree 
influence forms of participation are bypassed. However, other problems may 
appear in these circumstances, such as those outlined by Hartley (1992: 302) who 
maintains that employees will be unwilling to take orders from managers because 
employee views hold as much weight in the decision-making process. Where 
I- there 
is a significant element of employee ownership a manager cannot, and has 
no authority to, demand that an employee-owner performs certain tasks. 
Individualised Ownership andlor Control 
However, the contention that participation may amplify conflict also depends on 
the type of ownership and control process used, individual-unitarist or collective- 
pluralist. Where employee ownership and control is introduced to promote 
employee acceptance of management's values, and in doing so attempts to bypass 
both alternative value systems and traditional collective grievance expression 
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mechanisms, such as trade unions, the productive and organised expression of 
dissatisfaction and conflict can be weakened or removed. Individualisation of 
relations can, furthermore, result "in the feeling that communication would now 
be impossible" with the "loss of a common cause" (Thelen, 1970: 5). Thelen's 
study of a Chicago community housing group found that as the collective 
fragmented and members became more individualistic they became "more and 
more determined by self-concern" (1970: 7), ceased to work as a coherent group 
and had less commitment to the group. Since there were "no channels for 
constructive action to relieve frustration" (1970: 7), the isolation of many members 
was expressed in the rise in gossip, nunours, dishonesty and corruption. 
Therefore, an employee ownership and/or control programme which aims to 
promote the individual nature of the employment relationship, perhaps with the 
intention to displace collective relations, may find itself faced with a dissatisfied 
and uncooperative workforce, resulting in a lack of organisational. harmony and an 
enviromnent of increased suspicion. 
Alternatively, where an organisation has introduced employee ownership and 
control, even where no overt hostility was previously expressed, the very 
introduction of the scheme may encourage employees to question management 
decisions over their working lives which otherwise would have been accepted 
without overt conflict (Paton, 1978). The possibilities of raising grievances within 
meetings may also result in more personally directed disagreements as grievances 
can now be directed at an individual rather than at an impersonal organisation. 
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Collective Ownership andlor Control 
Even when considering the most formally collective (and high-level) form of 
employee ownership and control, the co-operative firm, unharmonious employee 
relations have been reported. While collective participation is expected to 
facilitate the open acceptance of both employee and management values, Paton 
(1978) reminds us that collective direct participation, in contrast to the collective 
representative participation practiced by trade unions, can also approximate 
adversarial relations in its outcomes. The freedom granted by collective 
ownership and control itself becomes the mechanism that facilitates and generates 
confrontational relations, resulting in factionalism rather than the expected 
unification of values and attitudes. 
Other authors have associated conflict within collectively owned and controlled 
organisation with their ultimate demise. 21 This raises questions about causality, 
and whether forms of employee ownership and control may lead to the dissolution 
of the firm, or whether organisations that introduce employee ownership and 
control would have closed down without any alterations to ownership and control 
structures. Part of the grounds for this debate lie in the various reasons why 
employee ownership and control schemes are established. For some firms, 
employee ownership is the last option in the face of plant closure; in these 
situations the firm may be terminally unprofitable and employee ownership 
inconsequential for its ultimate closure. 22 
Emerson, 1982, Rhoades, 1984. 
Benn Cooperatives, (Eccles, 1981). 
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Employee Ownership and Control in SMEs 
Yet another mediating factor in the application and effects of employee ownership 
and control is the size of the organisation. Relatively little is known about 
participation in the SME sector beyond what has been published on co-operatives. 
Therefore, little is known about individually owned yet collectively controlled 
SMEs. Many of the more recent surveys and studies fail to differentiate between 
large and small organisations. However, Bryson and Millward (1997) discovered 
that participation is "less prevalent in small firms ... than in larger firms" 
(1997: 8). A major survey which has looked into the state of participation in small 
and large firms, WERS98, indicates that while only 8 per cent of small firms had 
not introduced any new management or employee involvement measures, less 
than 30 per cent were using five or more of these schemes compared with well 
over half of the larger firms. 
Informal Relations at Work 
The success of participation measures has also been related to workplace cultures 
(Gallie and White, 1993; Geary, 1993), which can either counteract participation 
measures (Chelte et al, 1989) or support them. Ramsay et al (1998), for example, 
found that management style and personality were important determinants of 
participation success. This suggests that management attitudinal change is a 
crucial determinant of successful harmonisation of organisational relations 
through employee ownership and control. Commitment to and administration of 
participation schemes (Cooke, 1992) are therefore significant elements and can 
differ between -enterprises, between workplaces within an enterprise, between 
departments within a workplace and between work (or union) groups. While an 
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analysis of conflict (and procedures for conflict resolution) within cooperatives is 
provided by Comforth et al (1988) and Mansbridge (1980), both studies limit their 
examination to formal procedures (such as grievance procedures, the operation of 
meetings and trade union involvement) and consequently overlook the informal 
procedures involved in employment relations. Even specialist cooperatives' 
handbooks gloss over the informal employee relations issue. While Berry & 
Roberts (1984) address "personal relations" and the need to resolve antagonisms 
between members, the only advice they offer on informal employee relations is 
that "it is best to avoid becoming sexually or emotionally involved with other co- 
op members if possible" (1984: 24). 
Employee Heterogeneity 
Finally, there is a notable misconception in a large part of this literature on 
employee participation - the assumption that 'employees' are a homogenous 
group. The common oversight is to presume that all employees will respond to 
participation initiatives in the same way, but as Tynan and Thomas state "class, 
power and skills ... to a great extent determine the response of workers to the 
workplace" (1981: 10). Oliver (1990) has also pointed out that employees have 
different motivations (and vested interests differ between different employee 
groups); some may respond to the employee control aspects of participation, while 
others respond more to financial rewards. McNabb and Whitfield (1998) found 
that employee involvement schemes could have a negative effect on company 
economic performance "when introduced in isolation" (1998: 171) from financial 
participation measures. They go on to add that the benefits claimed for financial 
participation alone are however often "reflecting the effects of other participation 
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factors" (1998: 172). As a result of employee differences, various forms of 
participation are likely to affect individual employees differently. The 
combination effect of participation measures is replicated in a number of other 
studies. 23 Bryson and Millward's (1997) study of employee involvement in small 
firms for example, found that a combination of profit-sharing and direct employee 
involvement produced the greatest improvements in company performance. Ben- 
Ner and Jones (1995), on the other hand, provide conflicting evidence of the 
productivity effects of combination schemes - indicating that other factors are also 
playing a significant role in determining the outcomes of employee participation, 
and that a precise and tailored programme for each situation is probably required. 
However, much of the research on employee ownership and control has focused 
on just one form of participation, namely either financial or work-related 
participation, and the results presented above must therefore question the findings 
of much of this literature. Furthermore, without acknowledging employee 
heterogeneity, the literature can only provide "sweeping generalisations, 
unalloyed conclusions, and vacuously stirring prescriptions" (Ramsay et al, 
1998: 2) about the effects of participation. 
2' Levine and Tyson, 1990; Kochan and Ostennan, 1994; Ichniowski et al, 1994; 
FitzRoy and Kraft, 1995. 
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5. Attitude Formations 
5.1 Assumptions About Attitude Change 
The body of contradictory evidence concerning the effects and outcomes of 
employee ownership and control is hardly surprising given the lack of attention 
paid to the assumptions made about causality. In much of the literature, a linear 
causal relationship is assumed, linking participation to attitude change, and 
attitude changes to alterations in behaviour. 24 These processes are all too 
frequently shrouded in questionable assumptions about the nature of the 
workplace, workforce, and the causal effects of ownership and control 
programmes. Of particular concern are assumptions made about changes in 
employee attitudes, especially that participation induces greater employee 
association with management values, and that this will also improve industrial 
relations within the workplace. This assumption has proved to be fragile. 
There are a number of contested areas along this causal path, from participation to 
attitude change, and from attitude change to changes in employee behaviour. 
While Bryson and Millward have found that there is "little evidence" (1997: 64) 
that participation can alter attitudes and behaviour, other studies provide more 
qualified results, indicating that attitude and behavioural changes are not uniform 
and differ between forms of participation used and between different employees. 
Batt and Appelbaum (1995) for instance, found that performance enhancement 
" This is most often focused on employee attitudinal and value alterations, with very little attention paid to alterations in management attitudes or identities. 
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was predominantly associated with self-managed teams, while Ben-Ner and Jones 
(1995) discovered that financial or control rewards affected different employees 
differently; some workers exhibited a more instrumental approach to participation 
and therefore responded better to financial rewards, others responded more 
positively when they were offered extra control over their jobs, or a say in 
company decisions. Keef (1998) found that share ownership "did not result in the 
expected improvement in attitudes" (1998: 73), however it has been contended that 
the positive motivational effects attributed to share ownership will only be 
triggered by 'significant' shareholdings (Hyman, 1998). Pendleton (1998) agrees 
that when the level of ownership is sufficient to produce 'feelings of ownership', 
higher levels of commitment and satisfaction are observable. It is perhaps not 
surprising therefore that research indicates that, contrary to management hopes, 
employees may regard their shares as a gratuity or bonus offered to them by their 
employers (Bell and Hanson, 1987; Baddon et al, 1989), and not as sufficient to 
create feelings of ownership. 
Just as the literature casts doubt on the association between participation and 
attitude change, another associated misconception is that participation will in turn 
induce a more harmonious labour relations climate. Of all the assumptions made 
in the literature, the least questioned is this link between attitude change and 
behaviour change (Pendleton et al, 1998). Guest et al. (1993) have also criticised 
the frequent use of this dubious assumption in the literature. This unquestioned 
relationship may account for the contradictory results found for the effects of 
employee ownership and control on industrial relations climates within 
organisations. Pendleton et al. (1998) point out that positive attitudes towards 
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employee ownership do not necessarily equate with more positive attitudes to 
work (or therefore towards the goals of management). If the validity of this 
relationship is questioned, it then casts doubt on the link between participation, 
employee attitudes and organisational harmony. If participation may fail to 
produce attitudinal changes (of the direction and type anticipated) in employees it 
may also fail to induce behavioural. changes associated with changes to industrial 
relations climates. Moreover, Adam's (1991) study is a further example of the 
ambiguities of the association between attitudes and behaviour. This research 
indicates that the introduction of participation in the fonn of quality circles had no 
significant impact on employee attitudes towards quality, but still managed to 
affect behavioural changes resulting in improved productivity. In line with 
Adam's findings, Fernie and Metcalf (1995) present another contention that 
questions the causal link between employee ownership and control and attitude 
changes. They conclude that harmonious industrial relations do not necessarily 
lead to improved company economic performance, and demonstrate that 
participation can improve performance without engendering a harmonious 
industrial relations climate (1995: 405). This is also in line with Forsyth's 
contention that conflict is a necessary process in building group cohesion, which 
cannot occur "until intergroup hostility has surfaced, been confronted and 
resolved" (1990: 385). Participation schemes that seek to dispel all conflict may 
therefore be both unrealistic and theoretically mistaken. 
A further major and contentious assumption concerning attitude change is that 
disharmony at work only occurs between management and workers. However, a 
significant oversight concerns the degree and level of conflict between managers, 
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and between workers. For instance, the lack of success in producing attitudinal 
and behavioural. changes in middle management is often overlooked, as is the 
resulting obstacle middle management can pose to the operation of participation 
programmes. 25 
The central conundrum not addressed by this literature is therefore why, when it is 
assumed that worker owners embody both capital and labour, thus removing the 
logic for industrial conflict, conflict nevertheless continues to operate in 
employee-owned organisations. In addition, in employee-controlled organisations, 
authority and power within the organisation is equally distributed between 
representatives of capital and labour (the labour-managed firm), yet research 
indicates that conflict continues to be part of organisational experience. Issues of 
the unequal distribution of power must therefore continue to exist, but in a fashion 
not formally associated with organisational structures. However, most of the 
literature which acknowledges or examines conflict in employee owned and 
controlled finns overlooks the infonnal procedures involved in emploYinent 
relations. 
5.2 Power and Control 
Marx distinguished between two fonns of surplus value extraction in a capitalist 
society; absolute, where workers work longer hours to increase production; and 
" Fenton-OCreevy and Nicholson, 1994; Cunningham, Hyman and Balchy, 1996; Hyman and Cunninelam, 1998. 
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relative, which involves increasing labour productivity. Employee ownership and 
control seeks to act on the latter form of extraction (relative) by increasing labour 
productivity through inducing the harmonisation of attitudes and values at work. 
However in doing this, capitalism continues to create disharmony and conflict. 
For Marx this alienation arises out of the fundamental division of labour into 
owners and producers and can only be overcome by the termination of that 
division. Within this framework, worker control within conventionally organised 
enterprises can be seen as an inadequate answer to organisational conflict - it does 
not remove the underlying rationale for disharmony. Only complete worker 
ownership would ensure a different organisational climate. Organisations with 
employee control without commensurate ownership rights would therefore 
continue to exhibit organisational conflict. Weber, on the other hand, presented a 
different conception of social formations at work. His work distinguished 
between 'power', -where one actor in a relationship is able to enforce his/her will 
over others in the relationship, and 'authority', where a command is obeyed 
because the subordinate accepts the legitimacy of his/her superior. Issues of 
ownership of the means of production are not seen therefore as fundamental 
elements in the generation and resolution of conflict. Weber identified three types 
of authority: traditional, based on custom; charismatic, based on an individual's 
qualities; and rational authority, based on the belief in the right of those in 
authority. Within a worker-controlled firm, the Weberian definition of power is 
not relevant, as all members have equal political and bureaucratic rights, however 
Weber's definition of authority is applicable and can be linked to a social network 
approach to conflict generation. 
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The social generation of disharmony within organisational relations is therefore an 
important consideration. According to Galbraith (1984), control in industrial 
settings stems from "the three instruments and institutions of power; physical 
strength or the ability to inflict punishment, money or pecuniary reward, and 
persuasion or education7 (1984: 178). However, in worker-owned and controlled 
firms the unequal distribution of power normally derived from the control of 
capital and the ability to inflict punishment are equally distributed. Therefore 
socially derived abilities such as persuasive powers and education become 
significant sources of power. In the absence of ownership-based power, the 
impact of social networks on conflict and decision-making in these firms should 
also be clearer and more significant than in conventionally organised enterprises. 
To access this issue of conflict in formally equal power distribution groups it is 
necessary to turn to an examination of the group dynamics literature. French's 
work, published in 1941, into groups working on insoluble problems found that 
those groups whose members had not previously met subsequently split into 
subgroups and suffered the withdrawal of members, whereas in groups whose 
members knew each other "frustration did not produce as, much separation 
between members" (in Forsyth, 1990: 3 85) and although hostility was high the 
groups did not subdivide. Therefore the imposition of external environmental 
stresses had less of a conflictual impact on those groups who demonstrated a 
greater level of social coherence. 
Forsyth's work on group dynamics (1990) outlines three reasons for intragroup 
conflict which closely approximate Galbraith's three sources of power. First, the 
use of threatening influence strategies (i. e. the ability to punish); secondly, the 
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personal characteristics of the individuals involved (i. e. social/personal attributes); 
and finally, conflict over scarce resources (i. e. pecuniary reward). To take the 
first category, within employee owned and controlled organisations the ability to 
use formal influence strategies is removed by the existence of employees as 
owners and the dual role of each member as representative of both capital and 
labour. If the organisation is collectively owned then conflict over resources is 
also removed through equal distribution of ownership. The remaining sources of 
power are therefore derived, first, from the unequal distribution of ownership - 
which may occur in individualised employee ownership schemes - and, secondly, 
from the socially derived sources of influence of individuals or groups within the 
organisation. These socially derived sources of power may be a product of work 
histories (Keenoy 1992), where managers, for example, traditionally have greater 
influence than shop floor workers. Thus it can be hypothesised that the collective 
memory plays an important role in maintaining the status quo of organisational 
authority even once the structures which created it are removed. Alternatively, 
influence may be a product of associations outwith the organisation, such as 
membership of the local council, PTA, or union executive etc. Of whatever 
origin, these sources of influence are not directly associated with the formal 
structures of ownership and control of the organisation. 
The significantly different power sources in employee-owned and controlled firms 
therefore have important implications for the routes to and powers of leadership, 
which in turn hold strong implications for the structures and procedures of 
decision-making. Even where conflict based on unequal ownership is removed, 
Galbraith's definition of power shows that there is scope for leaders to emerge in 
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even the most formally equitable worker owned and controlled firms, based 
primarily on status and attributes gained through membership of different social 
networks. This unequal distribution of power could in theory give rise to 
frustrations, disharmony and conflict within such organisations. As a premium is 
put on oratory, social skills and command of information, the impact of social 
advantage and disadvantage (and network advantage - centrality and links, and 
disadvantage - peripheral and isolated members) may be magnified in 
participatory finns. 
However, there is little investigation or acknowledgment in the literature of any 
definite and recognisable leadership type in such organisations. While Mellor et 
al (1988) state that "cooperatives with no official figureheads can nevertheless 
find that leaders emerge to assume a disproportionate level of influence" 
(1988: 118), they fail to question how and why such leaders gain and maintain 
their positions of power - and thus the dynamics of authority and leadership are 
left unresolved. However, with no "natural focus for authority" (1988: 122), they 
assume that "unlike in a conventional business, there is unlikely to be one 
individual with ultimate authority to assume responsibility for difficult decisions 
and act as a focal point for workers' discontent" (1988: 115). Yet, using a social 
network approach to conflict within employee owned and controlled 
organisations, what is missing is therefore not simply any focus for conflict, but a 
conventional, formal and bureaucratic focus. 
Empirical evidence indicates however that in the majority of documented cases 
there have been individuals who have become focal points for discontent. 
iI 
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However, unlike a conventional firm, where an individual's position is detennined 
by their place in the formal hierarchy or bureaucratic organisation of the firm, in 
employee owned and controlled organisations positions of authority are to a much 
greater extent decided by more informal, social factors such as ability to 
communicate, ability to commit relatively more time to the enterprise, or by the 
desire for control. These attributes are largely determined by membership, or 
aspiration to membership, of social networks both, within and outwith the 
organisation. Authority in worker owned and controlled firras therefore certainly 
does exist but is produced as much socially as bureaucratically. 
Such a hypothesis is supported by the literature. For example, Tynan and Thomas 
(1981) claim that "the power of an individual within the organisation is linked to 
the wide social context in which he operates" (1981: 8) and that aspects such as 
"class, power and skills ... to a great extent determine the response of workers to 
the workplace" (1981: 10). This is illustrated in Tynan's study of a printing 
cooperative, Unit 58 (1980), where a machine operator, 'Janet Forester', claimed 
that her lack of education and working class background made her feel unable to 
participate in discussions about financial matters, such as the purchase of new 
machinery. In addition, the intellectualisation of the founders placed power in 
their hands in group meetings as their levels of education "reinforced the worker's 
feelings of inadequacy and did so publicly" (1980: 21). 
Class also played a significant role in the generation of conflict at Unit 58. The 
book-binder, Smith, for instance felt unable to participate in the planned job 
rotations as "driving the delivery van ... seemed to be beyond the call of duty for 
43 
him" (Tynan 1980: 6). Tynan also found that in another co-operative, 
Sunderlandia, hostility and class attitudes "pervaded the firm" (1980: 33) and "the 
meetings were an area in which class resources were exposed" (1980: 20). 
These early findings on exclusion are mirrored in Wichman's (1994) research on 
participation and employee status in the airline industry. She found that positive 
feelings about participation and ownership programmes varied by occupation, 
with lower level employees "either uninvolved or cynical about the programme" 
(1994: 829). The study hypothesised that higher level employees have the 
"interest and skills necessary to expand their areas of control" (1994: 830), and 
concluded that employee ownership may result in increased inequality in the 
workplace. Miller and Prichard's (1992) study supports this proposition, finding 
that employee propensity to participate was higher in younger, better educated and 
% more ambitious employees. Drago and Wooden (1991) also found that desire and 
ability to participate is influenced by promotion opportunities, job tenure, job 
security, and labour market conditions. In a similar vein, research by Baddon et al 
(1989) found that, with all-employee share schemes, manual employees were most 
likely to sell their shares and to do so quickly (Baddon et al, 1989: 206-215). The 
researchers point out that at the time of flotation, BT employees owned a mere 4.6 
per cent of shares, but by 1989 employee shareholding at BT had diminished to 
one per cent of issued equity. 
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5.3 Social Context of Disharmony 
"The internal processes of cooperatives cannot really be understood 
without reference to enviromnental factors" (Paton, 1978: 12) 
As social realities and identities are constructed through the interpretation of 
information and events, and information is assembled and comprehended through 
the mechanisms of the social networks to which people belong, when considering 
the determinants of conflict and authority in worker-owned firms it is necessary to 
look to an examination of the extemal social enviromnent. While there is 
evidence that social contacts outside of work can ameliorate organisational 
conflict, research indicates that external social forces are also signiflcant sources 
of organisational conflict. 
From a supportive external network aspect, Paton and Lockett (1978) established 
that out of work affiliations between workers in a co-operative meant that "even 
when their respective roles put them at loggerheads, they maintained cordial 
relationships, and their wives were close friends" (1978: 158). At Fakenham 
(Wajcman, 1983), as at Little Women (Tynan, 1978), efforts were made to 
accommodate the influence of familial networks, for example children were 
allowed into and looked after in the Fakenham factory, shifts were arranged 
around childcare responsibilities and women could take their machines home if 
they needed to care for a sick child. At yet another cooperative, Fairblow, 
'"activists' from different areas of the company would go to football matches 
together" and workers in the maintenance department "helped each other with 
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home improvements and the like, and arranged their own annual evening out with 
their wives" (Paton & Lockett, 1978: 15 8). Further afield it is possible to see 
regional networks at work in the building of Mondragon. The Mondragon 
phenomena only occurred in the Basque region of Spain, an area which in the 
1970s at least was severely geographically isolated, while "only 31 miles from 
Bilbao this takes a good 1 1/2 hours by car on account of the mountains, and there 
is no rail link" (Campbell et al, 1977: 48). Studies of the Mondragon complex of 
employee-owncd firms in Spain have suggested that their success is partly a result 
of their geographical and social isolation from the rest of Spain (Campbell et al, 
1977) and partly a result of the persecution of the Basque people under the Franco 
regime, both forging a strong regional identity and cohesion. 
While few studies have explored the generative effects of the wider social context 
on organisational conflict in employee owned and controlled organisations, one 
that has addressed this issue is Brown and Quarter's (1994) study of the 
propensity to participate in a conversion co-operative. The research found that 
social context was an important component of individual participation choices: 
one that "influenced employees to become owners of their workplace" 
(1994: 262). One of the prime determinants here was co-worker overlapping 
interests outside the workplace. Brown and Quarter found that at Conco "all of the 
managers reported overlapping outside interests with each other and attend 
community social functions together" (1994: 272). The other, and in this case 
opposing, cohesive network was that of the unionised workers who also met 
outside work at union-organised social events, at sports meetings and at parents 
association meetings. When overlap occurred within the management group, it 
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increased their propensity to participate in the buyout. However, when 
overlapping outside interests coincided with shop-floor union membership, 
despite a belief that participation in the worker co-operative could 
yield capital gains and job security, non-owner union members 
were unwilling to risk the negative effects of ownership on their 
social networks (1994: 277) 
In fact those who had joined had subsequently found it "a major source of 
friction" (1994: 278) with their colleagues. The influence of social networks was 
also "quite pronounced" (1994: 278) in the third workplace group, the office and 
warehouse workers, and their decisions to become cooperative members. One 
office worker, in accounting for her decision not to join the co-operative, 
explained "my husband is very much against it" (1994: 278). However, while the 
study tested the theory that "social networks influence employees to become 
owners of their workplace" (1994: 262), it did not investigate whether or how 
social networks affected conflict, communication and control mechanisms in a 
worker-owned firm once established. 
Other studies have also highlighted the role of external social factors in 
organisational conflicts. At Unit 58 (Tynan 1980), the influence of familial 
networks on participation was keenly felt by the workplace group. For instance, 
one member, Mary Bewick, "resented helping out in the factory and her husband 
preferred her not to" (1980: 6) which in turn caused resentment among the other 
workers. Another worker found that her friends working in conventionally 
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organised firms "ridiculed her for doing unpaid overtime" and "her husband could 
not understand her interest and enthusiasm for her worle' (1980: 14). Perhaps as a 
result of these pressures she remained "mostly silent" in meetings and eventually 
was one of the first to leave the co-operative. 
Yet another co-operative case study, Little Women (Tynan, 1978), also 
demonstrated that the "costs of reconciling the demands of home and work proved 
too great for some women7 (1978: 5) since "friction arose from outside the group 
in the demands, prohibitions or complaints of husbands and the behaviour and 
health of the children" (Tynan, 1978: 24). Therefore, wider social affiliations can 
be demonstrated to be closely associated with the cause of various organisational 
hostilities and conflicts. 26 
At Fakenham Enterprises, while most of the women's husbands supported them 
during the occupation of the factory, (moving the machinery into the annex which 
was to become their new production base and helping to erect barricades), 
"pressure from husbands seems to have been a factor amongst women who did not 
support the work-in" (Lockett, 1978: 20). Once production had restarted, families 
assisted in the design and selling of the leather goods the women made and by 
" However, these wider affiliations were not always a source of negative emotions. Ihe founding force of the cooperative was a young mother, Margaret Elliot, whose husband, having worked for 'Sunderlandia, a local building cooperative, "brought ideas home from work that seemed to turn their home life into an endless debate" 
(Tynan, 1978: 2). Significantly "wives.. were included in the intense cycle of meetings 
and social events that Sunderlandia generated" (1978: 2) and it was through this 
network that Margaret was "encouraged .. to think of setting up a venture herself with a group of friends" (1978: 3). Friends and family continued their involvement in 
the cooperative beyond these initial meetings through their help in renovating and decorating the shop. 
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doing the housework and cooking at home. However, while this shared 
experience "had created a cohesive group of around a dozen women" 
(Lockett, 1978: 92) this solidarity was to cause problems and become a source of 
tension once newer members were recruited. 
Lockett's research is in line with other case studies published, where the 
emergence of sub-groups within the workplace network is catalogued 
(Wajcman, 1983; Lockett, 1978; Comforth, 1981; Tynan 1978; Wood, 1993). In 
each instance the schism has occurred between the founding and the newer 
members, resulting in a breakdown in group cohesion and in many cases the total 
dissolution of the workplace network and therefore of the enterprise. The 
breakdown of networks with the introduction and non-integration of new members 
is not only a workplace phenomenon. Thelen (1970) describes how a Chicago 
community network lost its cohesion through the introduction of newcomers 
which "resulted not only in the breakdown of communication on the block but 
also in the [loss] of a sense of common cause" (1970: 5). As a result of this 
network breakdown, people began to withdraw from the network, neighbours 
became more individualistic and ceased to work as a coherent group, and 
I eventually move out of the area. With the breakdown of the network, the isolation 
of many people was expressed in gossip and rumours, dishonesty and power 
corruption as there were "no channels for constructive action to relieve 
frustration" (1970: 7). Individual behaviour became "more and more determined 
by self-concem" (1970: 7), less influenced by the neighbourhood network and, 
significantly, more by other external networks of which the individual was a 
member. Therefore, external social networks appear to play a significant role in 
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the generation of conflict and disharmony in employee owned and controlled 
organisations. 
It would appear, from what is contained in the literature which examines the 
influence of social networks on recruitment policies, that recruitment is largely 
confined to contacts with external social networks with which the workplace 
group overlaps: networks such as friends and family. Comforth's (1981) case 
study of 'The Gannent Cooperative' reports that "new workers were approached 
by workers who knew them7'(1981: 11). However, this research fails to question 
how these new workers were known to cooperative members or whether the 
vacancies were advertised and if so what criteria were used in the selection of the 
new workers. From the published study it would appear that the only criterion 
was membership of a social network which overlapped with the workplace 
network. 
A more recent study by Wood (1993) of a cooperative bus company indicated that 
"recruitment is largely done through word of mouth" (Wood, 1993: 12). 
Furthermore, Tynan's (1978) study of the Little Women food shop reported that 
the company had "an informal ruling that each recruit be known to at least two of 
the group" (1978: 9), for example a new Saturday girl was a regular baby-sitter for 
one of the existing members. Additionally, the women tried to recruit members 
(restricted to women only) with equivalent childcare responsibilities to the rest of 
the group. The negative side of closed network recruitment was demonstrated at 
Little Women where the closing of the recruitment procedure to anyone beyond 
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the overlapping external social networks meant that "jealousy and resentment 
existed if one relation or friend was to be preferred to another's" (Tynan, 1978: 25). 
Despite the small number of studies outlined above, much of the literature on 
employee ownership and control fails systematically to consider and analyse the 
impact of social networks on the internal organisation and processes within such 
finns (Walford 1977, Mellor et al 1988). Brown and Hewstone (1986) consider 
the hypothesis that "whatever the starting-point of an analysis of industrial 
relations, progress is only likely to be made if the fundamentally social character 
of these relations is realised" (1986: 137, emphasis added), but even this study 
remains strictly within the traditional confines of adversarial industrial relations 
between employer and employee. 
Paton and Lockett recognise this gap in their own work and maintain that "in 
retrospect, it was a mistake not to have investigated this aspect of social contact 
more thoroughly" (1978: 158). In addition, Paton maintains that "one would 
expect the internal workings of cooperatives to be affected by the social context 
within which they occur" (1978: 5), while Goldthorpe (1983: 69) stresses "the 
community and family situation of workers as the central source of work 
orientations" and Schumacher (1973: 32) states that "next to the family it is work 
and the relationships established by work that are the true foundations of society". 
Ingham's study of industrial behaviour (1967) also attempts to locate industrial 
actions within a wider social framework, through the worker's previous 
experience and the community setting of the organisation. Much of the empirical 
research into collectively owned and controlled organisations was carried out in 
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the 1970s and early 1980s (Rhoades, 1984; Paton, 1978; Emerson, 1982), and dealt 
with the factors leading to the failure of a number of 'new-start' cooperatives. As 
part of these studies the authors describe the internal working and social relations 
of the enterprises, but from a 'why they failed' perspective and not with relation to 
labour relations theory. Emerson (1982: 43) states that the social difficulties 
experienced at 'Neighbourhood Textiles' were because the enterprise "was not 
enough of a co-operative", implying that if it had been 'more of' a cooperative 
(which the study leaves undefined) the confusion and conflict over decision- 
making would not have occurred, due to the creation of "sufficient trust and 
respect" (1982: 44). This again is making the implicit assumption of a causal link 
between employee ownership and control and attitude changes. Rhoades (1984), 
detailing the demise of the Milkwood cooperative, presents 'social relations' as 
one of the factors leading to its failure (the other being finance), but does not, 
within this framework, address or attempt to analyse the dynamics or practice of 
employment relations. VAiile these studies provide an interesting insight into the 
machinations of social relations within cooperatives, as a group they fail to 
analyse or offer explanations for the actions of the social actors. If the role of 
employment relations is touched upon it is only within the framework of failed 
cooperatives and as such sheds no light on what forms of employment relations 
facilitate employee owned and controlled organisations' survival and growth. 
The traditional literatures therefore tend to assume that organisational labour 
relations end at the factory gate. Furthermore, the labour relations literature 
somewhat fails to examine the resolution and maintenance of employment 
relations by social networks separate from the f=, i. e. the pub, club and living 
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room. However, based on the evidence presented above, it is possible to 
hypothesise that labour relations extend beyond the organisation into wider social 
relations. If this is the case then there may be an argument for the investigation of 
social relations outside the workplace, and the group dynamics and social 
networks unassociated with the employee's role and position within the 
organisation, but which impact on relations inside the workplace. Consequently, 
relations within employee owned and controlled organisations can be perceived of 
as an issue involving a much broader scope of social relations than just work 
relations themselves. 
5.4 Economic Context of Disharmony 
However, the success or failure of employee owned and controlled firms cannot 
be adequately explained simply in terms of their social context. The economic 
context in which they are situated - their industry, region and historico-economic 
location also play important roles in the generation of organisational climate and 
conflict. 
Degeneration Theory 
Degeneration theory (Beatrice and Sydney Webb, 1914) postulates that 
democratic, participative firms will invariably fail to survive in this form and will 
degenerate into either conventionally organised or conventionally controlled 
enterprises through exposure to capitalist, market forces. Where worker 
ownership survives, the Webbs suggested that the worker-owners would 
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experience a change in class identification and become "associations of 
capitalists" (Webb and Webb, 1914, quoted in Mellor et al 1988). Jensen and 
Meckling (1979) have further argued that the dominance of conventionally owned 
and controlled firms in market economies, in which employee owned and 
controlled organisations have an equal opportunity to compete, is evidence of the 
superiority of the former. The poor performance of some employee owned and 
controlled organisations can be attributed to employee ownership schemes which 
have been designed principally as job saving efforts (Pendleton et al, 1995). Here, 
economic necessities often overtake the social, either resulting in firm closure 
(such as the Benn Co-ops, and Fakenham Enterprises) or sale to a new owner. 
This demonstrates a long-standing problem facing some employee ownership and 
control schemes, that they are susceptible to 'degeneration' into conventionally 
organiSed firms. This body of research suggests therefore that any attitude 
changes associated with employee ownership and control may not be permanent 
and can be reversed through external pressures and forces. However, in 
opposition to the degeneration theory, but in support of the pervasive influence of 
the external economic environment, Vanek (1971) argued that the poor 
performance of worker-owned firms in the market economies was due to a lack of 
access to external capital sources. 
Empirical evidence provides some support for the negative influence of external 
economic factors on employee owned and controlled organisations. Tynan's 
study (1980) of 'Unit 58' concluded that the establishment of the cooperative 
during a "general recession ... put the company under such continual pressure that 
they 'were never in a position to allow group decisions to hold and to learn from 
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their mistakes"' (1980: V). In this situation, the poor level and sporadic nature of 
wages, coupled with despondency over the company's financial position, led to 
the withdrawal of a number of the members. In addition, the pressures placed 
upon those in positions of responsibility to respond rapidly to external economic 
fluctuations, made the day-to-day decision-making appear "to the work force to be 
in direct contradiction to group decisions" (1980: 4) and produced "considerable 
friction and distrust" (1980: 5). The ovcr-ruling of group decisions caused by 
pressures of the economic environment was illustrated just two months after the 
establishment of the cooperative, when the enterprise was obliged to respond to 
nationally negotiated wages rises of E23 for the unskilled workers, which overrode 
the enterprise's originally planned pay differential of 2.5: 1. 
Lockett's (1978) study of the Fakenharn Enterprises cooperative in Norfolk also 
detailed the pervasive influence that the external economic environment had on 
the internal organisation and atmosphere in the factory. The initial external 
influence came with the liquidation of Sextons shoe company, of which Fakenham 
was a satellite workshop, in 1972. This, coupled with the dearth of jobs for 
women in the region and the media's coverage of the Upper Clyde Shipyard sit-in, 
prompted the women to stage their own sit-in to preserve their jobs. After the 
external environment had pushed the women into this action, Wajcman's (1983) 
study of the Fakenham Enterprises cooperative details the harsh external 
economic environment that the nascent company had to contend with: 
"Fakenharn Enterprises had problems in finding adequate finance, a marketable 
product and competent management" (1983: 56). The funds considered necessary 
to establish the new enterprise were estimated at f. 20,000, but in fact Fakenham 
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Enterprises received just E2,500 from Scott Bader and approximately L 1,000 from 
other sources. Additionally, the industrial sector in which they were situated, 
footwear, had since the 1940s been in severe decline. Due to the externally 
imposed, scattered and irregular nature of the work "tension was high in the 
factory" (1983: 112) and this lack of work resulted in a "growing discontent" 
(1983: 117) among the women. As a result of this lack of regular, paid work a 
number of members left the cooperative. These persistent economic pressures 
produced an initial subdivision of the Fakenharn women into three distinct cliques, 
based on the areas into which the women were physically divided for their work 
and between which there were strong negative relationships. The tensions meant 
that the atmosphere among the women changed from one of solidarity to one of 
gossip, suspicion and discontent. The growing hostility was eventually eased by 
the acceptance of a contract (which itself was particularly exploitative) offered by 
'Mr. K'. However the W contract in itself produced a two-way split among the 
members. In short, the new contract meant that those women with school age 
children were unable to complete a full shift on the machines, and this became a 
source of conflict within the group. Significantly, the fracture line also followed 
the division between the founders and the newer members, with the founding 
members dismissing the constraints which were placed upon the other members 
by their young children as consequences of their 'attitude' to work. The potential 
for a split was therefore already in place, however the environmental stresses 
served to highlight this division. 
A harsh external enviromnent is however not a necessary precursor for failure. 
For example, the building cooperative, Sunderlandia (Tynan, 1980), failed even 
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with a benign external economic environment. Alternatively, severe economic 
conditions can work to increase organisational harmony, as was demonstrated at 
the Buzz Cooperative (Wood 1993), where external economic pressures actually 
caused members to act as a cohesive network. The research quotes a driver as 
saying, 
when there is a crisis, everyone pulls together. But when things are 
okay, the underlying tensions surface as niggles in staff meetings 
... and one gets the sense of 'us and them'. (Wood, 1993: 22-3). 
Overall, these studies demonstrate that employee ownership and control cannot 
entirely be isolated from the effects of the external environment. Ramsay (1977) 
took this proposition one step further and suggested that the external environment 
accounted for apparent waves of employee participation, which he termed 'cycles 
of control'. His work hypothesises that employee participation is a management 
response to increased worker power and subsequent employee resistance to 
management control. Without a strong environment of worker power, an insecure 
external environment would therefore be more likely to induce employee 
compliance with participation programmes, and not the attitude changes necessary 
for employee reorientation to the values of management. However, this analysis of 
the literature suggests that, taken alone, the external economic environment is an 
insufficient explanation of the success or failure of employee ownership and 
control. 
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6. Conclusions 
While the literature suggests that harmonisation is the theoretically expected and 
anticipated outcome of employee ownership and control, and is associated with 
attitude changes in employee relations and thus with altered employee behaviours, 
this is based on a number of contentious assumptions. The principal assumption 
under scrutiny has been the causal link associating employee ownership and 
control with employee attitude changes in favour of management goals and 
ideology. The literature clearly indicates that while employee participation 
schemes may be successful in securing behavioural changes in employees, this is 
not necessarily in the direction predicted by theory. Where conflict continues or 
arises as a result of employee ownership and control, harmonisation is therefore 
either absent or harmonious attitudes are not influencing employee behaviour in 
the manner expected. Therefore, other forces and factors are necessarily at work 
within the employment relationship. 
While the type of conflict expression (overt, covert, direct or indirect) may differ, 
the literature suggests that forms of conflict are apparent in all forms of employee 
ownership and control. As such, theoretical assumptions concerning the 
harmonisation of values and relations through employee ownership and control 
are somewhat flawed and require further investigation. Unpacking this, the 
literature suggests that harmonisation is more prevalent and probable where high- 
level employee ownership and control is found than in those organisations with 
low-level ownership and control. In these low-level participation situations, 
conflict may be the overriding outcome. While conflict associated with high-level 
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ownership and control is reported, this has been associated with alternative forms 
of power and tension to those found in conventionally owned and controlled 
organisations. Harmony and disharmony also appear to have some association not 
only with the type of ownership and control found in organisation, but also with 
the size and make up of the organisational workforce and with organisational 
informal relations. They also depend on the socio-historical and political context 
as much as new organisational fonns and structures. 
Identity alterations in employees in particular, but also in management, are 
therefore drawn into question by this analysis of the literature. While many 
approaches to, and studies of, employee ownership and control assume employee 
identity alteration, evidence suggests that identities may not be so malleable or 
easily altered. In addition, research suggests that identities, once changed, are 
susceptible to reversal to their original, established positions. This analysis of the 
literature also suggests that identity alteration is as much a product of external 
influences as influences internal to the organisation and its ownership and control 
structures. Therefore it is necessary to investigate the causal relationships between 
employee ownership and control and employee/management attitudes. To achieve 
this, processual research is required in order to access the dynamics of this 
relationship. 
The case studies chosen and used in this thesis have been designed to address 
these gaps identified in the literatures. To access the various and diverse aspects 
documented in the literature review, two significantly different case studies were 
required. In the first instance, disharmony between workers and management was 
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an obvious consideration and therefore a case study was chosen that would exhibit 
overt class divisions, enabling the identification of divisions between workers and 
their management. To this end, an organisation which exhibited formalised and 
structured conflict was required. However, a significant omission in the literature 
is the consideration of conflicts between workers themselves, and the social forces 
involved in the production of these tensions. Therefore the second case study was 
carefully selected to be one without overt class or worker/management divisions, 
and consequently one where other social forces involved in the generation of 
harmony and conflict should also be apparent. Therefore, the second case study 
was nece§sarily an organisation that exhibited neither formalised nor structured 
conflicts. In order to address the further issues identified in the literature 
concerning the differing expressions and experiences of conflict and 
harmonisation in employee-owned and controlled organisations of differing size 
and workforce composition, the case studies were chosen to represent both the 
micro-enterprise (of under 10 employees) with close informal working relations, 
and the large firm sector (with over 2,000 employees) thus necessarily involving 
the formalisation of relations between different groups of employee-owners. 
Consequently, the forms of conflict and tension demonstrated by the case studies 
were expected to encompass the various types of conflict expression reported in 
the literature - overt, covert, direct, indirect, infonnal and formalised. 
The suggestion that identities under employee ownership and control conditions 
are susceptible to reversal to established positions necessitated the selection of 
study sites that were converted from conventionally owned and controlled 
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organisations, and not those that had been started as employee owned and 
controlled enterprises. Moreover, these organisations could not be recent 
conversions, the introduction of employee ownership and control had to be 
established in order to permit the examination of reversal tendencies. To enable 
comparison between the case study sites, both organisations were selected on the 
grounds that they used individualised financial ownership - using the statutory 
ESOP as their model - and also exhibited high-level employee influence. Within 
this framework, organisations with both collective and individualised, and with 
direct and indirect employee-control mechanisms have been examined. The use 
of these criteria in the selection of case study sites has enabled the investigation of 
both the structural and the social character of organisational relations. 
61 
Chapter Two 
Conceptual Framework 
1. Introduction 
The conceptual framework addresses and confronts the issue that the existence of 
worker-owned and controlled companies in an industrial society is an unexpected, 
paradoxical and rare alliance between capital and labour in a capitalist society. 
Chapter One described how in employee owned and controlled firms the 
traditional authority of ownership is transferred to the employees. It addressed the 
problem that much of the literature assumes that a transfer of ownership and 
control will result in improved cooperation between the workers and management 
and ultimately produce harmony and consensus. The conceptual framework 
unpacks the issues contained within this association between employee ownership 
and organisational climate by taking labour process theory and theories of 
4meaning' (i. e. the relations of production and the production of meanings), and 
applying these to the situation of employee owned and controlled companies. 
This is achieved using three central concepts: influence structures, collective 
identities, and identity conversion. 
This second chapter highlights how the use of the concept of collective identities 
allows the dualism between social structure and the individual to be addressed. 
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The social structure, or social network, is seen as a product of collective 
aspirations structured through the consensus of its members. In this respect social 
structures exist through (and because of) the social interactions of their members, 
and are therefore formed by network processes. It is through these network 
processes that collective identities and meanings are made tangible. The network 
is therefore a source of identity expression. This network perspective pennits a 
consideration of institutionalised conflicts and of the role of individuals within 
these processes. It also permits the contextualisation of conflicts, and allows for 
an investigation of the different functions that conflict has in different situations, 
and why diverse actions can be categorised and rccognised as conflict. 
The conceptualisation of conflict as an identity-network process indicates that the 
network processes involved are the essence of conflict. Therefore, a 
conceptualisation of the operations of conflict from a collective, or network, 
perspective is vital. Consequently, the conceptual framework avoids an 
overemphasis on the subjective action of individuals as the centre of analysis and, 
as such, rejects a post-modem, feminist and cultural studies approach that 
individualises acts of conflict and which focuses on individual tactics of 
resistance. As such, the post-modem approach under-theorises the structural 
genesis and perpetuation of conflict. 
A network perspective of conflict also emphasises the importance of the 
contextualisation of conflict processes., Conflict processes are located within the 
network situation and consequently the conceptual framework avoids theories of 
abstract structures of control because of their lack of contextualisation. However, 
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this is not to suggest that conflict does not exist when it is not in obvious 
operation. Quite the contrary, since conflict is a network property the operation of 
conflict processes are constant while often being covert or unobservable. 
Therefore conflict processes cannot be accessed through the observation of 
tangible conflict symbols alone - the underlying network situation is a crucial 
consideration. Through uncovering and understanding the relationships that 
underlie the generation and regeneration of conflicts, the social relationships that 
underscore conflict processes are revealed. 
The suggestion of the harmonisation literatures is that identities are malleable, 
changeable, and can be negotiated. The contemporary movement towards 
employee ownership and participation in firms is firmly rooted in the development 
of human resource management and associated soft systems theories of 
individualistic employee motivation. Here, social relations are seen as the prime 
motivation in identity change, not money. In this field, industrial democracy is 
cited as a means to self-actualisation (Maslow, 1970). These theories rely on the 
individualistic nature of employee identities and attitudes (Bennis and Schein, 
1966), and therefore organisations tend to concentrate on schemes which purport 
to allow individuals to "realise themselves through achieving organisational 
goals" (Grint, 1991: 129). However, these approaches write off as irrelevant the 
fact that they leave the labour process unaltered and fail to address whether or 
how identities can be altered, from that of paid labour to that of capital/owners of 
the means of production, simply by introducing employee ownership. A network 
perspective on identity would suggest that membership of overlapping networks is 
an influencing factor. Given overlapping network memberships, both within and 
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outwith the work situation, identities cannot be formed in a vacuum at work, but 
will derive from other allegiances or network memberships (Clegg, 1990). As 
conflict is network situated, its genesis and resolution will also be influenced by 
the web of social networks within which the relations of production are situated, 
Conflict is therefore seen simultaneously as network situated and as able to 
influence the network situation. 
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2. Network Forms 
The type of interaction that takes place within a social network, and the basis on 
which the network relationships are structured, is termed the network form. For 
the purposes of this study, network form has been defined in terms of distinct 
systems of interaction, but not necessarily geographically or socially discrete 
structures. Therefore, one social structure (such as an industrial organisation) can 
contain a number of different systems of interaction, and these different systems 
of interaction (or network forms) can have the same target populations. Each 
network form will have distinct and established routines of interaction while 
remaining embedded within the wider social structure. 
Networks are formed in two ways, they may either be formal networks, based on 
formalised relations, or they may be informal networks, created by infon-nal 
relationships between the members. 
2.1 Formal Networks 
A formal network is one based on contractual relations of communication and 
authority, where the lines of communication and of influence are contractually 
established, e. g. communication with a line manager or with a shop steward. 
While the ties that bind in a formal network are contract, bureaucracy and 
established hierarchy, in informal networks it is friendship and reciprocity. This 
distinction between formal and informal networks is not new, but it is often 
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assumed and rarely defined or theorised in detail. 
Based on this criterion, a fonnal network is a fairly rigid structure with little 
inbuilt flexibility of form and with an inclination towards continuity, but it will 
also have recognised rights and duties specified in its 'constitution', e. g. the 
employment contract. For the individual it involves accepting a role within a 
recognised and reasonably stable system, oflen a hierarchy, with recognised 
rights, responsibilities and duties attached to the post (Bryman, 1992). These 
include, for example, the right to issue commands, or the responsibility of 
representation. 
Succession within a formal network (such as a management or trade union 
hierarchy) is a relatively stable process, providing little threat to the stability or 
forrn of the network. The structural position within the network, at whatever 
level, senior management, middle management, or shop steward, remains even 
once the individual has left the role or the network (e. g. through promotion or 
retirement). Therefore to fit a new member into an existing formal network form 
is largely straightforward and involves no necessary changes to the network 
structure. 
2.2 Formal Influence 
Formal influence is the more overt of the two network pattern types because it is 
immediately observable. It can be displayed by the size and luxury of an office, a 
67 
top of the range company car, a private parking space, a job title, a name plate on 
the door, a personal phone line, or any number of other special benefits (such as 
preferential share options). Fornial influence can also be reinforced through the 
use of interaction rituals which sustain relative influence differences, such as 
seating a subordinate at a smaller desk, or using a secretary (or other intermediary) 
to communicate with employees, customers and suppliers. 
In work organisations, fon-nal influence is derived from employment contracts, 
where the position an individual occupies in a fonnal network is detennined solely 
by contract. Contractual positions carry with them a certain amount of influence 
which is independent of the position holder and will be passed on to the next 
individual who occupies that position. Therefore, formal influence, while external 
to and independent of the individual, is a property of the formal network structure, 
residing in the network position. Network influence is given to the member when 
he/she assumes the role within the network. It is also given as an incentive to 
perform, based on expected performance, but is not received until network 
position is changed, e. g. promotion, a pay rise, a bigger room or company car, a 
club tie or badge. The influence associated with the network position depends on 
how important to the structure that position is. In this manner the influence in a 
formal network is independent of the network members, resulting from a network 
of offices and not of officers. 
Formal influence can also be seen as a network resource. In industrial 
organisations, the trade union's network resource is the power of the work force to 
disrupt or halt production, thus jeopardising management's goal of ensured 
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profitability. This network resource is channelled formally through the union 
hierarchy. Management's network resource is the power to suspend, move or sack 
workers, and to alter terms and conditions of employment. This is also organised 
forinally through the management bureaucracy, based on their knowledge of 
company finances, external markets and competition. Both groups can augment 
their network resource by denying the other, group full access to this 
information/influence. 
2.3 Informal Networks 
Bryman (1992) defines an 'informal organisation' as "a cluster of unofficial 
practices and structures" (1992: 8). Consequently, unlike formal networks, an 
informal network is based on non-contractual, social relations (such as fiiendship), 
based on personal characteristics and personal relationships and not on formal 
network position. In the informal network the individual is the post, whereas in a 
formal network the post is external to the individual. Such disassociation from 
contractual relations means that informal systems can be more flexible in form 
than formal systems. With an informal structure, once the individual moves 
within or leaves the network, their original network position is ceded and 
disappears. Even where there is another new or existing member who possesses 
enough influence to move into that structural position, they still have to recreate 
that position for themselves and therefore, as their identity, history and experience 
differ from the previous position holder, so will the network role. While these 
informal relations may take longer to cement than formal links, which are 
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instantaneous on acceptance of the position within a formal network, informal 
relationships can easily be broken. While a fonnal relationship can only be 
terminated if a network member resigns their post, is fired, promoted, or made 
redundant, the non-contractual nature of informal networks means that there are 
no holds on members. However, like formal networks, the informal network does 
have its rights and duties, although unlike the formal network these are implicit 
and non-contractual. 
However, the literature covering informal work-place networks is remarkably 
limited. This is in part due to the focus of the management literature on the 
formal power of the manager, which is guaranteed by their position within the 
formal influence structure. Therefore informal networks and their influence are 
often seen as of secondary importance. Methodologically, informal structures are 
also difficult to establish scientifically and problematic to predict and therefore do 
not easily fall into a deterministic academic discipline. Consequently informal 
company networks often remain hidden from analysis in the management studies 
literatures. 
2.4 Informal Influence 
However, while management will command formal influence within an 
organisation, they may or may not possess informal influence. Authority in 
informal networks is constructed from informal influence which is independent of 
any network position the member may occupy in a parallel formal hierarchy. 
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Therefore as a result of their official, formal posts, informal network members do 
not accrue any informal influence and therefore formal influence does not predict 
informal influence. Informal influence may also allow the individual to adopt a 
role or position with more influence than their position in the fon-nal networks to 
which they belong permits. Unlike formal influence, informal influence is 
particular to the individual and belongs only to that member and not to the 
network position occupied. As there are no established network structures 
independent of the individual the influence associated with infonnal network 
positions depends on how important that member is to the network. Unlike formal 
influence, informal influence is less tangible, it does not offer observable symbols 
of prestige and it is not guaranteed. Rather, it relies on the flow of reciprocal 
influence such as friendship, trust, respect, praise, approval and also criticism. 
Consequently, informal influence is inherently unstable since there is no 
contractual basis for influence. Influence depends on the individual member, their 
personal relations and interpersonal dynamics, therefore an informal leader cannot 
'pull rank' or demand obedience from the network members. Consequently, 
informal leaders have to use other means to influence membership behaviour, 
based on interpersonal relations such as praise or criticism. Therefore an informal 
leader is necessarily continually engaged with the network membership to ensure 
that the membership trusts and esteems them sufficiently to maintain their 
informal influence. 
In informal networks, network members' influence is delivered via the network 
interactions in the fonn of 'expectations', using social pressures to enforce 
behavioural and value expectations on the leadership. The social pressures used 
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include a monitoring of leadership behaviour and achievements and evaluative 
fccdback from the followership - in the form of praise or criticism encouraging 
"positively evaluated role performance or change negatively evaluated role 
performance" (Hammer et al, 1991: 666). Therefore the network members have a 
high degree of autonomy and influence in informal networks, since the possession 
of influence is based on monitoring by the membership. Because there is no 
formal leadership position, the leadership can be assimilated back into the 
followership at any point if influence is reduced, and a new leadership can be 
promoted from the body of network members. 
2.5 Reciprocity, Followership and Network Form 
There exists therefore a subtle but important difference between exchange 
relations in formal networks - which are driven by relative influence positions in 
the formal network structure - and reciprocity in informal networks, based on 
informal and voluntary interactions. These different types of interaction drive the 
different bases for influence within the two network forms. In a formal network, 
the source of the leadership's influence comes from the formal hierarchy and the 
influence invested in each network position. In informal networks, relationship 
between the members and therefore between the leadership and followership are 
based on non-contractual mutualities, such as friendship, trust, and shared values. 
As such, different network types - formal and informal - produce different types of 
leadership since these network patterns require different functions to be 
performed. While a formal network can possess either an appointed or an elected 
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leadership, the functions the leadership will be called on to perform, and the 
authority it will have at hand to perform these tasks will differ from the leadership 
of an informal network. This may simply be that a formal leadership will have its 
functions laid down by contract or constitution and will have to act within these 
formal bounds. An informal leadership will also have to fulfil expectations, but 
these can be more fluid and flexible due to the nature of the informal network 
relations which are themselves less rigid. 
2.6 Network Form and Conflict 
While formal and informal networks can and do co-exist, the leaders of the two 
can conceivably be from different parts of an organisation as their leadership 
positions will be based on different concepts of influence. As an organisation 
could be comprised of both informal and formal networks using the same 
personnel, this co-existence of networks (and the differential positions and 
influence associated within the same personnel) could produce structural tensions 
which become the seat of conflicts. As Weber predicted (quoted in Bryman, 
1992: 29), "bureaucrats may fret about the possible loss of financial and 
managerial control if sponsorship were to accrue increasingly to charismatic 
leaders outside the formal party apparatus". It would also seem reasonable that 
tensions will also be produced within networks where an individual's formal 
influence does not equally correspond with their informal influence, position and 
role, and vice versa. 
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3. Network Patterns 
However, while network forms are different and distinct, there are also similarities 
between the two forms of network. Both can be either concentrated or dispersed 
interaction network patterns. 
3.1 Concentrated Interaction Networks 
A concentratcd interaction network 1,0cuses network interactions and 
C0111111LIllications on a central figurc or gl-OLII) Mthill the network. In this respect, 
this network pattern enjoys a concentrated flow of' interactions, with the central 
network location experiencing the most connections (Figure 2.1 ), while peripheral 
locations have a narrower band of relationships. In some extremely concentrated 
interaction networks. peripheral locations may interact only with the centre and 
not with other peripheral members. 
Figure 2.1 Concentrated Interaction Network 
The concentrated interaction network pattern therefore results in highly 
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centralised influence at one network location. Communication is focused at a 
central network point and it is largely through this central location that the 
network members communicate with each other. Therefore, in a concentrated 
interaction network each follower will only have access to partial network 
communications and information while the leadership has full access to all. As 
the followership are denied access to full communications (i. e. they are denied 
access to resources in the form of information) therefore the followership possess 
relatively little autonomy. Consequently, while their support is still necessary for 
the leadership, followership influence is consistently at a low level. As such, in a 
concentrated interaction network the followership has a largely passive role in 
group leadership. 
The pattern of the network therefore influences the form of the relationship 
between the followership and leadership. In concentrated interaction networks, 
leadership is situated at the centre of the network and limited towards the edges 
(which is the rationale of many formal structures). This does not mean that all 
formal relationships are unequal, some formal networks are also reciprocal, e. g. 
MPs and their constituents, shop stewards and the shop floor, and are thus inclined 
towards the dispersed interaction network pattern. However, many formal 
networks are concentrated interaction networks, e. g. the relationship between 
senior and middle management. 
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3.2 Concentrated Influence 
While a concentrated interaction network results in a high degree of centralised 
influence, it also corresponds to a low degree of followership autonomy. The 
leadership of a highly centralised network receives "communication ... [which) 
converges on him and is filtered through him" while the other group members are 
"so much less informed of the pertinent facts" (Gordon, 1955: 60). Those 
members located at the centre of a network will therefore have access to a wider 
range of communications and a greater understanding of the network than those 
members situated on the periphery of the group. The ability of the followership to 
act independently of the centralised leadership is thus diminished since each 
follower is in incomplete and mediated communication with other network 
members. Therefore, the collective influence of the followership is reduced as a 
direct result of the accumulation of influence at the centre. 
The basis for leadership does not necessarily, therefore, have to be aligned directly 
with followership goals and aspirations since, in concentrated interaction 
networks, the followership is not in a position of power to enforce its goals. 
Consequently, the influence of a centralised leadership could be used to achieve 
goals that are not in line with or even in the interests of its followership. A 
concentrated leadership distribution thus indicates an influence relationship where 
the leadership does not rely on the distribution of influence to all levels of the 
network (since the form of the network makes this strategy inappropriate for 
preserving centralised leadership). Therefore, for the followership, a concentrated 
interaction network provides little opportunity for followership influence over 
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network identity and actions. 
3.3 Dispersed Interaction Networks 
A dispersed interaction net-vvork en. joys a widely distribLItCCI Sý'StClll 01' Illtel'aCtiOlIS 
and communications within the network. which reSLIltS in a more equalised 
distribution of interaction (FIgUre than in a concentrated network. In this 
network pattern, interactions are not focused on one network location. bUt spread 
throughout the network to a nUmber of locations. The dispersed interaction 
network does not therefore possess one central location, but many centres of 
interaction spread throughout the network and. in correlation to its lack of a 
centre, also possesses fewer peripheral members. 
Figure 2.2 Dispersed Interaction Network 
Fhe pattern of a dispersed network therefore provides a 111.1mber of network 
locations xvith influence. In a dispersed interaction network. communications 
between members are largely immediate and there is no central location through 
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which communications and information pass, therefore parallel leaderships can be 
situated at a number of different locations concurrently. As followers have access 
to a similar amount of communication and information as each leader, the role and 
influence of the followership is consistently high and independent. Thus, in a 
dispersed interaction network the role of the followership is active in network 
leadership. 
3.4 Dispersed Influence 
By virtue of the flatter hierarchy, and the complete and immediate 
communications between network members that a dispersed interaction network 
pattern allows, the followership are likely to be influential and autonomous. 
Therefore, a dispersed network pattern permits the development of a strong 
followership since it provides the followership with a greater amount of authority 
and thus more potential to influence the leadership. The essence of leadership in 
such a network is on a 'first among equals' basis, and therefore because of this it 
is more focussed on fulfilling the goals and aspirations of the followership. In a 
dispersed interaction network the followership hold the reins of power, the hidden 
influence within the network. It is, in essence, the followership who are in control 
not the leadership, since if the leadership pursues a goal that is not aligned, or in 
the interests of, the followership, the followership have the influence to remove or 
alter the erring leadership. In such a structure, the function of the followership is 
to prevent any alteration in network pattern that would allow any one leadership 
location to achieve a disproportional degree of influence, and thus concentrated 
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leadership influence. Therefore, to maintain a dispersed interaction network, the 
accumulation of centralised influence would result in sanctions by the 
followership. However, the role of the followership in the creation of these 
leadership choices has been largely overlooked in the literature. In a network 
where the influence of the followership is strong and displays the ability to 
remove support from any leader, the leaderships succeed because they display a 
dispersed influence distribution pattern. Where a strong followership exists, its 
support is essential for the maintenance of leadership, without which leadership 
would be cut off from information about the followerships' ideals, goals and 
understandings, and thus become unable to lead. Therefore a leadership has to 
instil in the followership trust in its methods of leadership and distribution of the 
benefits thereof. If the followership should withdraw their support, the choices for 
a leadership would either be to withdraw from the leadership role and become 
assimilated into the followership or to leave the network. 
3.5 Network Pattern and Conflict 
While concentrated influence may provide the network with a firm direction, it 
can also produce autocratic leadership and difficulty with succession. In a 
concentrated interaction network the marginalisation of the followership could 
also result in dissatisfaction within the ranks of the network membership. While a 
dispersed interaction network allows equally powerful leaders to emerge within a 
single network, these separate leaderships and their goals could be in conflict with 
each other. Moreover, and significantly, in both network patterns the followership 
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retains the right not to support the leadership. 
Just as formal and informal network forms are not mutually exclusive, neither are 
concentrated and dispersed network patterns. A concentrated network may 
overlap or overlay a dispersed network since the same individuals can be members 
of both networks. For example, members of a typically concentrated network 
such as a business hierarchy, can also be members of a local social club where the 
pattern of the network is dispersed. In employee owned and controlled enterprises 
the overlap is particularly pronounced, where workers may belong to a 
concentrated work hierarchy network and also to a dispersed ownership 
(shareholders) network. Where overlaps occur, tensions may be created through a 
mis-match of network positions, influence and communications. However, not all 
networks overlap and where they don't, the differences in network form and 
pattern could make interactions between networks problematic. For example, 
where a concentrated interaction network, with its defined authority centre, enters 
into negotiations with a dispersed interaction network, with its multiple centres. 
. 1- 
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4. Influence Relations in Employee Owned and Controlled 
Organisations 
Chapter One provided a hypothesis which suggested that employee owned and 
controlled organisations experience a radically different system of authority 
relations, controls and exchanges to conventionally organised firms. This implies 
that these forms of organisation experience alternative patterns of influence and 
thus different network forms and patterns to conventionally owned and controlled 
organisations. The suggested alteration in influence relations is based on the 
assumption that in employee owned and controlled firms the distribution of 
authority and control based on the control of capital (and the ability to punish) will 
be equally distributed. This indicates a dominance of dispersed interaction 
networks. The hypothesis in Chapter One goes on to add that as a result, socially 
derived sources of influence will rise in significance, implying an increased level 
of informal network forms in employee owned and controlled organisations. In 
these firms, while there is management there is no formal authority in the 
traditional sense, therefore alternative authority structures have to be established. 
To relate this to the study in hand, the debate about employee ownership and 
control is centred on an increased role for workers in the leadership of their own 
companies, in other words increased worker centrality in organisational influence 
structures. This indicates a move away from a traditional association of 
leadership with management, i. e. where the management group controls the 
leadership roles within an organisation thus constricting power and restricting 
information to the managing body. With employee ownership and control, the 
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workers have rights to company information and decision-making previously 
restricted to management. Thus alternative ownership and control structures 
increase the flow of information and require a more participative approach to 
decision-making. 
The inclusive role of workers in authority structures is however largely 
overlooked in the literature. A good deal of this is due to a bias towards 
'management studies', and thus a concentration on management influence and 
leadership alone. The industrial relations literature, while explicitly addressing 
the role of workers in organisational power relations, conceives of this as dualistic 
- as a struggle over the resources of the enterprise. 
4.1 Leadership and Influence Structures 
When discussing alternative influence forms and patterns it is first necessary to 
establish and define the various different meanings and arrangements 
encompassed by the term 'leadership'. Within the field of management studies 
much work has been published on what differentiates 'leadership' from 
'management', based on the assumption that leadership arises out of day-to-day 
management but requires significantly different (and often implicitly preferable) 
qualities (Selznick, 1957: Gibbons, ý 1992: Krantz and Gilmore, 1990). According 
to Kotter (1996), management is concerned with 'coping with complexity' and 
leadership about 'coping with change'. They are "distinct and complementary 
systems ... each has its own function and characteristics activities. Both are 
I 
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necessary for success" (Kottcr, 1996: 620). Bass (1985) further defines 
management and leadership as transactional and transformational respectively. 
Transactional leadership has been described as "a somewhat mundane set of 
activities involving short-term problem-solving and decision-making" (Bryman, 
1986: 23). Leadership as different to management is also discussed in Zalencik, 
1977; Bennis, 1976; Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1990; Hickman, 1990, and 
Peters and Austin, 1985. However, all of these consider leadership and 
management to be parts of the same system, while these definitions of differences 
between the terms leadership and management are inappropriate for worker- 
owned enterprises, where employee influence and leadership is structurally 
separate from organisational management. 
For the purposes of this research, leadership as a_ tenn will be applied to any 
relatively centralised influence within any number of influence structures within 
an organisation. Management on the other hand will be used solely to denote 
operational management groups. In this respect the term leadership can be 
applied to management, trade unions, bodies of shareholders, and to both fon-nal 
and informal groups. However, this perception of leadership is not reflected in the 
literature where, originating with F. W. Taylor, organisational leadership and 
authority has been perceived as the sole domain of the manager, with a 
subordinate role for the worker in this relationship. For much of the management 
studies literature the assumption remains that influence structures are situated 
within the managing elite of organisations alone. Due to this location of leadership 
studies in the management literature a key issue is under-represented - the role and 
influence of the workers, both formally and informally. 
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5. Networked Influence Relations: Followership 
Within the employee owned and controlled firm, organisational influence is 
therefore an interdependent relationship encompassing both management and 
workers. While the workers remain employees they are also the employer and as 
such embody both sides of the influence relationship, both followership and 
leadership. Therefore the distinction and dualism between follower and leader is 
removed as workers simultaneously manifest both aspects of influence relations. 
This alternative influence relationship is embedded in social processes and 
structures within and outwith the enterprise, and these provide the mechanism by 
which the influence of the followership is transmitted. Therefore the social 
network is integral to the study of followership since this is the reciprocal 
mechanism that links the follower to the leader, i. e. the periphery to the centre. 
While the concept of parallel followership and leadership roles is relatively 
underdeveloped in the literature, some work has been undertaken which addresses 
the area of mutuality in group relations. The existence of a followership and of 
their relationship with the leadership is occasionally - addressed in the literature, ' 
but while this mutuality is acknowledged this is often done obliquely and with 
little conceptual development. Research undertaken by Bargal and Schmid (1989) 
criticises much of the leadership literature for ignoring the "mutual fulfilment of 
both parties", and adds that "the means by which the influence is exercised, or the 
context within which the leadership-followership interaction is taking place" 
' Bargal and Schmid, 1989: Hafsi and Misurrý, 1992: Heller and Van Till, 1982: 
Hollander and Julian, 1969: Schein, 1985: Moore, 1976: Herold, 1977: Fodor, 1974: 
Crowe, Bochner and Clark, 1972: Hammer, Currall and Stem, 199 1. 
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(1989: 39) are not explained. An exception is Sandford's work (1982) which 
directly addresses the role of the follower, "it is the follower as an individual who 
perceives the leader, who perceives the situation, and who, in the final analysis, 
accepts or rejects leadership" (1982: 159). But it is clear that Sanford perceives 
followership as an individual property and not a collective relationship, and 
therefore not as a social network phenomenon. 
5.1 Mutuality 
An early reference to the contextualisation of leader/follower relations within 
social structures is contained in Gibb's work (1930), which maintains that 
"leadership is always relative to the situation ... a process of mutual stimulation" 
(1930, in Gordon, 1955: 272). The mutual relationship between the leadership and 
the 'situation' or context indicates an interdependent relationship between the 
leadership and the social network. Gordon (1955) explicitly examines the 
reciprocal role of the followership when he writes, "a leader also must be led ... 
leadership is truly a process of interaction" (1955: 51). Thus he indicates the 
importance of reciprocity in the leaders' relationship with the network within 
which they are situated. More obliquely, Kotter's study of leadership (1996) 
introduces the idea that a leader's 'vision' usually consists of "ideas that are 
already well known" (1996: 622). His work therefore gives credence to the theory 
that the followership plays a significant role in forming the vision of the 
leadership. Kotter adds that "what is crucial about a vision is not its originality 
but how well it serves the interests of important constituencies" (1996: 622), thus 
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indicating the influence of a collective followership. This contextualised view of 
followership and leadership is reproduced in Krantz (1996), who looks at the 
"idea that control and leadership is [not] such a top-down process" (1996: 643), 
and Gilmore (cited in Bigley et al, 1996) stresses "the importance of leaders who 
work with and through people" (1989: 649). These works imply that the 
relationship between followers and the network structure is an important dynamic 
in the study of leadership. 
Turning to systems literature, Krantz found that "in systems terms ... leaders and 
followers mutually co-produce overall system leadership" (1989: 643-4). This is 
consistent with the view of leadership as a product of relative influence 
distribution networks. 
However comprehensive these studies of leadership and followership are, they 
omit consideration of employee/worker leaders, although much of the work on 
leadership and followership can be applied to this category. Despite the research 
cited which deals with followers and followership, all authors treat leadership and 
followership as separate entities and forces, often within a dualist exchange 
relationship. None consider the integral natures of leadership and followership 
and the possibility in many situations that they are parts of the same force or entity 
- which is the social network. Moreover, the literature assumes that the role of the 
followership remains a largely subordinate one. For example, Bums (1978) while 
acknowledging the role of the followership, assumes that this is a dependent, 
passive role, where "leaders see and act on their own and the followers' values 
and motivations" (1978: 19). Homans (1961), Gibbons (1992), Griffin (1979), 
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Hollander and Julian (1969) and Heller and Van Till (1982) also conceptualise 
leadership and followership as interlinked in this manner. These studies indicate a 
form of exchange relationship, where the followership receive advancement of 
their goals in return for a subordinate role in the relationship, thus the followership 
is always conceptualised as dependent, i. e. as part of a concentrated influence 
network. The function and role of dispersed influence networks in organisational 
life is thus missing from these accounts. The lack of interest in these mechanisms 
of reciprocity has also meant that very few pieces of work deal with the 
emergence, or decline, of leaders - dealing mainly with theorising the successes of 
leaders in motivating workers and achieving management goals. This 
demonstrates that the literature is firmly slanted towards a management bias, that 
leadership and its control of the followership is of prime importance. It also 
demonstrates the assumption that all followers are structurally subordinate to the 
leadership and therefore cannot and will not become leaders themselves. This 
indicates a reliance on formal and concentrated influence networks in the 
exploration and analysis of leadership in the literature, while a review of the 
literature on employee ownership and control indicates that these forms of 
organisation possess a dominance of informal and dispersed interaction networks. 
One work that has addressed the mutual power balance between leaders and 
followers has been produced by Kirkpatrick and Locke (1996). They state that 
"effective leaders give power to others as a means of increasing their own powee, 
(Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1996: 191), indicating a level of dispersal of influence 
within the social network. But ultimately the research does not examine the 
mechanism that transmits power through such actions. 
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Networks therefore possess four forms of influence: formal and concentrated, 
formal and dispersed, informal and concentrated, and informal and dispersed 
influence (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Models of Network Influence 
Formal Informal 
Concentrated 1 2 
Dispersed 3 4 
All are network properties in that the fonn and pattern of networks establish the 
relative distributions of authority and leadership 
networks operate on different fonns of influence. 
By this means, different 
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6. Collective Identities 
The fields of industrial sociology and psychology (e. g. Festinger, 1954; Homans, 
1950; Mayo, 1946) have established that social interaction (and therefore social 
networks) plays a large part in forming employee identities, and in establishing a 
stable pattern of relations (Friedman, 1989) within networks. Friedman 
conceptualises "organisational culture as interaction rituals" (1989: 4), indicating 
the importance of communication, and thus a network perspective. Therefore the 
network is central to the communication of culture, as it is the vehicle through 
which meanings and understandings are communicated (Rice, 1993: lbarra & 
Andrews, 1993: Hammer et al, 1991: Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). The network is 
the vehicle through which members "come to agreements about what they value, 
how they will behave, and how they will interpret their experiences" (Wheelan, 
1994: 27). In a similar vein, Heller (1989) asserts that "reality is considered a 
social construct ... the primary vehicle for substantiating reality 
is conversation, 
particularly conversation with significant others" (1989: 68). The use of 
conversation and 'significant others' thus indicates a social network perspective to 
the process, though this network concept remains undeveloped in Heller's article. 
The mechanisms by which culture or collective identity is communicated via 
network routines include such methods as induction courses and training, and also 
via network symbols, 2 such as catch phrases (Child and Smith, 1987) and mission 
statements. Such cultural symbols are communicated through members' actions 
and expectations of behaviour and also via symbolic gestures, i. e. culturally 
' Geertz, 1975; Goffman, 1959. In this literature, the term 'symbol' includes any 
'thing' (an event, object, relationship, etc. ) that conveys meaning. 
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appropriate behaviour or language rewarded with acceptance, praise and respect 
(or censured by criticism) by the network. Furthermore, identity control can be 
achieved through, for example, the scapegoating of cultural deviants (Anthony, 
1994) in order to achieve their cultural displacement. Through this means, the 
network is purged of unwanted identities by accrediting an individual or clique 
with those deviant attributcs/idcntitics and then displacing the scapcgoated 
members to a peripheral network position, or removing them entirely from the 
network. 
The collective interpretation of experiences and events via networked interactions 
can be tenned the collective identity of the network and therefore collective 
identity is intricately linked to network form and pattern. Collective identities are 
constructs of meaning and understanding which are particular to each network. 
As such, each network could be said to possess its own framework for interpreting 
wider cultural, social and economic influences. As a result, two similarly 
structured systems of interaction will not exhibit identical frameworks of 
understanding since each framework is built on network experience and history, as 
well as the experience, histories and individual orientations of its members. 
Therefore, the meanings given to situations and events by those experiencing them 
will be contextual and, while each network possesses its own unique collective 
identity, or framework of understanding, it will also exist as part of a wider 
cultural identity. Consequently, the wider cultural' environment - cannot be 
interpreted independently of social interactions, and the structures that these social 
interactions form. 
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6.1 Organisational Cultures 
Organisations can therefore be seen to be made up of an number of collective 
identities which are constructed through networked interactions. However, while 
corganisational culture' has been the subject of widespread study for several 
years, much of the literature dealing with the topic remains located in the field of 
management studies. There are a number of limitations associated with this, not 
least that this literature assumes that an organisational culture can and does 
encompass the entire organisation (Storey, 1989). As a consequence of this 
unitarist approach, the assumption is that a managing elite or leadership directs 
and forms the organisational culture and that culture originates with management 
and diffuses from that point to the rest of the organisation (Pfeffer, 1981: Peters 
and Waterman, 1982), 
Organisational leaders are typically portrayed as cultural leaders, 
and other organisational members are seen as sharing their cultural 
viewpoint. Powerful organisational members, usually 
organisational leaders, define the agreed-upon cultural viewpoint 
of virtually all organisational members (e. g., Trice & Beyer, 1991). 
Thus, consensus is emphasised. (Stevenson and Bartunek, 1996: 5) 
Therefore, a concentrated influence network is assumed which encompasses the 
entire organisation. This obviously leaves little or no room for the theorisation of 
organisational culture under alternative network patterns, or for the influence over 
network collective identity by the followership. While there is little work 
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acknowledging divergent subcultures (Schein, 1985; Deal & Kennedy, 1982), 
there is growing recognition that organisations can possess more than one culture 
(Jennier, Slocum, Fry, & Gaines, 1991; Martin, 1992; Sackmann, 1992). 
However, these cultures are frequently perceived as sub-cultures, operating within 
the overarching organisational culture. 
While the management literature focuses on the production of culture simply 
through processes at work within the firm (Trice & Beyer, 1993; Stevenson and 
Bartunek, 1996), it is clear that network collective identity fonnation is also 
embedded in wider social processes, such as the trade union movement. Such 
wider social processes are the macro-cultural environments which carry the wider 
collective identities in society. Organisational social networks are therefore 
situated within these macro-cultural constructs and the macro-cultural 
environment is therefore closely associated with, yet separate from, network 
collective identities. The interaction of macro and micro identity influences leads 
to the - development of established routines and expectations of action and 
interaction within networks that reinforce their collective identities and internal 
coherence. This then results in systems and means of deciphering and diagnosing 
the information that reaches and travels within the network. However, the 
interaction of the two forces is experienced through the values and beliefs of the 
network, i. e. through the followership. 
However, the nature of divergent interests in conventionally owned and structured 
organisations means that organisational culture cannot simply be the culture of the 
management group, neither can it be said to constitute one cohesive culture for the 
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entire organisation. While traditionally divergent interests may not be as apparent 
in employee owned and controlled organisations, the collective memory of 
x divergent identities could play an important part in maintaining cultural identities 
and thus in maintaining established conflicts. Furthermore, alternative power 
sources and structures in employee owned and controlled organisations indicate 
that the assumption of one, unitarist organisational culture is also unlikely to be 
found in such enterprises. Organisational culture is more likely to be embedded 
in a pattern of interactions between core cultural, or identity, groups, while the 
organisation remains a collection of competing identity networks. Friedman 
(1989) has shown that there are numerous cultures held within a coherent 
organisational whole, linked by their expectations and shared routines. It follows 
that any one individual can be a member of a number of networks, each with 
distinct but co-existent identities. 
6.2 Followership and Collective Identity 
Despite the significance of social network forces in the formation of 
organisational cultures and network identities, the literature largely neglects the 
integral role of the followership in supporting or in undermining cultures within 
organisations and regards the followership as a body to be manipulated by the 
leadership (Anthony, 1994) and not vice versa. For example, Schein (1985) 
focuses on the cultural impact of organisational founders, and how they create the 
basic assumptions of the group, consequently the followership has no place in 
Schein's scheme. Heller also places cultural emphasis on the leadership, "as they 
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define the reality of the work setting" (1989: 68) and can "mediate reality" 
(1989: 75). The problem again lies in the assumption that the leadership is drawn 
from a different group to the followcrship, and that followership equates to 
subordinate employees. 
Cultural leadership has also been termed 'visionary' leadership (Bennis & Nanus, 
1985) and while Mintzberg and Waters (1983) describe these visions as 
originating in part in the environment, they fail to explain what is meant by 'the 
environment'. Kotter's study of leadership (in Bigley et al, 1996) introduces the 
idea that a leader's 'vision' usually consists of "ideas that are already well known" 
(1996: 622). Kotter is therefore implicitly indicating that the followership plays a 
significant role in forming the vision of the leadership. For example, even in 
instances where the followership often appears docile (some religious cults for 
example) and the will of the leader supreme, the needs and desires of the 
followership are still shaping the culture and beliefs of these networks. The 
leadership of any network can only obtain supreme control over their followership 
if the desire and need of the followership is for this. If the desire is not there, the 
leader would be oppressing the followership and dissent and conflict would 
inevitably result. This concept is illustrated by Bryman's (1992) work, which 
links culture, leadership and followership, saying that those who "possess 
charismatic attributes embody the core or central values of the societies to which 
they are attached" (1992: 34). As Ralston (1989: 57) writes, charismatic leaders 
"were able to focus and shape ideas already present in an obscure manner in the 
consciousness of their followers", i. e. dormant goals or suppressed frustrations 
within their framework of understanding. Bums (1978) also acknowledges the 
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role of the followership when he writes that, "leaders see and act on their own and 
the followers' values and motivations" (1978: 19). 
6.3 Influence Relations and Collective Identity Formation 
The form and pattern of networks will therefore influence how interaction routines 
are constructed. This in turn will construct collective identities by influencing 
how events are deciphered and given meaning by the network. The more network 
influence an individual possesses, then the more influence they will have over a 
network's interpretation of experiences due to control of the communication of 
understandings, meanings and language, and through role modelling. In 
concentrated interaction networks for instance, central members will be able to 
communicate their interpretation of events directly to most of the network, while 
peripheral members will have little opportunity for this. The reflection by the 
central location of the peripheral followership's beliefs and goals may therefore be 
distorted and imprecise. In a dispersed interaction network, the followership and 
leadership are highly integrated and thus the collective identity is more likely to 
be integrated. 
Identity influence can also be exerted through the possession of fonnal or infonnal 
influence. For instance, in an informal network, influence is not derived from 
structural position but from embodying, realising and focusing the ideals and 
values of the followership. If the followership constrains or removes the 
communication of these ideals and identities to the leadership, then the leadership 
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becomes ineffective, unrepresentative and likely to fail. 
Furthennore, position relative to others in the network, i. e. level of influence 
attained by the individual, will determine whether the individual can participate in 
event interpretation, and when or whether their interpretations are listened to or 
given credence. Not only are there established interaction rituals that dictate the 
form and pattern of decision-making, but the structure of the network may provide 
disincentives to speak outside the traditional constraints provided by these rituals. 
Therefore status comes into prominence in event interpretation situations, through 
leadership and followership influence. In a concentrated interaction network the 
focus of information and resources on the leader may disadvantage the rest of the 
membership in terms of adequate participation, since they will not have access to 
the full information they need to make a diagnosis of the situation or event, and 
from there produce an interpretation. 
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7. Collective Identities and Conflict 
7.1 Identity Convergence 
Theories of organisational culture are based on assumptions of conventional 
ownership and control of enterprises, where management and workers are likely to 
have divergent collective identities, and where management's identity will be in 
conflict with that of the workers. The harmonisation hypothesis assumes that 
divergent collective identities within organisations can be moved towards 
convergence through the mechanism of employee ownership and control. The 
management studies literature on identity convergence implicitly takes the view 
that the power of language and symbols can construct organisational. cultures, 
increasing employee identification with 'company' goals and values. 
Contemporary movements towards employee empowerment have been seen as 
management efforts to organise and construct consent (Burawoy, 1979; Ramsay, 
1977), away from class-consciousness and towards corporate consciousness. This 
approach assumes that the interests of employers and labour are intricately 
intertwined (Tomlinson, 1982) at the firm level and this dependence can be 
manoeuvred into a common identity, in other words a homogenous corporate 
culture. In this, the field of management studies assumes that identities and 
consciousness are individualised and created by immediate, individual 
relationships, and in doing so the literature largely disregards the reality of 
collective conflicts of interest within the employee owned and controlled 
organisation. Unsurprisingly therefore employee resistance has continued to be 
expressed under these individual-focused schemes. According to this paradigm, 
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successful efforts at employee ownership or industrial democracy would forge a 
unitarist organisation, producing a homogenous workplace culture and collective 
identity, without requiring any alterations to the labour process itself. 
Much of the literature assumes that the opposing forces of labour and management 
can be overcome simply through changes within firms, however this discounts the 
influence of external social forces and institutions. The literature also bases its 
prediction of the removal of conflict on the basis that work identities and 
behaviours are formed solely within the environment of the firm. While employee 
ownership and control is assumed to remove the inherent conflicts between labour 
and capital (at the same time as increasing cooperation and identification with 
common organisation-wide goals), the fundamental flaw of this approach lies in 
the assumption that identities can be formed solely by those micro-social 
institutions held within the organisation. However, macro-social institutions 
outwith the firm are important factors in individual and collective identities, 
particularly institutions such as the trade union movement. As such, the network 
identities within organisations are based on collective identities which are in part 
constructed outwith the organisation. Much of the literature and thought on 
employee ownership and control therefore ignores the macro-cultural influences 
on network identities. While it recognises the existence of divergent cultures 
within the firm, it assumes that these can be aligned without any change in 
ownership or control. 
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7.2 Collective Identities and Conflict 
Network form, pattern and collective identity will consequently shape the options 
for action and reaction to circumstances and stresses experienced by the individual 
and the network. Accordingly, a situation may be experienced differently by 
different networks, according to their means of deciphering and constructing 
understandings of the situation. Thus the same event may be experienced as 
subtly different realities by different networks. Furthermore, the origin of 
information, from within and outwith the network, will influence its understanding 
and meaning - for example, whether information originates from a 'friendly' or an 
4antagonistic' source. No two systems of understanding will therefore be 
identical. These differences in understanding and in experienced realities could 
produce or exacerbate conflicts as meanings understood by one network are 
misunderstood by the other party to the conflict. 
Differences in network form, pattern and collective identities also mean that 
dissimilar networks may approach problem-solving differently. Indeed, it could 
mean that a network engaged in a conflict situation fails to accept that there is a 
problem to be resolved, especially if there is a mis-match of understandings 
between networks engaged in a conflict, 
For a group to initiate the process of problem-solving there must 
be some agreement that a problem exists. (Gordon, 1955: 61). 
If the problem exists, or has meaning, for only one network within an 
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organisation, then another network may not perceive it as an important matter, 
resulting in tensions over solutions to the issue. This process operating on 
understandings within a group has also been termed a 'stage of diagnosis' 
(Gordon, 1955: 63) of what the problem actually is. 
Network cultural realities and identities thus create the boundaries for frameworks 
of understanding and this imposes boundaries on the reach of problem-solving. 
Thus, one network may see an appropriate resolution differently to another 
network and consequently, different interpretations of a problem may require 
different answers. Part of the effect is that network structures (form and pattern) 
act by "blocking out certain possibilities for action" (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 
1994: 1440) which means that certain solutions to problems and conflicts will not 
be acceptable to the network identity. 
Recurrent conflict between two groups, following the same patterns, can therefore 
be seen as a product of opposing, unchanging identities and the learned reactions 
due to shared histories of conflict which "serve as effective stimuli to the 
behaviour of members in the present" (Gordon, 1955: 78), i. e. embedded 
frameworks of misunderstanding. Choices of action and reaction therefore 
depend on "the individual's restrictions and opportunities" (Zeggelink, 1994: 297) 
which are determined by their network mediated understandings of the situation 
and the choices available to them as a result of their network role and situation. 
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7.3 Frameworks of Misunderstanding 
While the organisational conflict literature focuses on two main, opposing 
networks in industrial organisations (the formal trade union and management 
networks), it is possible to examine industrial relations as a clash of collective 
identities, resulting in a common organisational framework of misunderstanding. 
As infonnation and events will be deciphered and understood differently by both 
networks, a common framework of understanding may be lacking, which leads to 
misunderstandings, suspicion and mistrust - the traditional 'them-and-us' 
situations. Such misunderstandings often result in hostility (apparent in 
enterprises with a suspicion of 'hidden agendas'), and occasionally in open 
conflict. An adversarial negotiations framework within an industrial organisation 
could therefore be seen as a framework of misunderstanding. 
7.4 Identity Dissonance 
Since membership of organisational networks is not necessarily discrete, 
dissonance, or conflicts of meaning, may arise as any one individual can be a 
member of a number of networks, each with distinct but co-existent collective 
identities. Conflicts of meaning can therefore occur within, as well as between, 
networks through the process of identity dissonance, where more than one 
collective identity exists within an individual or a network. Consequently, 
tensions may be created by the membership of overlapping networks, where the 
collective identities of the networks are not compatible. For instance, Hammer, 
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Currall and Stem's (1991) study of worker directors throws light on the conflicts 
that arise as a result of industrial democracy in firms. The research records that 
worker directors were perceived as "a potential threat to the power of corporate 
management" (1991: 664). This conclusion should not be surprising since worker 
directors constitute a threat to the formal power base or influence of the 
management network. As company directors, their position within the formal 
management network is highly centralised, yet their background, and informal 
network membership, is usually based on a central position within the local union 
network. 
From the other side of the dissonance equation, Hammer et al focus on the role 
expectations of worker directors, which they describe as 'sent roles', based on 
"communications from others about role expectations intended to influence 
worker director behaviour" (1991: 666). Tensions arise when worker directors 
"receive divergent role expectations" (1991: 667) resulting in role conflict within 
the individual. From a network perspective, this can be reconceived as 
information and expectations received from membership of parallel networks with 
distinct collective identities, resulting in contradictory expectations and thus in 
identity dissonance. Therefore conflicting collective identities occur in the 
individual. The solution to the perceived problems created by this forrn of 
employee participation suggested by Hammer et al is to "create or define a worker 
director role that does not threaten [management's] power position" (1991: 664), 
in other words to find an alternative network position for the worker directors that 
does not directly overlap with management's influence network - thus removing 
the source of the tensions. While this could be achieved through assimilating 
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employee representatives into management's network in a more peripheral 
position, it could also mean situating the worker directors in an alternative 
network. Hammer et al do not consider these alternative scenarios, and so neglect 
to evaluate the implications of their conclusions. If the latter scenario were the 
case (situating the employee representatives in an alternative, non-management 
network), then the assumed creation of common goals within participative 
companies would be unlikely to occur since the separate organisational networks 
would still remain, even perhaps becoming reinforced by the creation of 
participatory structures. Therefore, within employee owned or participatory firms, 
tensions can be created by the multiple, but not complementary, organisational 
network memberships of workers. Consequently, the membership overlap 
between both ownership/management and workers' networks in employee owned 
and controlled organisations may result in tensions created by identity dissonance. 
However, identity dissonance may also occur where the collective identity of a 
single network is challenged. In this event, the collective identity of the network 
is in flux and dissonance occurs while the network searches for identity stability. 
In dispersed interaction networks, for instance, where the form facilitates a 
number of leaderships located throughout the network, competing leaderships may 
result in a number of competing (collective) identities, resulting in identity 
dissonance within the network. In more concentrated identity networks, where 
leadership is focused on a central network location, leadership succession may 
also produce identity dissonance among the followership, as the new leadership 
displaces the framework of understanding of the departing leadership. Heller 
(1989) indicates identity dissonance in her work on leadership succession, 
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Leadership transition is a conversion process that succeeds when 
followers transfer their allegiance from the predecessor - and that 
person's view of reality - to the successor. (Heller, 1989: 65) 
Heller maintains that new leaders "encourage followers to repudiate the old order 
and give their allegiance to the new one" (1989: 75), through a process of 
scapegoating and 'status degradation' of the departing leader. However, this work 
does not distinguish between different forms and patterns of relationships between 
the leadership and followership, and leaves the mechanisms underlying the 
conversion process unexplored. The social construct of influence is assumed and 
the article fails to give adequate importance to the tensions that disruptions of 
network processes will generate, unlike Friedman's work on labour negotiations at 
International Harvester, (1989) which outlines how the disruption of interaction 
patterns could result in conflict. While, at International Harvester, the formal 
positions of management and union were opposed, established informal 
interaction patterns between the negotiators allowed them to communicate and co- 
operate during negotiations. The conflict Friedman studied was a result of 
management "eliminating those managers who carried and reproduced that 
culture" (1989: 3), thus removing from the informal network those managers who 
understood the language of the union identity. In effect, International Harvester 
replaced a common framework of understanding, for their negotiations with a 
framework of misunderstanding - resulting in conflict. 
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8. Summary 
The conceptual framework developed for this study has sought to avoid and 
escape from the bounds of the concept of power and resistance, and develop an 
alternative view of influence relations in organisations, which is argued to be 
comprised of multiple layers of meaning. The concept of collective identity, 
created through network interactions and recognised through network symbols 
such as language and understandings, presents a concept for disclosing both 
observable and unobservable organisational conflict. This social network 
perspective pennits a consideration of institutionalised conflicts and of the role of 
individuals within these processes. It also pennits the contextualisation of 
conflicts, and allows for an investigation of the different functions that conflict 
has in different situations. However, to operationalise this concept a methodology 
and method are required which can address both the structured abstraction of the 
social network and the grounded experience and contextualisation of 
organisational tensions and conflicts. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology and Method: Issues and Practice 
This chapter will, in the first instance, address the methodological issues raised by 
the combination of a methodology firmly based in a quantitative tradition with the 
use of qualitative research methods. The second section of this chapter is devoted 
to a discussion of the issues raised by the gendered dynamics of the research 
process. In particular the matter of gendered access to data is considered, 
including the dilemmas, obstacles and advantages of being a female researcher in 
both female and male dominated organisations. 
1. Methodological Introduction 
The broader social construction approach on which this study and its methodology 
are based contends that individuals, their identities and behaviours, are embedded 
in social network relations. This implies that identities can be formed via a 
number of different allegiances, from small scale, localised networks to the wider, 
more abstract forms of networks, ie where allegiances and identities are formed 
without a tangible relationship between core and periphery. This does not imply 
that all networks have the same influence on identity. Some small scale networks 
such as the immediate family may have a considerable identity forming influence, 
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while a larger network such as membership of a global association may hold little 
sway over opinions and behaviours. Alternatively, membership of a workplace 
network or team may exert little influence over an individual's identity, while 
membership of a larger network, such as a trade union, may be a significant 
identification factor. Importantly, identities are assumed to be both unique to the 
individual while at the same time encompassing the reality of collective identity. 
In addition, identities are also considered to be contextual in nature, and the 
differing ways in which, individuals and networks experience, understand and 
conceptualise their realities is considered. As Chapter Two outlined, this ontology 
draws on a number of theoretical sources, but does not pretend to deliver a global 
theory of social construction, rather the dominant organising principle in 
organisations is considered to be their social networks, both formally and 
infon-nally organised. The methodological approach adopted therefore utilises and 
encapsulates aspects of social network analysis. 
As the literature review of Chapter One demonstrated, membership of an 
employee owned firm embodies in each individual the role of both employer and 
employee. It has therefore been hypothesised that worker owned firms experience 
a radically different system of influence relations, controls and exchanges to 
conventionally organised firms. This hypothesis has a number of different 
geneses, in labour process theory and in managerialist studies. Extrapolating from 
labour process theory, the suggested change in influence relations is based on the 
assumption that in worker owned and controlled firms influence and control based 
on the control of capital (and the ability to punish) will be equally distributed. 
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Therefore socially derived sources of influence will rise in significance. This 
socially derived influence is, in social network analysis theory, tenned 'social 
capital'. However, the use of this term confuses the issues of control of capital 
with that of possession of social influence and as such this study will not be 
adopting this particular network terminology. 
However, the reduction or removal of the unequal distribution of capital through 
the vehicle of employee ownership does not necessarily equate to a hannonisation 
of relations. This study hypothesises that in employee owned and controlled firms 
there will be scope for unequal distribution of influence, giving rise to conflict 
based on socially derived status and membership of social networks. Such a 
hypothesis finds some support in the literature on cooperatives. Tynan and 
Thomas (1981) claim that "the power of an individual within the organisation is 
linked to the wide social context in which he operates" (1981: 8). Tynan illustrates 
this in her 1980 study of a printing cooperative. In this case, a semi-skilled 
worker claimed that her lack of formal education and working class background 
made her insecure about participating in company discussions. 
From a managerialist perspective, it has also been suggested that employee 
participation in decision-making increases employee identification with company 
goals and values. This identification is achieved, without any change in 
ownership of capital, through increased worker control of the labour process. It is 
however clear that both hypotheses suggest a fundamental alteration in employee 
identifications within the workplace, and with the form of influence relations at 
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work. Extrapolating from this ontology to the study of conflict, conflict processes 
are seen to be shaped both by social networks and by the wider context, and 
consequently the nature of conflict processes will vary over space and time. 
Therefore, there is a need to understand contextualised and complex network 
identities and realities in order to understand conflict practices and processes. To 
explore these associations, an investigation of influence and identity distribution 
in employee owned and controlled firms is necessary. As the literature suggests 
that influence in employee owned and controlled organisations is socially, as well 
as bureaucratically or politically produced, this indicates a need to examine the 
social relations within such organisations. In addition, in order to specify why 
some individuals may become more or less involved in conflict situations, their 
generation and resolution, a study of the morphological and interactional 
characteristics of the social networks under investigation is required, since the 
attitudes and values individuals adopt in a conflict situation do not necessarily 
indicate the underlying reasons for their actions (Mitchell, 1969). 
These underlying reasons are hypothesised to be based around membership of and 
position within social networks. ý Social networks however encompass wider 
organisational. relations than those most often examined by much of the industrial 
relations literature which confines itself to analysis of conflict within the formal 
structures of the firm, focusing on areas such as grievance procedures and 
collective bargaining. In contrast, the literature from the field of psychology 
emphasises the informal, interpersonal aspects of conflict and, while it draws on 
theories of 'group dynamics', fails to give adequate weight to contextual factors. 
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These two fields of conflict analysis could be married through the use of 
contextualised social network analysis, which allows the study of both fonnal and 
informal contextualised conflict, on small and large scales alongside the study of 
group conflicts and the role of individuals. However, despite a number of studies 
of employee owned and controlled organisations in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
very little is known about the shape or strength of their workplace networks. The 
literature fails to place an emphasis on networks of relationships, and while it 
generally talks of 'social relations' and their problems, it possesses no 
methodological or theoretical framework in which to place or analyse the sources 
of organisational dynamics and/or stasis. While most studies do report that 
employee owned and controlled organisations tend to exhibit an intense group life 
(Paton, 1978; Tynan 1980), what has been published leaves the question of the 
impact of social relations practically unanswered. Moreover, over the last decade 
research on cooperative forms of work organisation and ownership has largely 
faded out of fashion. This is a process mirrored by the relative decline in 
collective worker influence in society at large and in its political processes. 
Therefore, a contextualised social network analysis should be applied to the study 
of conflict and harmonisation processes in employee owned companies. Social 
network analysis provides a coherent methodological and analytical framework 
within which these relations can be investigated and within which the relational 
data can be organised and analysed. Without the use of such a framework for the 
understanding of social relations and constructions, conflict cannot be accurately 
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or adequately analysed, and without adequate analysis workable solutions cannot 
be formulated. 
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2. Method 
The methodology adopted by this study is designed to access the mechanisms 
used by social networks in the generation and resolution of conflicts at work. 
However, the more positivist industrial relations methodological approaches to the 
study of conflict, resistance and consciousness are, for these purposes, overly 
deterministic and dualistic and as such are unlikely to uncover the complex, 
contextual motivations and constraints which underlie participation in conflict 
practices. The use of these approaches would thus tend to deliver inadequate 
methodologies, due to an over dependence on relations and conflicts that are 
visible. From the other academic pole, managerialist approaches to the study of 
workplace conflict and identities are also overly positivist, and in addition are 
overly individualistic for the study of collective identities while also failing to 
account for the contextual and relational nature of conflict processes. Too much 
emphasis on the individual and a lack of consideration of the objectivity of 
experience could also be a critique levelled at cultural studies. The 
epistemological position adopted by this study would be poorly served by such 
methods, as the objective of the research is to uncover hidden meanings and 
relations within networks and use these to illuminate conflict processes. Therefore 
it is important that the methods chosen do not overly impose meanings or 
intentions onto the participant's behaviours, and consequently a qualitative 
methodological framework is appropriate. This allows the research to go beyond 
the more mechanistic approaches of the managerialist measures of job satisfaction, 
employee loyalty and attitude surveys, which reduce employee values and 
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identities to aspects of management philosophy, and which reduce employee 
identities to face values, i. e. what can be observed. In order to gain access to the 
invisible aspects of network relations and processes a method, which is able to 
access data beyond the surface observable events, is required. This creates a 
number of complications when using social network analysis. Even though some 
of the original studies were undertaken, using anthropologically derived methods, 
in work enterprises, (Warner and Low, 1947; Mayo, 1933; Lupton, 1963), social 
network analysis has since developed within a positivist, quantitative tradition, 
comprising formal mathematical procedures (Filament, 1963; Harary, Norman and 
Cartwright, 1965). 
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3. The Principles of Social Network Analysis 
The field of social networks can be dated back to the 1930s and principally to 
Mayo's studies of factory and community life, but it was not until the 1950s that 
the term 'social network analysis' became commonly used. At this time, the 
research undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s was principally concerned with the 
effects of "the morphological features of the network itself and their implications 
for social behaviour" (Bames 1954, in Mitchell, 1969: 5). Mitchell himself 
considered interactional characteristics were "likely to be apposite in any attempt 
to describe social behaviour adequately" (Mitchell, 1969: 12). Thus, the origins of 
social network analysis lie in behavioural studies and in social anthropology. This 
link between social structures and behaviour closely approximates the collective 
identities hypothesis on which this study is based. 
Social network analysis as it stands today provides a means of measuring and 
analysing interactions within a social structure. However, while network analysis 
measures the relational characteristics of the group or network, its development as 
a methodology has been in a highly quantitative, positivistic direction. 
Established social network analysis exactly measures the morphological 
characteristics of a network, using indices such as density, reachability, degree, 
and centrality (Appendix 1). These characteristics indicate the theoretical 
possibilities open to an individual to interact and communicate with other network 
members. Social network analysis uses these measures to determine an 
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individual's position and role within a network, for example whether a figure is 
peripheral or central to the network. From this data, a picture of the shape of the 
network can be constructed, including for example the existence of dense sub- 
groups or cliques. The general hypothesis generated by and associated with the 
shape of a network is that if infonnation flows easily in all directions then it will 
become possible to dissipate tensions and therefore deal with the sources of 
conflict. However, if communication does not occur or is trapped within a clique, 
this may lead to a build up of hostility and conflict and result in an inability to 
deal with the root causes of the conflict. In this way, highly centralised networks 
may "reduce group satisfaction, harmony and solidarity and instead produce 
internal conflict" (Hogg & Vaughan, 1995: 248) through the isolation of peripheral 
members. However, these measures rely heavily -on quantitative data, thus 
reducing relationships to simple structures or lines on a graph, and individuals to 
nodes within a sociogram. The use of these mathematical methods removes any 
subtleties from sets of relationships. Beyond these strictly morphological 
measures, the transactional content of interactions is a crucial consideration in the 
study of conflict processes. A high reachability score for example does not 
indicate positive relations if the relationships between members of a network are 
acrimonious. Social network analysis is also used to examine the transactional 
nature of relationships and the character of those links. Indices used to measure 
transactional content are - intensity, multiplexity and the direction of relationships 
(Appendix 1). 
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Networks with high scores in intensity and multiplexity indicate that network 
members interact in many different contexts and therefore will probably identify 
strongly, and on many levels, with the other members of the network. Multiplex 
networks also provide their members with a high level of co-accessibility, e. g. at 
work, at the pub, the gym, the cinema, and therefore with ease of communication 
which can be used to promote group norms. Social network analysis theory states 
that the more cohesive, e. g. dense and multiplex, the network is, the more 
conformity to group standards there will be. This is achieved through improved 
communication, cooperation and interpersonal acceptance (Evans & Jarvis, 1980; 
Mudrack, 1989; Levine & Moreland, 1990). The establishment of common values 
and behaviours within a group can therefore decrease the incidence of conflict 
arising from a clash of network values (or 'frameworks of understanding'). The 
variety of relationship contexts in a multiplex network also means that it is harder 
for a member to withdraw completely from the network if there is a disagreement. 
If a relationship were to be 'single-stranded, e. g. based solely on a work 
connection, a problem in this relationship could easily result in the individual's 
withdrawal from the network, e. g. resignation from the job. Multiplex, or multi- 
stranded, networks are therefore assumed by the literature to be more robust and 
able to withstand conflict than single-stranded relationships (Boissevain, 1974). 
In addition, consideration of the flow of information within a network is crucial in 
the study of conflict type and intensity. In a highly centralised network the 
possible scenario of a unidirectional flow of communication from those in control 
of information may provoke frustration in other members. It may also prevent the 
116 
open expression of this conflict, as individuals could be wary of speaking out 
against those in possession of influence. Again, these are measures of purely 
observable phenomena and allow for no interpretative data to be gathered or used 
in a sociograrnatic analysis. 
This dilemma was highlighted in the piloted methodology, ' which was constructed 
using social network analysis-led indices of network interactions. The intention 
was to construct sociograms of various relationships using indices and 
measurements constructed around Barnes' interaction analysis criteria (Hollander, 
1976). From these indices a picture of network relations and morphological 
patterns was to be constructed, using a simplified version of the concepts of 
centrality, direction, multiplexity, and cliques. The indices used were numerous' 
' Used in Case Study One, NurseryCo, a small childcare ESOP in the West Midlands. 
NurseryCo had a staff of five full-time (of which three were owners), and two part- 
timers. Two of the full-time and permanent staff were being considered for ownership. 
Control on a day-to-day basis was restricted to the Full-time Nursery Officer as 
required by legislation. However, once a month a full meeting of all staff was 
arranged, out of working hours, to discuss and vote on future issues. 
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* When a member went to another for advice and who gave the help. 
* When a member went to another for permission, who they went to and the outcome 
of the exchange. 
" When decision-making help was requested and from whom. 
" Whether informal help was offered at work and whether it was accepted, e. g. making 
cups of tea, going to the shops. 
* Who gave and who received information on work, leisure pursuits, gossip about 
another member. 
" Who told jokes to whom, about whom. 
" Whether there was someone who was complained about and who tended to receive 
the complaints. 
* Who offered help outside work, e. g. lending time or money to another member, or baby-sitting for another member. 
" Who met outside work, e. g. to go to the pub or cinema. 
" Whether any member leaves the organisation - turnover and absenteeism measures, 
to indicate one conflict solution. 
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and were constructed to measure the multiplexity of the group, transactions and 
their contents, central and peripheral actors, and conflict situations. In order to 
identify network positions, interactions were coded along the following lines: A 
score of minus one (-I) indicated an interaction in which a group member took a 
subordinate role, a score of plus one (+I) likewise indicated an interaction where 
the member took a dominant role. A nought (0) was used to indicate a lack of 
interaction. The field notes also recorded the frequency and duration of 
interactions between network members. In addition, proximity was noted, i. e. 
whether actors worked side by side. While these measures of frequency, duration 
and proximity proved useful in identifying subgroupings within the network, the 
indices used in the pilot proved to be a severe obstacle to the collection of the 
quality of data the study required. In the first instance the use of scored measures 
restricted the data to a finite set of indices and coded categories, devoid of context. 
While this allowed network form to be recorded with confident accuracy, much of 
the rich detail of the network relationships and interactions was lost in their 
reduction to simple mathematically described and defined relationships. The use 
of this technique also fonnalised and estranged the researcher's presence by 
making the data collection process highly visible to the participants yet highly 
coded and therefore inaccessible to them. This resulted in a constraining effect on 
the behaviour of the group, and the researcher's role as a participant was also 
restricted. Consequently the data collected largely represented an outsider's view 
of the social processes. 
118 
Therefore, SNA as a methodology, while it is case specific, suffers from a lack of 
contextualisation and of rich data. To avoid the problems faced by much of the 
literature of false assumptions which then evolve into erroneous causal 
connections, a deeper and wider analysis is needed. While SNA measures remain 
important, their primary value to this study is in their indication of network form 
and pattern, and not as an indication of network processes. The methodology 
therefore needs to be examined not as a blueprint for conducting research, or as a 
research design, but critically in order to discover whether a more qualitative form 
of social network analysis could be developed as the basis of a new methodology 
for this study. This new methodology would be based on the belief that the 
background, culture and context of relations are what make interactions 
decipherable. Likewise, it would need to provide an insight into the dual role of 
the individual and of the social structure in the evolution and revolution of social 
relations. The following section will examine the shortcomings of established 
social network analysis, especially its essentially descriptive nature, and then 
move on to rework the concept to include notions of both network and individual 
frameworks of understanding. The result will be an analytical framework that 
expresses the three-fold nature of social networks - structure, identities, and the 
cultural-historical-political enviromnent within which the network is located. 
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3.1 Structure 
The vast majority of the literature on social network analysis remains dedicated to 
the quantitative, mathematical study of social networks, where actions are 
primarily determined by the social structure. These analyses concentrate 
particularly on categories and relationships in an abstract form. Social network 
analysis's tenns, such as density, centrality, distance, structural hole, multiplexity, 
cohesion and symmetry indicate a solely structural, and snap-shot, approach to 
networks which reduces the individual to a node, and relationships to directional 
lines. Thus the highly deterministic and quantitative developments within social 
network analysis have amplified the removal of the network from its social 
context. Established social network analysis assumes that the position or office an 
individual occupies within a network is of greater significance than that 
individual. This focus inevitably leads to certain types of, and limitations to, 
predictions of network behaviour and dynamics. The assumptions of social 
network analysis also tend to be globalistic in the sense that it is assumed that 
individuals in similar network positions will behave similarly. Therefore, there is 
a fundamental assumption of homogeneity and hegemony within social network 
analysis and a lack of contextualisation. The result of this is that relationships 
within a network are awarded values devoid of their cultural situation. Even with 
measurements of the transactional contents of relationships, the wider picture can 
be lost and the network positioned in a social void. Thus a concentration on the 
content and forin of networks (the purely structurally determined responses) can 
be overly restrictive. The need is for a framework (and therefore following from 
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this an appropriate methodology) that does not impose artificial boundaries on 
understandings of the social dynamics of networks. However, this does not 
indicate that structure is redundant in this study, it does have an important 
analytical role to play, but it is not considered to be the prime determinant of 
social dynamics. The 'network' is not the same as the formal structure of roles 
within it, but more than that. It is a social institution which links actors and their 
goals within a more or less stable structure. Therefore, both the formal structure 
and the informal content of networks must be examined. 
3.2 Identity and Micro-Cultural Environments 
The informal content of networks is determined by the network members and their 
identities, the cultural-historical-political situation of the network and of the 
individuals who constitute it. Therefore the network is more than a question of 
structure or of individualised behaviour, it is a product of macro and micro forces 
and collective frameworks of understanding. Therefore, the role of the micro- 
cultural environment of a network is as important as that of its social structure in 
the analysis of social action and change. 
Members' identities will be derived partly, but are also separate, from network 
position, i. e. individuals in similar network positions will not possess the same 
individualised identities, just as they won't be biologically identical. Just as there 
will be differences in gender and age within a population so there will be 
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individualised identities derived from social experience and by membership in 
other, overlapping networks. All of these play a considerable part in group 
dynamics. Network members will however share a common micro-culture with 
the other network members and therefore will have a common collective identity, 
such as the collective identities of a work team, a football team, or a family. This 
does not suggest a network populated by identical individuals, but that a network 
generates its own micro-cultural environment with which its members associate as 
parts of that network entity. While the wider culture, e. g. capitalism or 
secularism, extends beyond and addresses all networks, there is a localised 
cultural environment, associated with but different to the macro environment. It is 
with this localised culture that this study is primarily concemed, and how the 
individuals as a network shape and are shaped by their localised frameworks of 
understanding. 
Such localised culture can be defined as a shared set of values, meanings and 
purpose which work together to form network ideologies which "organise and 
simplify our overall understanding of what is important" (Wheelan, 1994: 41). 
Network ideology is therefore a framework of understanding for the network, an 
idcntity which is closely associated with network goals. These frameworks of 
understanding create a social reality for the network members, and are shared 
through communication (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) with "salient or relevant 
others" (lbarra and Andrews, 1993: 288), in the network. As communication is a 
network property affected by network structure, culture and understanding are also 
network properties and must be studied in this respect. 
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Where two or more frameworks of understanding overlap, misunderstandings may 
occur where the different networks use different vocabularies, language and 
concepts to explain the same events or information (Sewel, 1974). The network is 
therefore the repository of ideals, meanings and understanding of the environment 
within which its membcrs arc situatcd. The framcwork of undcrstanding 
embodied by the network is the means by which information flowing into the 
network is processed and deciphered. Interaction is therefore central to the 
construction of understandings and culture. Thus the network embodies the ideals 
for and of its members. New members may join because of what the network 
represents, for example some cultural frameworks can only be realised 
collectively, e. g. worker resistance. The network structure therefore carries the 
framework of understanding of the group and the personal beliefs and values of 
the members. As a network is enlivened by its members, these frameworks of 
understanding and collective identities are not fixed and can be changed by the 
members (Mathien, 1988) or by a change in members. Therefore change occurs 
via the network and is thus a network property. 
3.3 Macro-Cultural Environments 
Such micro-cultural identities, or collective identities, of networks are themselves 
situated within broader socio-cultural-historical enviromnents. Identities will also 
be formed by membership of macro-communities or networks, where social mores 
will amend the presentation of identities. For example, in some communities 
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actions that are otherwise considered blameless may be considered unacceptable 
(for example wearing shorts is usually acceptable in secular society, but may be 
considered inappropriate clothing inside some churches). Therefore, some groups 
may posses differing value judgements about the boundary between acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour. To understand the mechanics of social action, wider 
value systems, beliefs and characteristics also need examination. 
The concept of the role of the macro-cultural environment owes recognition in 
part to the field of 'group processes' literature, and within social network analysis 
to the work of Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and their concept of the 
"(potentially) autonomous causal significance of cultural or political discourses" 
(1994: 1436). Emirbayer and Goodwin's paper criticises social network analysis 
for having omitted consideration of the way 'cultural structures' shape social 
action, and that social network analysis has "inadequately theorised the causal role 
of ideals, beliefs and values of the actors that strive to realise them" (1994: 1446). 
However, they fail to distinguish between macro and micro cultural frameworks 
and how these are established and interact with networks. They are implicitly 
concerned with the macro-cultural environment and how it influences the 
individual actor. There is a lack of analysis of how the two different forms of 
cultural framework affect network member's frameworks of understanding and 
identities within a situation. Therefore culture is not necessarily as external to the 
network or discrete as Emirbayer and Goodwin would suggest. 
124 
In addition, historical period may also alter behaviours, for example the increase 
in industrial action in periods of relative worker power. This plays an important 
part in determining action in a given situation. Therefore, the macro-historical 
environment is an important consideration since it makes certain networks and 
their cultures more enabled, popular and salient at certain historical periods. At a 
smaller scale, it is also important to consider the histories of the individuals in a 
network - their joint histories and their separate histories. A micro-historical 
understanding is therefore necessary in order to explain why individuals join 
networks (their past experiences), and why networks act as they do, e. g. network 
rituals, expectations (such as 'them-and-us'), and learned responses. This 
provides infonnation on the context of the collective identity of the network. 
The main concept developed through this re-working of social network analysis is 
the interlinking, yet discrete, natures of structure, with individual and cultural 
situations. The decisive element in this study is the inclusion of the last point, the 
cultural-historical-political environment, which links the fields of social network 
analysis, formal and informal social relations research, and group processes 
literature. The dynamics of response and change are therefore subject to the 
interplay between the individual, the network and the cultural situation. Network 
qualities are therefore a product of both the members' identities, individual and 
collective, their individual network situations and the situation of the network in 
the historical-cultural-political enviromnent. Consequently all individuals are 
different and unique, but are all situated within networked cultures and all 
situations are different - structurally, culturally and historically dissimilar. 
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Furthermore, individuals can choose to uphold or alter the network identities, as it 
is through the individual that the networked reality explanation, or identity, is 
interpreted and portrayed. 
The social network framework used in this study therefore has its roots firmly in 
social network analysis but has been developed beyond the present scope of this 
perspective. Structural analysis alone has been shown to be insufficient since a 
structure needs to be populated with contextualised individuals, and the values and 
beliefs of these contextualised individuals are as important as the abstract network 
structural force. As network characteristics are an integral part of understanding 
social action and change it is only by looking at the interaction of group values, 
frameworks of understanding and characteristics within a structure of social 
relations that it is possible to trace the evolution of social norms and identities. As 
frameworks of understanding and the social structures within which they are 
embedded are interdependent and rely upon each other for dynamic social 
relations, social interaction within a group or structure creates a dynamic as 
networks create, or react to, social situations. Often this is in response to 
alterations in the cultural-historical-political environment in which the group 
operates and from which it draws its identity. This interplay can be facilitated or 
constrained by either micro and macro social forces. These responses to social 
stimuli can reinforce the collective values and behaviour of the group, produce 
response evolution or revolution. 
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This three-way interaction between the individual, network and ideology or 
culture provides a framework through which the researcher can explore and 
analyse the dynamics of social processes. It is through these contextualised 
network response processes that an understanding of the role and significance of 
conflict can be generated. However, SNA crucially fails to acknowledge the 
intrinsic impact of micro and macro-cultures and their historical and political 
situations. While social network analysis recognises individuals it does not 
recognise their uniqueness and tends to portray all actors as identical with 
homogeneous identities. Currently the bulk of the social network analysis 
literature is concerned with creating a static picture of the network 
(Zeggelink, 1994), exploring issues such as the degrees of centrality, reachability 
or density of a network (Mizruchi, 1994; Granovetter, 1994; Skvoretz & 
Fararo, 1996; Burt, 1992; Knoke & Guilartre, 1994; Hogg & Vaughan, 1995; 
Meyer, 1994; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). While these 
network analysts would not deny that individuals, culture etc. are important in 
particular situations, their approach is to abstract from all that in order to identify 
the independent influence of network structure. Such an approach is inappropriate 
for this study, which is concerned with the contextualisation of network structures 
in order to understand the processes and dynamics at work. As conventional 
social network analysis depends heavily on a quantified structural analysis of 
social relations, its usefulness in exploratory, qualitative research is limited. The 
analysis presented here has taken social network analysis a step further and 
integrated individual identities with the social structure within which identities are 
embedded - the networks and frameworks of understanding. The web of social 
127 
networks, which constitutes meso-society, is the context within which individual 
networks operate. This alternative social network framework captures the 
dynamics of the social process at work since it allows the consequences of 
interactions between the individual, network and culture to be studied. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity and change within and between networks is easily 
accommodated within this concept of social dynamics. Networks arc therefore 
complex institutions and not simply abstract forces - behaviour and behavioural 
modifications within groups are considered to be products of the interrelation of 
contextualised individuals, their values and identities, with the particular abstract 
structure of their networks. Consequently, it is of particular importance that 
networks are embedded in cultural, social and historical relations (such as the 
social relations of production), which is an issue social network analysis totally 
omits. The concept of the social network used in this study is not therefore one 
which simply focuses on the formal structure of roles, but one which is able to 
access both formal and informal relations and processes. 
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Field Method 
This reworking of social network analysis provides the background for the 
collection and analysis of the field data. The appropriateness of the field methods 
adopted was consequently a crucial consideration particularly as the 
epistemological approach to the study indicated that there is no unambiguous 
'reality' with which, or within which, networks and their members operate. In 
order to align social network theory with concepts of contextualised, collective 
identity construction a more interpretivist method was required, rooted in 
ethnomethodology and utilising qualitative, context sensitive methods. This 
would allow the meanings, realities and identities of the research participants to 
emerge and distil out of the noise of the narratives. To achieve this, a return to the 
anthropological origins of social network theory and methods (Gluckman, 1958) 
provided a meaningful springboard for the reworking of social network 
methodologies. 
The major methodological change associated with the remodelled social network 
analysis was therefore a move away from' the collection of data related to 
quantitatively defined indices, to one based on 'themes', where the characteristics 
of the networks and their social dynamics were not taken to be abstract 
calculations or measurements. This permitted a broad range of data to be 
collected, most of it in free flowing narrative form. An inductive approach to the 
study of conflict processes and identity construction was therefore developed. 
This provided a framework which allowed for the examination and analysis of the 
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different ways in which the participants experienced, perceived and apprehended 
those conflict processes and practices with which they were associated. However, 
many realities, identities and understandings held within networks cannot be 
approached or seen directly and are hidden within the interactions and 
relationships between the network members. The choice of method had to reflect 
these constraints and possibilities, and therefore in order to understand the 
contexts within which the networks were operating a qualitative and longitudinal 
approach was designed. The methodology allowed a progression to a more 
specific theoretical treatment of the data which meant that the analysis could occur 
concurrently with the data collection by uncovering from the narrative hidden 
meanings and processes and links between themes. As the data was organised 
certain network patterns became apparent, which could be explained as patterned 
customs or rituals, which "express and reinforce conflicts" (Gluckman, 1958, in 
Frankenberg, 1982: 20). The generation of these patterned concepts involved a 
constant re-evaluation of the data. As the analysis of the themes layered on to 
each other, links between the concepts were developed, which invariably involved 
a return to the narratives and a deeper analysis of the texts. However, it was 
important not to loose sight of the fact that any understanding gained represented a 
specific socio-historical, cultural and political moment. 
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4.1 Observation Methods 
The principal method adopted for the data collection was observation, both direct 
and participant depending on the field context. However, the tenn 'observation' is 
somewhat misleading in the context of this methodology because it implies a 
reliance on events as they appear. In reality what was undertaken was "the 
suspension of the belief that things are as they appear" (Giddens, 1993: 41), thus 
going as far as it was possible to avoid imposing over rigorous and academically 
defined boundaries on the data. These 'invisible' processes and relations are more 
likely to be accessed by observation approaches (participant and direct) because it 
means that data otherwise considered irrelevant by the participants, 
misrepresented, or misunderstood would be considered (Scott, 199 1). In addition, 
it means that interpretative and impressionistic data could be collected. This 
method also allows for a richer detail in the data (Wajcman, 1983), for example by 
recording the type of clothes wom on different occasions and by differently 
located network members. Observation of events in the field was also considered 
the appropriate method as the data had to be situational to be realistic, it could not 
be taken from laboratory situations, and the networks had to be seen in action to 
explore the variety of adoptive responses to network pressures. However, the 
reality of the 'Hawthorne Effect' or the biasing presence of the researcher in the 
field on the behaviours of the research participants was also considered. An 
explicit exploration of this, its disadvantages and advantages, is contained in the 
second part of this chapter. To reduce bias and to bring contextualisation of the 
data to the forefront, the data was recorded as the events occurred (Hogg & 
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Vaughan, 1995). To supplement the observation data, documentary evidence and 
unstructured but themed interviews with network members, senior company 
personnel and members of significant overlapping networks were also used, in the 
main to obtain material on the backgrounds and external environments of the 
groups. 
4.2 Case Studies 
As the purpose of the research agenda was to ascertain the particular and not to 
discover the general, the investigation of networked identities during conflict 
processes was conducted through the use of case study investigations, utilising 
two in-depth studies with comparable yet different forms of employee ownership. 
In this way, interpretation of the conflict processes would arrive via an 
understanding of the actions and interactions of the members of these networks. 
To ensure an accurate representation of the network characteristics and 
morphology, it was necessary to embark upon longitudinal studies of the case 
sites. The aim of this was to build up accounts of the ways in which the network 
members interacted with each other, particularly in conflict situations. In 
addition, it permitted an examination of the stability of the network relationships 
(Faust & Wasserman, 1994) and the robustness of the network identities. 
The study focused on two work group networks, which were complementary in 
that they were both situated in employee buy-outs (ESOPs) of conventionally 
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owned companies. The case sites provided contrasting models of employee 
owned and controlled organisations in that the initial site was a micro-enterprise 
with just nine employees, which operated along personalised and informal lines. 
The second site was a hierarchical, unionised and large firm of over 2,500 
employees. Both buy-outs had occurred a couple of years before the research took 
place. The lapse of time since conversion had allowed much of the initial 
euphoria of the buy-outs to dissipate and for employee ownership and control to 
become embedded, thus reducing any skewness of the data due to particularly 
atypical conditions. 
Case Study One 
The initial research site was a small childcare ESOP in the West Midlands, 
NurseryCo. It employed five full time staff, and two part-time, plus a number of 
students on work placement from local colleges. All staff and students were 
female, local to the area with similar backgrounds and experiences of work. Three 
of the full-time and permanent staff were also employee owners, two of whom 
were founding members. At the time of the field research, two more of the full- 
time and permanent members of staff had been asked to consider becoming 
employee owners, one of whom had turned down the offer. 
Case Study Two 
The second case study was conducted over six months in a large, employee-owned 
local bus company in the North of England, BusCo, among the union 
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representatives of the 'platform staff, or bus drivers. This group of employees 
was entirely male, of ages ranging from early twenties to mid sixties. 
The rationale behind selecting two sites of differing contexts is based primarily on 
the consideration that there may be a threshold size of network for the 
harmonisation of relations (Gluckman, 1958) in employee-owned firms. The 
premise for this was to explore the expected different fonns of conflict found in, 
first, small groups with personalised conflict relations, and secondly in a larger 
group where conflict would be largely formalised in established industrial 
relations structures. The initial case study presents a network of relations based on 
personaliscd and informal connections, the second case study meanwhile presents 
a highly formalised, ritualised, bureaucratic and hierarchical forrn of conflict 
relations. The infonnal and formalised relations in the two case sites allowed the 
investigation of the means by which both formal and informal conflict relations 
and group identities are influenced by conversion to employee ownership. A 
secondary consideration is that the first work-based network is entirely female, 
and the second entirely male. Feminist literature suggests that female groups are 
more likely to engage in less visible or overt forms of conflict, and that gender to 
some extent determines the 'repertoire of actions' available to individuals (Game 
and Pringle, 1984). However, it is the contention of this study that this conflict is 
less visible only to the more traditional, positivist methodological approaches to 
data collection. While the literature on workplace relations presents some 
analyses of gendered relationships (Crompton, 1997) on the whole it overlooks the 
gendered aspects of the relationships that build into conflict process. Therefore, 
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there is a need to examine the conflict and hannonisation relations within the case 
studies through a gendered perspective, using qualitative methodologies. 
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5. Gendered Access: Issues and Practice 
It is important to recognise that data collected using longitudinal observation 
methods, from case sites, is influenced by the response of the participants to the 
researcher and the researcher's response to the participants. Given the duration 
and intensity of the research relationship generated by using these methods, a 
certain subjectivity is inevitable. To reduce bias in the reporting of events these 
subjectivities must be acknowledged and explored. 
5.1 Case Study One 
At NurseryCo, the matter of gendered access to data was not formally an overt 
consideration. However, covertly and informally access to the participants and 
their relationships was strongly gendered. Key access to the organisation was 
negotiated with the Chief Nursery Officer during an initial interview to discuss the 
purpose of the research. During the interview access was granted to work 
alongside the ESOP staff for two to three days each week for a duration of three to 
four months. While this access was not overtly gendered, covertly it was a highly 
gendered decision. In the first instance, the group was entirely female and 
employed no male staff. During the research it became clear that this was an 
unwritten and partly subconscious group policy. The group had interviewed 
males for nursery positions in the past, but none had been appointed because it 
was considered that they would not fit into the group (interview with'Chief 
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Nursery Officer). As a female researcher this informal, covert policy was a 
significant key to unrestricted access to the group, it not only facilitated entry into 
the group but had a male researcher been involved it may have obstructed access. 
Developing Rapport and Reciprocity 
Formally, the reciprocal nature of the research relationship, meant that while the 
nursery provided research access for two days a week to work alongside nursery 
staff, this work was provided on a voluntary, unpaid basis. The second aspect of 
reciprocity was less visible and concemed the group's accepted norms of 
'feminine' behaviour and dress. As a female researcher, certain properties were 
attributed to my character which accelerated my acceptance as a group participant. 
The reciprocal aspect of this developing research relationship was clear in the sort 
of behaviours the group expected of its members, and without which access to the 
members and to their relationships would have become curtailed. It was important 
therefore that these expected traits and group identity were carefully observed and 
maintained in order to facilitate the development of rapport with the research 
participants. Overtly, this involved appropriate dress incorporating anything that 
did not stand out from the norm, including no aggressive or revealing clothing. 
Make-up was either not wom or applied very lightly, and hairstyles were unfussy. 
It was also important to observe and adopt the group's work ethics, which 
involved ready participation in all activities and a willingness to act both 
autonomously and to take instructions, the criteria for employees being that they 
were "caring, enthusiastic and willing to do overtime" (Chief Nursery Officer). 
For some group members my presence remained completely unquestioned, and 
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their belief that I was a trainee nursery nurse only came to light a few months after 
the research had started. 
Gendered Role Assignment 
From the outset I was allocated the implicit role of trainee nursery nurse by the 
group. By attending the nursery, unpaid, for a couple of days a week I was 
unintentionally mirroring exactly the commitments of a trainee and my actual 
position as a student in the town reinforced this role. The standard form of 
relations between members at work was very informal and friendly but not 
exceptionally close, and so was easy to adopt and as an outsider relatively quick to 
integrate. However, relationships were established solely along personal lines. I 
was very rarely asked about the research and more often this was never 
mentioned. Rather, the expected norm was to chat about out of work activities, 
especially boyfriends. Conversations about the organisation, politics or wider 
social issues were not brought into the relationships. Part of the infonnal, social 
based relationship between the members involved socialising together out of hours 
and the assumption of the group was that I would join them at the pub, nightclub 
and aerobics class. 
There were many benefits in assuming the role the group had assigned to me. 
Principally, it meant that access to and acceptance by the group was immediate. 
In addition I was allowed to work alongside qualified staff and was treated as an 
unthreatening member of the group. I was allowed access to all areas and given 
the opportunity to work with all members of staff. In relation to the group's 
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concentration on an individual's life outwith work, my life experiences were 
similar to the rest of the group and therefore rapport was relatively easy to 
establish. This exposure to and acceptance by the group facilitated the 
ethnographic purposes of the fieldwork. Consequently, and crucially, access to 
the relationships among the group was reasonably unhindered as a result of my 
unthreatening position, which meant that the members treated me as one of their 
group and opened up to me. 
However, acceptance of the role also brought with it problems. Principally, 
moving between the role of trainee and that of researcher proved problematical. 
For the purposes of participant observation the role assignment was extremely 
useful, however when extra information was required, acceptance by some staff of 
a move into the role of researcher was problematical. In the implicit role as a 
trainee or student I was seen as subordinate by some of the fully qualified staff, 
which to some extent hindered access to relationships within the core group. The 
role of trainee allocated me an unthreatening role within the group, because it 
placed me in a peripheral position within the group network. For example, the 
core group would occasionally retire to the office to discuss an issue or just to chat 
while doing the books, and these were moments and interactions the rest of the 
staff had no legitimate access to. On these occasions the decision to opt out of the 
role as trainee and into that of researcher was difficult - and ran the risk of 
endangering role coherence. As a result, data on these relationships was also 
gathered by interview and direct observation as well as participation. An 
additional problem was that I could not explain my research without endangering 
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my position within the group. Doing this would have set me apart from the other 
staff (i. e. outwith the group network), something I was eager to avoid in order to 
preserve my network position. If the group had perceived me as a threat, access to 
data which illuminated the underlying network dynamics of the group would have 
been curtailed. - As a result of being unable to explain the research some 
information which may have been pertinent has probably been overlooked by the 
participants. However, as a result of developing rapport with the group, much 
information which otherwise would have remained implicit, and held within the 
group, has been exposed. However, while engaging in the role allocation given by 
the group allowed access to data, it followed that it also meant an additional 
position within the group network. Even though this new position was peripheral 
it still altered the form of that network by adding another member. This 
acceptance into the network facilitated data collection but also altered and biased 
the data collected. 
5.2 Case Study Two 
The means by which the relationships with the key informants in the second case 
study were established was also a considerable influence on the type and form of 
data collected. From the outset, my access to and role within the group were 
entirely informal and this opened up access to a great deal of information on the 
informal relations among the key decision-makers within the network. Access to 
the network studied was non-traditional - through neither the union nor the 
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management (although informally both knew about the research) - but through the 
worker directors. My 'gatekeepers' to the network were the two platfonn staff 
worker directors, Dan and Chris, both seasoned union campaigners for different 
TGWU branches. Both were in their mid fifties, had worked as drivers for many 
years and were married with a son and daughter each. Both their daughters were 
married and Dan had two granddaughters while Chris's daughter was expecting 
her first child. This non-traditional access had arisen through a meeting with Dan 
and Chris at an informal reception in London to launch 'Employee Ownership 
Week'. The party representing the bus company comprised of four worker 
directors and various trade union representatives, but no management and it was 
Dan and Chris who assumed the responsibility of educating me about their 
company and its ESOP. During the event in London, business cards were 
exchanged and it was arranged that I would give them a call to set up a visit. 
Developing Rapport and Reciprocity 
After the Employee Ownership Week event informal drinks were had where Dan 
and Chris invited me to join their table, made sure I was looked after and took a 
great deal of pleasure in showing me photographs of their children and 
grandchildren. A rapport had been established outwith the work environnient at a 
relaxed social occasion where I was not considered a threat in any way, merely an 
item of curiosity. Reciprocally, neither did I consider them daunting or 
threatening. Therefore from the very first encounter our relationship was on an 
informal, personalised basis, and the worker directors were established as my 
main contacts within the company. Consequently, there was no need to 'go in 
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cold' to the managing director with an anonymous letter requesting an interview 
as I had two allies willing to mediate for me and support my case. This meant 
that, as my key informants, Chris and Dan responded quickly to requests for 
information, and took it on themselves to arrange all my meetings and interviews. 
Management never officially sanctioned their help, it was on their own initiative 
and was a direct result of our informal relationship. 
While Chris and Dan provided a lot of information and also organised my visits, 
something was expected in return. Formally, I was asked by the Managing 
Director to provide the company with a copy of any material I would write. In 
addition, there was an element of informal reciprocity that my informal 
relationship with the worker directors required. Just as they had provided me with 
information about their family situations and members, from the outset I was also 
expected to divulge information about my friends and family. In reciprocating, by 
asking after their families, I was reinforcing the infon-nal nature of the 
relationship. The genesis of this reciprocity was the establishment of our 
relationships outside the work environment and thus they did not associate 'work' 
with my visits. These visits to the company were seen as a continuation of our 
first meeting in London. It was therefore important that I was prepared to treat 
these meetings as social events, as well as for work purposes. Consequently, it 
was also important that I observed what I wore to the company in order to create a 
competent but not overly formal impression to maintain the atmosphere of my 
visits. 
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Gendered Role Assignment 
From the outset, my key informants had made a number of assumptions about my 
identity and characteristics that were to inforra and shape the level and type of 
access to the group and to their relationships that were granted. Dan and Chris 
transposed their interest in their daughters' lives onto mine - in effect I became a 
'surrogate daughter' while I was at the company. This role arose spontaneously 
from them, as a result of my gender and age which had reminded them of their 
own daughters. Consequently, they wanted to know if I was 'courting', who he 
was, his job and whether we were going to get married. This was all asked with a 
mixture of teasing and concern, which explains part of the reason' why my 
interviews were chaperoned - they were treating me as they would have wanted 
their daughters treated. 
This chaperoning behaviour ran from taxi-ing me to and from the train station at 
every visit, to timetabling interviews and buying me lunch. For example, on my 
first day at the company I was offered a lift to the firm's headquarters, " where it 
had been arranged that I would interview a number of senior managers. I was 
never left alone with an interviewee, one of the worker directors sat in on every 
interview. Lunch was then provided and I was taken a few miles down the road to 
one of the garages to interview another manager, where I was again chaperoned. 
' The chaperoning served another function, to monitor and control with whom I 
spoke. 
' Later I met them in the more informal settings of their 'home' garages. 
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The assigninent by Dan and Chris of this role and identity had its benefits and its 
problems. The benefits were numerous, the most straightforward being that I had 
access to all aspects of the company through the worker director's informal 
influence networks with both management and trade union. The worker directors 
were situated at the core of an informal network which encompassed both the 
formal management and union networks. They had direct informal access to all 
key decision-making personnel within the organisation. As the worker directors 
were members of neither formal network, management and union representatives 
tended to disassociate them from these formal roles. The advantage of a close 
association with the worker directors was that I was also not associated with either 
fonnal group and was therefore free to approach either without arousing their 
suspicions or defences. This meant that I was able to ask to speak to anyone and 
the worker directors would arrange it. Like the worker directors, I was perceived 
as a neutral player. My association with the worker directors also meant that I was 
seen as Chris and Dan's 'project' and so I came under their 'protection'. Due to 
their popularity and mobility within the company I was made welcome wherever I 
went. For example when neither Chris nor Dan could make it to a meeting they 
arranged for someone else to ferry me about and the informal chats during these 
journeys proved extremely useful for gaining a different perspective on the 
network processes. This 'friendship by association' was the cue for how the 
others participating in the negotiations related to me. This enabled me to conduct 
spontaneous interviews, often in the form of conversations, with a variety of 
informants. These took place in the canteen during tea or lunch breaks or on the 
way to the station, and in this respect who you stood next to in the dinner queue 
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was an important consideration. The one drawback was that as a non-smoker I 
had only restricted access to those who took cigarette breaks. 
However, these quite considerable advantages of my access route into the 
company did not come without a price. The problems they engendered during the 
field study were not inconsiderable. The most overt issue concerned the matter of 
control over the research process. While at the company I was rarely in control of 
the field situation. The interviews, who I should interview and where, were 
arranged by the key informants and this had the effect of controlling the 
information I had access to. The supplementary problem associated with being on 
their premises and in their offices was that I also had to play by their rules to 
ensure continued access. I felt obliged to confonn to the role they had allocated to 
me, and in this way they were controlling me. I could have refused to conform but 
this would have deeply upset them and thus alienated my key informants and, as 
my presence at the company was largely informal this could have terminated my 
access. It is important to note that in another situation this element of control 
could have been threatening, for example the expectation of sharing infonnation 
about my friends and family (and theirs) could have been difficult. For the same 
reason, lifls to and from the train station in another situation might have been 
uncomfortable or inappropriate. In addition, because I was seen in a 'daughter 
role' I was not also seen as a 'professional' and on occasions this meant that I was 
not informed of some important forthcoming meetings. 
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Control also became an issue due to my informal status among the research 
participants. The informal nature of my status at the company meant that I had 
little control over the research process since I relied to a great extent on informal 
meetings and spontaneous interviews. Therefore, interaction was on the 
participants' grounds and to their agenda. While I knew for certain that I would 
be spending a day at a meeting, the information given informally during the 
breaks in the meetings was essential to make sense of the proceedings and what 
lay behind them. Introducing an informal aspect to the relationship with the 
research subject can however mean that the researcher is too close to the process 
being observed, resulting in questions over objectivity. For example, it was 
difficult not being able to react to criticisms of the worker directors. These 
criticisms were made in public within the meetings and informally to me during 
the breaks, with the intention that what was said would be taken back to the 
worker directors. In this I had become a pawn in the power struggle processes 
within the network and my additional presence in the network started to become 
an obstacle to the research by altering the process under observation. 
While it was extremely useful to be situated, by proxy, in the centre of the 
company's informal influence network, it also meant that no snowballing of 
participants took place. This was because the network connections spanned out 
from the key informants like the spokes of a wheel. There were few cross- 
connections, making my position at the company fragile, and potentially 
problematic. This fragility became clear when one of the worker directors was de- 
selected. In this instance I lost all access to this worker director and his contacts. 
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Had I had only one key informant this would have been a serious problem, but as 
it was, the other worker director remained in position. However, the newly 
selected worker director held me at arm's length as a result of my association with 
his discredited predecessor. 
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6. Summary 
The methodological dilemma associated with using a quantitatively based 
methodology with qualitative methods has been dealt with through a remodelling 
of social network analysis. This has incorporated a number of the structural 
measurement elements from established social network analysis and combined 
them with ethnographic methodologies to provide a phenomenological social 
network approach. While this approach concentrates on uncovering hidden 
network processes, it is also necessary to acknowledge the researcher's role in 
these processes. From a research process perspective, this reflexivity has included 
the many benefits of gendered role assignment, principally the establishment of 
informal relationships with the research participants which provided access to 
otherwise hidden information about their network process and underlying issues. 
There were however also a number of drawbacks, principally a loss of control 
over the research process. The type of access granted to a researcher by a firm 
therefore dictates to a significant extent the nature of the research experience. 
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Chapter Four 
NurseryCo 
1. Introduction 
The first case study of this research, NurseryCo, a childcare nursery, was initially 
approached through contacts with the Coventry and Warwickshire Cooperative 
Development Agency. While NurseryCo was set up as an ESOP, it was run along 
the lines of a cooperative, with regular meetings of the staff to discuss company 
issucs. As with most of the local contacts madc through the Cooperativc 
Development Agency, this was a small firm, with five full time staff, two part- 
timers and between three and four students on placement. 
The first intention with this case study was to pilot the social network analysis 
methodology needed for this investigation and to use this site as a testing ground 
for the themes and connections that had been established from the literature 
analysis and development of the conceptual framework. Both traditional field 
notes and the network analysis sheets were used to record interactions between 
network members, both at task and at organisational level and in particular to note 
whose decisions and opinions took precedence in any specific group fonnation. 
Of particular note were incidents of hostility, conflict and tensions at work and 
their relation to employee ownership and control! 
' See Chapter Three, page 118. 
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The in-depth participant observation technique employed in order to gain access 
to the underlying structural dynamics of the group involved spending most of the 
research time at the nursery in interactions with the staff and children in their care. 
By this method, it was possible to develop an understanding of how the nursery 
work was organised, and it also provided the opportunity to get to know the staff, 
thus facilitating acceptance into the workplace social network. Accordingly, I was 
allowed to work alongside the qualified staff and was treated both as an 
unthreatening equal and as a network insider or member. While this exposure to 
and acceptance by the group facilitated the ethnographic purposes of the 
fieldwork, it meant that the strict and exact coding of interactions required by the 
piloted methodology posed a problem. It proved problematic to bring out the field 
note sheets to record interactions while the people whose relationships were being 
observed were still in the vicinity. This would have made the research process 
and observation crudely overt and thus have set me apart as an outsider from the 
other staff, something which it was nccessary'to avoid in order to preserve my 
unthreatening position within the workplace social network. There was a real 
possibility that, had I been perceived as a threat by the network, access to the 
underlying network dynamics of the group would have been curtailed. Therefore, 
at first it was necessary to resort to frequent, brief trips into the upstairs office to 
code the interactions while they were still fresh in the memory. However, after a 
few weeks this became an obvious strain on my network position since it must 
have seemed, to the other staff, a rather odd behaviour. This became a crucial 
issue when, a few weeks into the research at NurseryCo, some money went 
missing from the upstairs office, and it became clear that, as a relatively new 
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network member and therefore still a peripheral member, continued access would 
only be maintained if I could make myself a less conspicuous outsider. Therefore, 
the decision was taken to write up the field notes in the evenings after a day in the 
field, and from these notes to code as many interactions as it was possible to 
recall. However, this method obviously involved a considerable amount of error 
and omission incompatible with the exact measurement requirements of the coded 
social network analysis methodology and, in conjunction with being unable to 
observe all the relationships within the group at once, it was eventually decided to 
abandon much of the coded data in favour of traditional ethnographic field notes. 
This more traditional participant observation technique was to prove indispensable 
in identifying not only the positions of actors and subgroups in the network, but 
more crucially the network dynamics and the context of social interactions. While 
the coded data had provided information on the existence and direction of 
interactions, the broader field notes provided crucial information on the content 
and context of these interactions. Writing up the field notes from memory after a 
day in the field also facilitated a more interpretative and less descriptive approach 
to the data. This, alongside the original descriptive material, provided a broad 
flavour of the network dynamics. This more fluid and broad recording technique 
permitted a less deterministic approach to the network, and facilitated access to 
data on the underlying reasons why certain actors became the focus of conflict 
within the group, and crucially why the network members on the whole 
suppressed this conflict. 
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The main aim for Case Study One was therefore to establish whether conflict at 
work could be meaningfully analysed as a network phenomenon. The intentions 
were to examine not only obvious examples of conflict but also communications, 
collaboration, conformity, deviance and rivalry within the network. However, 
first it was necessary to identify the network. In order to permit an in-depth study 
of a network it was necessary to delimit the extent of the network and to this end 
the networks of interest for this study were bounded by the workplace and to those 
activities which involved the whole workforce. However, principal attention was 
given to those members involved in the control of the ESOP, i. e. the paid staff, 
both owners and non-owners, and less attention was paid to the unpaid students 
who were not involved in organisational decision-making. Being a small firm, 
and cooperatively organised, the network for this case study included all staff who 
worked within NurseryCo, both full and part time. While the network was limited 
by the boundaries of the firm, this did not mean that non work-related interactions 
between the network members would be excluded from the data. Care was 
therefore taken to extend the participant observation to out of work social 
occasions, such as the workforce Christmas dinner, after work trips to the pub, 
weekend fund-raising events and events hosted out of work hours on the nursery 
premises (such as Employee Ownership Week). The imposed boundary for the 
network did however mean that those social relationships between NurseryCo 
staff and their other friends and family were excluded from the analysis, since 
there was both limited possibility of access and also because these relationships 
did not involve interactions among the network members. 
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2. Rationale for Employee Ownership and Control 
The NurseryCo ESOP was established in 1992, as a direct result of the previous 
owners' decision to move out of the childcare industry. The original ownerS2 had 
established the nursery primarily as a profit making enterprise, with one of the 
founders providing the main financial backing. The owners of the nursery 
themselves had had no formal childcare qualifications and took no part in the 
actual childcare responsibilities; thus, they provided the capital and were entirely 
business administrators, overseeing but not participating in the day-to-day running 
of the nursery. Two years into the enterprise, NurseryCo had been performing 
well, however, subsequent years saw a decline in profits and this, coupled with a 
family redundancy, made the original owners decide to sell the business. At this 
point one of the founders contacted the local Cooperative Development Agency 
(CDA) and invited them to the nursery to talk to the staff about becoming a 
cooperative. However, until the CDA representative arrived, the employees had 
"no idea that they were thinking along those lines" (Gill). Yet in the end, the aid 
of the CDA was invaluable to the group in putting together business plans to raise 
capital for the buy-out, and in establishing what form of common ownership the 
group required. In the end, the group decided upon a non-profit making ESOP 
form, with the existing employees making up the four shareowners - three 
Directors (Gill, Dot and Tracey) and one member (Jeanette). Prior to this move, 
the employees at NurseryCo had had no experience of owning or running their 
own business. While they were all employed to look after the children in their 
care, only some of the employees were trained nursery nurses (some with more 
'The original owners were two local businesswomen. 
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experience), while the rest of the staff had no formal childcare training. However, 
this initial group included all the positions needed to run a viable, legal childcare 
nursery. Gill, by joint agreement, became the Managing Director of NurseryCo 
since she had been in charge of the day-to-day organisation of the nursery under 
the previous ownership and management. The ESOP was finally established on 
4'h August 1992. After the buy-out, the Cooperative Development Agency 
continued to help the group develop the necessary administrative skills, such as 
bookkeeping. 
2.1 Attitudes to Conflict at NurseryCo 
The employees at NurseryCo reported that they had had few affective ties to their 
previous employers, partly resulting from their absentee-management style, and 
partly due to the owners' autocratic management methods. The employees also 
reported that there had been a certain amount of tension and disharmony between 
the owners and the employees, which had made their working lives 
uncomfortable. Consequently, when the owners decided to quit the childcare 
industry and sell the business, the employees felt that another non-worker owner 
would only be likely to replicate the tensions between employer and staff. This 
opinion was informed not only by their experience at NurseryCo, but also by their 
wider work experiences in other childcare establishments, where this pattern of 
owner/worker tensions was reported as prevalent throughout the industry. 
Therefore, the decision to buy the company themselves was brought about by their 
desires to permanently remove tensions and conflict from the workplace, 
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facilitated by the circumstances in which they found themselves. Consequently, 
the move to buy the company was driven by their desire to control their own work 
experiences, create a harmonious working environment, and not to rely on the 
benevolence, or otherwise, of an absentee owner. As such, job satisfaction, 
harmony at work, and control were important motivational factors in the 
employees' buy-out decision. 
These expectations of employee ownership can be directly associated with, and 
traced back to, the literature that promises harmonisation through greater 
employee control over work and organisational decisions. However, of greatest 
interest is the expectation by the NurseryCo staff that employee ownership would 
remove entirely the tensions they had experienced in their jobs, not just at 
NurseryCo but in their previous work experiences, i. e. that employee ownership 
and control could overturn the industry trend of dishannony at work. The 
expectation was that through removing the external source of tension, i. e. the non- 
worker owners, the remaining employee-owners would be able to run the business 
and the childcare aspects without any animosity, hostility or tensions. They 
appeared to have good reason to expect this outcome, having all worked together 
for a number of years at NurseryCo under the previous regime without any 
hostility breaking out between the members of the work group. However, 
replacement of the original non-worker owners with yet another set of non-worker 
owners was obviously not sufficient for the staff. For the employees it was 
therefore not a simple matter of personalities, rather, subconsciously, it was a 
matter of work structures and controls. To remove the possibilities of replicating 
what they saw as the structural source of tension within the workplace, it was 
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necessary for them to control their work structures, and to do this they had to own 
and control the company. 
The decision to attempt to buy the company had not been taken lightly by the 
group; in fact it was by all accounts a step taken reluctantly. However, the group 
felt that, while they had disliked the hostilities with the previous owners to a great 
extent, they had enjoyed working together as a group and so buying the company 
was what they had to do to preserve this. Gill reported that the ESOP fonn was 
chosen since, on the one hand, it had enabled them to raise the money required, 
but also crucially because the group supported the ethics of cooperation, which to 
their minds equated to working with no "outside" people, the removal of outsiders 
being associated with the removal of tensions and conflict from the work 
enviromnent. 
Apart from the new form of ownership, the group ran the nursery on a day-to-day 
basis as previously, since the work hierarchy was set in place by legislation. As 
the group had been "left much to our own devices" (Dot) under the previous 
ownership, they were used to organising their own work time. The managerial 
responsibilities fell, as they had done before, to the most senior nursery nurse, 
Gill, therefore the day-to-day running of the nursery suffered no changes with the 
change in ownership. However, with the establishment of the ESOP, the 
employee owners had shared the administrative burden, and decision-making at 
NurseryCo had changed somewhat with the group instigating a monthly meeting 
to discuss business matters. 
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2.2 Structural Changes at NurseryCo ESOP 
The employees had therefore achieved their main buy-out expectation, to run the 
business as a group without any outside interference. However, by the time this 
fieldwork was conducted at NurscryCo, there had been a few changes in personnel 
since the employee buy-out, which had taken place four years previously. Two of 
the ESOP Directors were still at NurseryCo, the senior nursery officer, Gill, was 
still in position, as was the nursery assistant Dot, whose ESOP responsibility was 
to keep the company books. However, the two other original members, Jeanette 
and Tracey, had left the company within a year of its conversion into an ESOP. 
The first to leave, Jeanette, left because, shortly after the buy-out, the business 
began suffering financially and a job had to be lost. This situation arose, 
according to Gill, because the founding owners had "run the business down while 
the coop was waiting for funding". With no personal financial stake in the ESOP, 
loosing a member was reportedly relatively simple to achieve. As a non-director, 
Jeanette was voted out by the other three, partly because as an unqualified carer 
she was seen as the most disposable. However, Dot was also unqualified, but the 
three ESOP Directors felt it would be more difficult to get rid of a Director than a 
member. While this was reported by the remaining two founders as a relatively 
painless episode with no associated conflict, doubts must be raised over the lack 
of conflict admitted during the process of removing one of the founding owners. 
The indication from the evidence of the remaining founders was that a clique of 
Directors had developed who protected their own positions, at the expense of 
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Jeanette. The evidence that the matter was resolved by vote and not by consensus 
also suggests reluctance on the part of the departing owner to leave her post. 
The second to leave, Tracey, left NurseryCo not long after this. Gill and Dot 
related that her decision to leave was a direct result of the employee buy-out, 
which had made her uncomfortable with the amount of extra responsibility she 
then had to shoulder as a company owner. She left to take up a position as a 
nursery nurse in another, conventionally organised nursery. Again, this was 
reported without reference to tensions or disharmony within the network, yet for 
Tracey, employee ownership and control had obviously not delivered the type of 
work environment she had anticipated or was comfortable with. Her decision had 
been to withdraw not from the childcare industry, but specifically from the 
NurseryCo network, suggesting some unease or disquiet with the ESOP structural 
arrangements. 
Just one new ESOP member, Sarah, replaced these original two within a year of 
the ESOP formation, thereby bringing the number of ESOP Directors (and 
company owners) back up to three. It is significant, given the losses of personnel 
in the first year, that since taking on Sarah as a new member, no new members 
had been incorporated and that since the inception of the ESOP, the employee- 
owners had employed non-owner staff to help them run the nursery. With just 
three ESOP members, the group was under a legal requirement to employ more 
staff to comply with the amount of supervision required per child in their care. Of 
the non-owner employees, June and Bridget were trained nursery nurses, and Fay, 
while not officially trained, had worked in NurseryCo since she was thirteen. 
158 
While none of these new staff were, at the time of the fieldwork, ESOP members, 
disaffection with conflictual working environments had prompted the majority of 
the newer employees to approach NurseryCo in the belief that the ESOP could 
offer a more harmonious working experience. In addition to the non-owner 
employees, the nursery also employed a number of nursery nurse students as part 
of their training, and also a cook, Carol. The age structure of the group was fairly 
mixed, Dot and Carol were the eldest (mid fifties and early forties respectively) 
and both had grown up children, while June and Gill were in their thirties with no 
children. Fay and Bridget were much younger, both being nineteen, and the 
students were younger still, around sixteen. 
2.3 Social Networks 
The NurseryCo formal network can be classified as a concentrated interaction 
network (Figure 4.1). This network pattern was a result of the legislative 
requirements for childcare, which specified a strict hierarchical structure, 
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Figure 4.1 Formal NurseryCo Network 
However, within the NUrseryCo informal network, there were a number of 
signiticant subgroups or cliques. 
Subgroup One 
The first subgroup (Figure 4.2) comprised the three employee-owner FSOP 
directors (Gill, Dot and Sarah) and Fay, a longstanding but a non-owner 
employee. This subgroup was mainly work-based, and was reinforced through the 
taking of shared decisions about the nursery, such as large acquisitions or 
bookkeeping. While all group members were linked through work associations, 
given the nature of the job they had to work directly together and thus this 
subgroup of four members was a distinct and cohesive grouping, 
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Figure 4.2 NurseryCo Subgroup One 
Subgroup Two 
The other main subgrouping within the network consisted of Fay, Bridget and 
Carol (Figurc 4.3). This subgrouping was madC LIP cntirely of' non-owner 
employees. This subgroup excluded the three employce-owner F'Soll directors 
and comprised all of the non-owner staff, with the notable exception OFJLIIIC. This 
clique was based on and reinforced through close social links out of work - most 
often the members would meet Lip for a drink or a video. 
Figure 4.3 NurseryCo Subgroup Two 
Bridut 
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Subgroup Three 
The final subgroup (Figure 4.4) was also apparent from its member's out ot'work 
associations. Comprising only two members, Gill and June, this was the smallest L- 
of the cliques, but no less significant for network patterns of conflict for all that. 
It is clear that being the isolate of the whole group. June had fewer exchanges with 
the others and spent less tirne workino with the other members. In addition, she L- 
was the only full time staff member not to be a member ofeither subgroups one or 
two. 
Figure 4.4 NurseryCo Subgroup Three 
(illi 
Jun] 
The full sociograrn (Figure 4.5) of the group's strong positive links therefore 
looked as follows: 
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Figure 4.5 NurseryCo Relationships Network 
It is clear from this representation of the network that, while Gill was the central 
actor in the NurseryCo network. Fay was also an important member, active in 
both SLibgrOLIPS one and two. Fay and Gill were therel'ore both SitUated in central 
network positions, having the greatest number of direct links to other _group 
members. At the other end of the scale, June was the most isolated network 
member. having only one positive and direct link. However, this link was to tile 
network member with both formal and informal influence. the nursery manager, 
Gill. Therefore, June's position and status within the group was secure for as long 
as her relationship with Gill remained. However, if Gill were to leave the group, 
Fay's strong network position could have a deciding influence on June's security. 
It is interesting that in a pure network sense, Fay - not an employee-o\vner - \vas 
an influential network player, having five direct links, only excluding Julie. The 
members of the primary clique, subgroup one, had at least three direct links 
apiece, while the members of the subgroup two had at least two direct positive 
links. flo, ývever, Fay was not the most influential network member, this fell to 
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Gill, who worked hard to maintain positive links with all group members. It was 
clear from her concerted efforts at harmony, and from the fact that other members 
would bring their problems to her, that Gill was the principle carrier of the group's 
ideology of harmony. 
The distinction between the network subgroups was however not overt and the 
network members revealed these subgroupings slowly through their casual 
remarks and actions. Recognition of the existence and membership of the 
subgroups could therefore only come about through close participant observation 
of the network. For example, on occasion I was making cups of tea for the whole 
group and asked Dot what people drank, she replied that "everyone has tea with 
two sugars". In fact, of the whole network only Dot, Fay and Sarah (Gill was 
away) drank their tea like this, therefore the boundaries of Dot's 'everyone' for 
that occasion actually consisted of subgroup one. 
2.4 Non-Owner Recruitment 
Given the localised nature of the work, NurseryCo recruited only from the 
surrounding area and this recruitment occurred on both formal and informal 
levels. Formal recruitment involved placing adverts in the local papers and the 
local job centre, and contacting the local college for recently qualified nursery 
nurses. NurseryCo's student trainees came from this local college. However, in 
practice informal networks were the more significant instruments in finding new 
staff. It was clear that pertnanent recruitment into the group, and thus into work at 
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the nursery, was achieved through member's existing and extended social 
networks. New recruits had therefore often been found by word of mouth and 
were either friends of employees or linked to existing staff through a network of 
friends. For example, Fay and Bridget had been at school together and 
consequently Bridget had approached NurseryCo because she knew of a vacancy 
through her contacts with Fay. These informal network means of recruitment 
were not surprising given NurseryCo's local recruitment approach. In addition, 
the criteria for new employees were that they were "caring, enthusiastic and 
willing to do overtime" (Gill). The recruitment process involved the selection of a 
new employee by Gill, with the other network members voting with her choice. 
On the one occasion that Gill was outvoted, she reported that while the new 
employee was engaged, this "was a disaster" and the new recruit was soon sacked. 
Following this, the other members had approached Gill and reputedly said, 
"they'd think twice about outvoting me again! ". 
2.5 New Recruits' Expectations 
While social networks were an important mechanism in the recruitment of new 
employees, these new non-owner employees claimed that the principal reason for 
joining NurseryCo was the reported harmonious working atmosphere -a 
consequence of its ownership structure. 
One of the most telling comments was made by one of the full time nursery 
nurses, June, who accounted for her recruitment into NurseryCo, nine months 
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before the field research started, as "it's not what you know but who you know". 
June, originally from a neighbouring town, had trained as a nanny and worked 
away from the local area. When she returned, to work in another nursery run by 
the same people who had owned NurseryCo, these owners suggested that she 
contacted Gill to learn more about working in a nursery. Since then, June and Gill 
had become friends and often saw each other socially. By the time NurseryCo 
became an ESOP, June was unhappy with the antagonistic and unfriendly work 
environment in the other nursery and mentioned this to Gill when she next saw 
her. Three days later, Gill offered her a job at NurseryCo. 
Sarah's position at NurseryCo had also been arrived at through extended social 
networks. Before taking a position at NurseryCo she had worked in a nursery in 
another part of the city, but was also disaffected with the work environment where 
she was working. She mentioned this to the social services inspector of nurseries, 
and asked her to keep her eyes open for any openings in other nurseries. The 
inspector mentioned this to Gill, who was looking for staff, and Sarah went over 
"for a chat", with the result that she was offered a job, employee-ownership and a 
directorship of the ESOP. 
Furthermore, the nursery's cook, Carol, was also recruited through a friendship 
network. She had no formal catering training, but was friends with the woman 
who used to do the cooking at NurseryCo. When this friend became pregnant and 
gave up herjob, she suggested that Carol "gave it a try". Consequently, Carol was 
now working on a permanent, part-time basis at NurseryCo. Like the other staff, 
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she was attracted to NurseryCo by the working environment because "it isn't one 
of those places where everyone is bitching". 
The maintenance of a harmonious working environment had therefore been a 
major influence in the founders' decision to buy the company, and in the decisions 
of more recent recruits to take up employment at NurseryCo. Both the original 
founders of the ESOP and the newer non-owner employees had all been 
disillusioned with their previous work experiences and had all come to NurseryCo 
with the expectation that the ESOP structure would provide them with a more 
friendly, less antagonistic working enviromnent. They had all also invested in 
coming to NurseryCo, by either risking their livelihood on the venture, as the 
founders had done, or by giving up employment elsewhere. It is notable that none 
of the NurscryCo staff had been recruited from the unemployed, but had all 
voluntarily come to NurscryCo to achieve a goal other nurseries were denying 
them -a happy, harmonious working climate. It was obviously not the job itself 
that had disillusioned them, otherwise they would not have been looking for 
alternative childcare employment, but the social climate within other nurseries. 
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3. Reported Harmony 
The crucial test, however, of the ESOP's ability to generate a more harmonious 
working environment for the NurseryCo employees and owners was whether the 
structural changes associated with employee ownership and control had actually 
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brought about the removal of tensions within the workplace. 
Gill, as the most senior member of staff, operated as the team leader and 
spokesperson for the group and therefore fulfilled the role of key informant for the 
research. The accepted story or mythology at NurseryCo, as reported by Gill, was 
that in contrast to the former regime at NurseryCo, working relations at the 
nursery as a result of the employee buy-out were now decidedly and robustly 
harmonious. When asked to explain how and why this had come about, this was 
accounted for first by the "friendly working atmosphere", and secondly because at 
that time there was no need for job losses. Notably, the reported harmony at 
NurseryCo was very much in evidence on initial investigation, and there was 
evidence of much laughing and joking among the group and relations, on the 
surface at least, appeared relaxed and supportive. The team would also socialise 
together after work, occasionally as a whole group but more commonly in smaller 
groups of two or three. 
While the level of reported unitarism within the group was high, given that all 
network members had the same ideology and goal of a harmonious working 
environment, claims made for unanimity were another issue. The group leader, 
Gill, reported that an important aspect of the harmony at NurseryCo was the 
168 
unanimity within the group, principally that nursery decisions were taken on a 
consensus basis. Such consensus appeared to be an important claim for the group, 
especially as decision-making included monthly group meetings (established at 
the time of the buy-out) and the new, non-owner employees also had a right to 
attend and vote. However, the ideology of harmony meant that the group claimed 
that voting was never used and all decisions were taken by consensus. The group 
was therefore claiming that common values meant that there were no substantive 
disagreements within the team. 
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4. The Evidence for Conflict 
The research however suggested that while harmony was apparent, other more 
permanent aspects of conflict had not been eradicated by the employee buy-out. 
A re-examination of the evidence of relations between group members and the 
accepted story of harmonious relations, presents the evidence from NurseryCo in a 
different light. Contrary to expectations and public image, conflict had continued 
to exist within the group and while this conflict at first appeared to be related to 
disagreements over work issues, further participant observation revealed that 
network-related interpersonal conflicts were an integral part of the picture. 
It was apparent very early on in the research that the picture of a harmonious 
working environment that had been painted by the group was not an entirely true 
representation. While harmony was the overall impression given by the group, 
and was certainly apparent between certain network members, within the network 
as a whole harmony was by and large a surface construct. While some of this 
conflict took the form of overt disagreements, most took the form of suppressed 
conflict. Disagreements regularly arose between group members, and these 
tensions frequently had to be dealt with by forms of conflict avoidance and 
suppression. 
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4.1 Direct Conflict within the Group 
Despite the group's claims to the contrary, direct, i. e. face to face, and open 
conflict was evident within the team. This type of conflict was largely confined to 
work-control and forms of conflict relating to matters of staff hierarchy. As such, 
overt conflict was related to day-to-day tasks involving the running and control of 
the nursery, which the ESOP had left largely unchanged. For example, the 
students would on occasion receive a direct reprimand from the permanent staff, 
notably Sarah as Deputy Officer in Charge. However, as these students only 
attended the nursery one day a week, and then only for a few weeks duration, they 
could be classed as exceptionally peripheral and temporary members of the 
nursery team. Therefore, if group members engaged in direct conflict with 
students, the student's peripheral network position would mean that this could do 
little to influence or harm the harmonious relations within the core group. In this 
way, direct conflict between an employee and a student did not endanger the 
group goals. 
However, direct and overt conflict was also an observable, but rare, event between 
group members themselves. On one occasion, Sarah (a company Director and 
employee-owner) had gone into the playground where June (a non-owner 
employee) was supervising the children. As June picked up a little boy, Sarah 
with strong criticism in her voice, told her not to pick up the children since she 
would not have been able to go quickly to any other child that fell over. The tone 
of this communication clearly indicated a direct conflict relationship. June 
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however, did not retort with direct or overt conflict, and waited until Sarah had 
left before turning and saying angrily "that annoys the hell out of me! ". 
The situations of direct and overt conflict could therefore be said to arise through 
the need to monitor and control the work of subordinate members of staff. 
Significantly, direct and overt conflict was never observed between employees of 
the same network status. However, it is notable that direct and overt conflict was 
used to deal with such day-to-day control issues, when a more equal or 
harmonious approach was conceivable. While there was evidence of conflict 
between the employee-owner, Sarah, and some subordinate members of staff, the 
other employee-owners, Gill and Dot, did not utilise this form of control in the 
workplace. It is important to note, that this form of overt conflict largely occurred 
between the employee-owner Sarah and other members of staff, since Sarah held a 
dual position of power within the hierarchy - as an ESOP owner and as the 
Deputy Officer in Charge. Significantly, direct and overt conflict was never 
observed between the group of ESOP employee-owners. Therefore, conflict 
relations cannot be said to be simply situated between the founding members and 
newer employees. The genesis of direct and overt conflict therefore also lies 
elsewhere within the network. 
In such instances of direct and overt conflict, the conflict exchange was overtly 
work-related with, significantly, no overt personal content to the conflict. 
Notably, however, the individual on the receiving end could not easily respond to 
this task criticism with equal force, since they were both 'in the wrong' and, in 
relation to the formal staff hierarchy network, less influential. Due to the lack of 
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direct, overt responses from those on the receiving end of this form of conflict, 
task-related conflicts could occur within the group without escalating or adversely 
affecting the group's self-image and surface construct of a harmonious whole. 
4.2 Suppressed Conflict 
While openly expressed conflicts between network members would have run the 
risk of endangering the group's goals of harmony and friendship (through the risk 
of overt conflict escalation), it was notable that face to face yet suppressed conflict 
between group members did frequently occur. This form of conflict occurred 
regularly between network members of similar status positions. However, since 
the disagreements occurred between similarly ranked employees, direct and overt 
conflict exchanges could not be used. The employees therefore, to preserve the 
group image of harmony, had to find alternative means of expressing their 
criticisms of and to their workmates. This suppression occurred in both direct and 
indirect conflict forms. 
4.3 Suppressed Direct Conflict 
One of the main recurring daily activities of the nursery timetable was 'circle 
time', where the children sat down on the carpet to either sing or watch television 
under the supervision of one primary member of staff. The general daily pattern 
was to watch television during the morning circle time and to sing songs with the 
173 
children in the afternoon. Divergence from this routine could ý and did occasion 
suppressed, direct conflict between various network members. Early on in the 
research, June, a full-time nursery nurse, was supervising the afternoon circle 
time. Fay, a younger but longer serving staff member (and therefore of 
comparable status within the network), was sitting on the carpet with the children, 
with her back to June. June decided that she wanted the children to watch the 
television (a divergence from the accepted routine) and asked one of the older 
children, Adam, to turn the set on. However, Fay, without turning round, ordered 
Adam to turn the television off. Adam ignored her, and at this Fay complained 
loudly that she didn't like having the television on and wanted to do some singing. 
June didn't acknowledge or respond in any way to Fay, who had said all of this 
without turning round to look at June. The result of this terse exchange was that 
the television was left on and Fay stood up and left the area. When the 
programme was over, June told the children that Fay had wanted to do some 
singing with them but had "gone away". 
These episodes of disagreement and tension were revealing for what they 
disclosed about the mechanisms and norms established and used within the group 
to suppress conflict. The first point to highlight is the depersonalisation of the 
conflict through the use of body language. During the 'circle time' disagreement, 
direct conflict between the two women was avoided by Fay's refusal to look at or 
even face June while targeting direct criticism at her. The second issue is the 
public nature of the hostility, which both women knew could not be escalated in 
order to maintain the appearance of a harmonious working environment. Finally, 
through withdrawing from the exchange by leaving the area, Fay in effect broke 
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off the interaction and thus avoided any further conflict possibilities. The 
individuals involved therefore did not allow their disagreements or hostilities to 
escalate into open conflict and made use of a number of conflict suppression 
techniques to retain the impression of network consensus. Since the ethos of the 
NurseryCo ESOP was the production of a harmonious working environment, in 
these instances the conflicts had to be suppressed in order to maintain the 
collective network identity of unanimity and consensus. 
4.4 Conflict Avoidance 
The behavioural norms of dealing with potential conflicts within the network also 
took other forms, both direct and indirect. To avoid tensions becoming public 
disagreements between individuals, conflict suppression was also experienced on 
a much more subtle level in the forrn of conflict avoidance. This took the form of 
teasing or joking when a situation became tension laden. This type of conflict 
suppression was more likely to occur between network members who had 
established strong infonnal interpersonal links with the other co-worker involved. 
Consequently, the form of conflict suppression or avoidance used was a direct 
product of network form and pattern. Conflict suppression was more likely to 
occur between network members with similar formal status, whose network links 
were less direct, whereas conflict avoidance tended to take place between network 
members, not necessarily of similar formal status, but who exhibited close 
informal network ties, i. e. members of sub-groups or cliques within the network. 
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Group members with strong network links frequently used these subtle measures 
to express dissatisfaction while avoiding open confrontation. Dot on one occasion 
teasingly scolded Gill for leaving a scrubbing brush, which she had used to clean 
out the fish tank, on a kitchen surface. Teasing was also used to present intentions 
in such a way that could not provoke conflict. For example, in the initial stages of 
the research with the NurseryCo network, Dot had asked me to make a pot of tea 
for the group, to which June had added, in a joking tone, that "when someone asks 
they are really telling". 
On another occasion, Sarah had asked Bridget to do her "a favour" and do the 
washing. To which Bridget replied "sorry I was gassing", indicating that she was 
aware that Sarah was to some extent annoyed with her. To restore harmonious 
relations, Sarah teasingly replied that "you come here to work you know! " and 
both women cemented the relationship by laughing. Yet another illustration was 
the occasion in the second week of fieldwork, when Bridget had asked for help 
her fill the water tub. In the middle of this she was called away to deliver cups of 
tea to the other staff, and so June also began to fill the playtub. However, when 
Bridget returned she joked that she was no longer needed because her job had 
been taken over. Subtle tones in her voice, underlying her joking manner, 
indicated that she was telling the other staff to let her get on with the job. 
The teasing mechanism for dealing with conflict could however be placed under 
strain and was occasionally strongly tested, such as during an argument over the 
children's safety around a playtub of water which involved a disagreement 
between the closely linked network members Bridget and Fay. Bridget had been 
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supervising the activity when Fay arrived and started to move some tables away 
from the tub, thereby interfering with Bridget's autonomy. Bridget asked her why 
she had moved the tables, to which Fay replied that it was because the area 
"wasn't safe" and added that she "thought about these things", which Bridget 
looked taken aback by. At this point, Fay realised that the situation was becoming 
overtly hostile and difficult, and rescued her relationship with Bridget by 
emphasising that what she had said was meant as a joke. This seemed to calm the 
situation, but here the interaction ended as Bridget moved away from the area and 
left Fay to supervise the children. This is a clear illustration of how network 
members avoided an escalating conflict through the multiple use of mechanisms; 
both teasing by making the criticism a joke, and withdrawal from the exchange. It 
is important to note here that Bridget and Fay were members of subgroup two 
within the network, had been at school together and had grown up together. They 
were also of a similar status within the network, for while Fay had worked at the 
nursery for much longer, Bridget was a qualifled nursery nurse. 
Notably, teasing was only used to reinforce relationships between the permanent 
group members, and not between the staff and students. As mentioned above, 
staff dealt with students by means of direct, open conflict. Teasing was therefore 
an important method used by close group members to reinforce their harmonious 
relationships, while at the same time making light of disagreements and thus 
avoiding interpersonal conflicts. Through this approach, the group also 
maintained the appearance of consensus. In these examples, the NurseryCo staff 
were responding to potential conflict situations by dealing directly with the other 
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actor(s) in the relationship. However, on these occasions they were not engaging 
in direct overt conflict, but direct conflict avoidance. 
4.5 Indirect Conflict 
Indirect conflict was yet another means of avoiding face to face, overt conflicts 
between group members. This means of maintaining group harmony usually took 
the form of two'or more employees, with close informal links, complaining about 
or criticising a third party's actions. In this manner, conflict was voiced in a 'safc' 
environment, but not directly to the object of the conflict. This therefore qualified 
as indirect conflict expression. - 
The incident of direct overt conflict expression from Sarah to June in the 
playground (cited in section 4.1) also illustrated indirect conflict expression. 
Notably, June's response to Sarah's criticisms was in the form of indirect conflict 
expression. Her response was indirect in that while she did give voice to her 
feelings of tension, she did so to me, as the only other adult in the playground, and 
not to Sarah. The overall result of June's actions was therefore to prevent the 
escalation of the overt conflict relationship with Sarah. This could also be 
explained by June's formal network position relative to Sarah, an employee-owner 
and deputy officer in charge of the nursery. Sarah was therefore June's superior 
and her employer. June was also a significant isolate in the informal network 
relations - with only the one close informal link to Gill. 
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On another such occasion a lack of communication spilled over into indirect 
conflict between June and Bridget. The incident had taken place in the nursery 
the previous day when, at around 5.20pm Bridget had decided, apparently without 
asked the others, to give the children some cake. June was upset about this 
because she had been due to finish work at 5.30pm and had to stay around for a 
little longer. In this instance, conflict was suppressed by June's subsequent non- 
communication with Bridget. However, June vented her anger in retelling the 
incident to me the next day, therefore exhibiting indirect conflict. Later that day 
June again exhibited indirect conflict by complaining to me about Bridget, who 
"hadn't bothered to ask" June what activities the children had already completed. 
The involvement of the researcher in these incidents of indirect conflict 
expression should be considered at this point, yet despite the possible bias 
introduced by the presence of an outsider in the midst of the network, this form of 
conflict avoidance was not only used by June, but was also used by others to avoid 
direct conflicts. For example, Dot was observed using indirect conflict to displace 
her tensions with June. In this instance, Dot, while June was supervising the 
toilets, chose to criticise June's actions to Sarah, saying, "she's just standing there 
like this", putting her hands on her hips in imitation of June. She needed to repeat 
this twice to Sarah to get a response. In this way, Dot depersonalised her 
comments about June by addressing them indirectly, and thus maintained the 
fagade of harmony. Later in the day, again with Sarah, Dot once more indulged in 
indirect conflict directed at June, when she criticised her ability to follow driving 
directions. When June returned she explained to me that Dot and herself knew the 
roads by different names and explained the problem as "getting confused". 
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5. Conflict and Network Structure 
It is clear from these accounts of conflict within the network, that network form 
and pattern played a significant role in the types of conflict expression used within 
the NurseryCo network. Direct, overt conflict was largely a product of the 
unequal distribution of formal network influence between network members. In 
this respect, the possibilities for overt conflict escalation were removed through 
the subordinate network member's inability to respond in a likewise fashion. 
Suppressed conflict on the other hand only occurred between network members of 
relatively equal formal status and was used to protect the collective network goal 
of a hannonious working environment. Conflict avoidance was principally used 
among network members with close informal network links, and not necessarily 
of similar formal network status. Finally, indirect conflict was only observed 
between the most peripheral member of the workplace informal network, June, 
and some of the other network members. 
5.1 Halloween Preparations 
By the second month of the fieldwork, the nursery was entering into preparations 
for both Halloween and the Hindu festival of Diwalli. June in particular, was 
feeling tense because she had "been told" to make the Halloween preparations, 
while Bridget and Fay were planning for Diwalli together. 
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During one lunch break, as Fay and Bridget discussed their plans for Diwalli, they 
intedected exchanges of social news. Although Bridget and Fay's discussion was 
conducted over lunch in a crowded room, and was therefore public, the presence 
of others annoyed Bridget who attempted to make their discussion private in two 
ways. First, she made the discussion explicitly exclusive by turning her back to 
the others and by then turning round and provocatively enquiring, "are you all 
happy eavesdropping? ". Bridget's body language was therefore exclusionary, 
sitting as she was with her back to the rest of the room. However, despite this 
June attempted to put her views forward to Bridget and Fay. In response, Fay 
replied directly to June., making eye contact. However, Bridget refused to 
acknowledge her presence or to face June (although Bridget was sitting no more 
than two feet away), and communicated her answers to Fay who then repeated 
them to June. During this brief exchange the situation was extremely tense, 
however Fay did not appear to find this situation difficult, suggesting that she was 
either used to or willing to go along with this means of dealing with the tension 
between June and Bridget. Following this short-lived, indirect conflict exchange, 
June quietly withdrew from the discussion and left the room. Later, she expressed 
her dissatisfaction with the discussion to me, feeling that her attempts to comment 
on her Halloween preparations had been ignored. 
The theme of conflict surrounding relationships with June was emphasised later 
that day when further indirect but overt conflict became clear over the Halloween 
preparations. Fay, Carol and Gill were in the nursery kitchen, where Fay was 
expressing severe criticism of June's Halloween preparations. Although Fay was 
not directly involved in the preparations, she complained to Gill that June hadn't 
181 
organised anything for the Halloween celebrations and expressed her opinion that 
June was being "a dippy cow". In response, Gill suggested to Carol and Fay that 
they "don't suggest everything - you know", adding with a smile, "We'll see how 
it goes", thus managing to diffuse the conflict situation. However, the next day 
Fay took her criticisms of June to Sarah, joking that June had thought pumpkin pie 
was a savoury dish. Again, these criticisms received some support from Sarah, 
but it was a muted agreement - to reply equally forcefully would have risked 
escalation of the conflict, beyond the group's acceptable levels. In this instance, 
the tension was generated by June's perceived unwillingness to conform to 
expected work norms, i. e. to take on autonomous responsibilities. Although the 
complaint was taken to two ESOP employee-owner directors, the tension between 
Fay and June could not be resolved in this indirect manner, it could simply be 
hidden from June. 
5.2 Diwalli Celebrations 
Continued signs of June's isolation for the other network members were apparent 
during the Diwalli celebrations. As dress was an important part of, the 
celebrations, all the staff wore full saris for the occasion - except June, who wore 
her sari over her T-shirt and jeans. In addition, all the staff wore a 'bindi' on their 
foreheads, again except June. Thus she became immediately isolated from the rest 
of the group by her different choice of dress. However, June's close informal 
links with Gill meant that no direct, overt conflict was expressed from other 
network members, instead Gill briefly expressed their tensions with June through 
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teasing her about her fussy eating habits. However, the message beneath the 
teasing was a prompt to June to join in a bit more with the Diwalli activities. In 
this case, to eat some of the Asian food, "how can anyone say they don't like 
something unless they try it first? " (Gill). 
The interplay of network and conflict resurfaced once the celebrations were over. 
Again the isolate was June, and the individuals with whom her relations were 
strained consisted of the core network members Fay and Sarah. It was clear that 
Sarah and Fay had tried to raise an issue with June and didn't believe her answers 
about how the decorations sewn onto June's sari had ended up on the floor. 
Consequently, to avoid escalating the conflict, they took the problem to Gill to 
solve because her network relationship to June was close and not antagonistic. 
Clearly, the final recourse for conflict avoidance was Gill - on whose shoulders 
therefore rested the ultimate cohesion of the group. Gill asked the two to tell June 
that it was time to come in and change. This was not the first time that Gill's 
friendship with June has been used as a form of conflict avoidance. June, 
obviously willing to accept Gill's demands and not the others', came to change 
immediately. It was clear that June had been unwilling to accept criticism of her 
actions from Sarah or Fay, and once alone with Gill gave her a different version of 
the story about what had happened to her sari to that she had given to Fay and 
Sarah. 
The necessity of expressing conflict, but hiding it at the same time was again 
apparent during the evening following the Diwalli celebrations. In June's car on 
the way to a local pub, Fay, sitting behind June, had mimed stabbing her in the 
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back and silently mimicked what June was saying. Fay repeated this hostility 
towards June in the pub, once June had left her seat to go to the bar. At this, Gill 
turned to me and asked me to "take no notice" of Fay, excusing her because "she's 
only young", thus explaining away the conflict as a result of youthful high spirits. 
It was clear that the group's attempts at eliminating or containing the conflict were 
not entirely successful because later that evening on the way home, it was 
apparent that June recognised that the tension existed between herself and the 
group. June's self-awareness of her network position was indicated through her 
comments, expressed with resentment, to Gill,, on how "funny" everyone was in 
the pub, discussing how they were to get home and that no one had asked for her 
help to drive them home. 3 It was clear therefore that June felt her social isolation, 
but appeared unable to break out of this antagonistic relationship with the rest of 
the group. Gill explained away the others' actions in tenns of the group not liking 
to assume that because June had a car she could be told to drive people home. 
5.3 Employee Ownership Week 
Events surrounding the annual Employee Ownership Week, which fell during the 
fieldwork period, further illustrated June's network role. Employee Ownership 
Week, attended by the city's Mayor, was celebrated locally by an evening event at 
NurseryCo. Both June and Bridget arrived for the function alone, while Gill, 
Sarah and Fay arrived together, having been at Gill's house beforehand. After the 
' June being the only group member to own and drive a car. 
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reception, the group went out together for a drink. This included June, but only 
after much persuasion from Bridget, who promised to buy her a drink. 4 June 
isolated herself further during the evening by sitting alone at the end of the table, 
deliberately physically self-isolated by leaving one space between herself and 
those around her. In this way, she positioned herself too far away from most of 
the group to hear the conversation. Significantly, the only people she could hear 
were Gill, her close friend, and myself, a fellow outsider. 
The importance of social norms for group cohesion was illustrated here. During 
the evening it was proposed to hold a future get together, this time in a club, and 
Gill, Sarah, Bridget and Fay arranged to go. June however turned down the offer, 
saying that "it's not my scene". Therefore, June's isolated position within the 
group was partly self-perpetuating, she did not share with the others their social 
interests and therefore could not integrate into the informal network. 
As the isolate of the group, this appeared to create a feeling of tension also within 
June. For example, she did not neutralise conflicts with a joke, but tended to 
withdraw from them, mainly by refusing to respond. She would however, vent 
her tensions when the others were not around, principally to me as another 
outsider or to Gill as a close friend. This suggests that there were tensions 
building up which could not easily be resolved through the usual group 
mechanisms. Indirect conflict used by other group members was expressed to 
their informal subgroup associates, whereas June as a member of neither main 
informal clique, had no one to bounce her tensions off. Neither could she use Gill 
"A promise which was forgotten once June had driven everyone to the pub. 
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for this purpose, because Gill maintained harmonious relations with all network 
members at all costs. However, June's relations with others in the group were less 
straightforward. The other members appeared to deal with their feelings about her 
in a different manner to other forms of conflict avoidance. In June's case they did 
not indulge in teasing or joking, they preferred instead to address their 
dissatisfactions indirectly. Fay, for example, chose not to look at June while she 
criticised her choice of television over singing for the children's circle time. Dot, 
on the other hand, when June was supervising the toilets, chose to express indirect 
conflict by taking her criticisms to Sarah. A re-examination of the network 
patterns within the group reveals why this was occurring. While the group norms 
of conflict avoidance applied to the tightly knit and overlapping informal 
subgroups, June's position was less integral to the informal network and therefore 
allowed the group members to deal with her differently. However, there was little 
use of direct and open conflict with June - she was still an integral part of the 
formal nursery network. 
Indirect conflict was therefore the most common means of dealing with tensions 
in the groups relationships with June. In some ways, the amount of conflict that 
was directed at June posed a potential threat to the group's harmonious self- 
image, but this conflict was also suppressed and indirect and therefore served as a 
crucial safety valve for the relatively risk-free expression of their tensions. This 
form of conflict expression served two main network purposes. This first was to 
enable the core informal network groups to express their tensions without fear of 
rupturing the whole network and its collective identity of harmony. The second 
purpose was to reinforce the cohesion of the core groups, by identifying 'an other' 
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against whom the norms of the network, could be measured, identified and 
reinforced, in this instance the reinforcing of work norms. June herself played an 
important role in this network process by reinforcing her isolation by not using 
teasing as a form of conflict avoidance and instead almost exclusively using 
withdrawal. However, her inclusion within the nursery group was reinforced by 
her means of entry, i. e. her friendship with the central member, Gill. 
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6. Network Position and Conflict Form 
While an informal core of network members existed. closelý linked to a number of' 
other inthential members, June and the students were informal network isolates 
and therefore not integral members of the group. Therefore, there were obvious L- 
alliances vvithin the group, producing lines along which contlict erupted and 
which then had to be suppressed to meet the group's beliefs about its collective 
identity. In particular, the most isolated member of the full-time staff. . )Line, 
applied a different form ofconflict to the rest of the group. In her case, she used 
and tended to receive indirect contlict expression. Clearly, from the mapped 
representation ofinformal relationships at NurseryCo, June was an Isolate III ternis 
ot'close and frequent harmonious relations (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6 NurseryCo Harmonious Relationships 
Bridget 
Sailth I Carol 
Obviously, this network of close harmonious relations replicates the informal 
subgroup structures illustrated in Section 2.3) of this chapter. However, it' regular 
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conflictual relations (of all forms) between network members are mapped, a 
different picture arises (Figure 4.7). Here, rather than being an isolate, June was 
the primary focus for hostile interactions. 
Figure 4.7 NurseryCo Conflictual Relationships 
I Fay I[ =Bridget 
I'lierel'ore, there was an inverse relationship between the two neovork lorms. 
While the network of frequent and close harmonious interactions was divided into 
subgroups. the conflict network was much more focused. This pattern of cliques 
and schisms within the group extended into the decision-making sphere. On 
major acquisitions and other company decisions. the publicly touted line , vas that 
decisions were taken jointly by Gill, Dot and Sarah. In reality, and dLIC to tile 
nature of the work and shift patterns. decisions were often taken unilaterally by 
Gill, or on occasions. Fay was included in the decision-making process. 
By overlaying the two opposite forms ofnetwork - harmonious relations (shown 
in a solid line) and conflict relations (shown in a broken line), a full picture of the 
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dynarnics at work within this small network can be presented (Figure 4.8). 
Figure 4.8 NurseryCo Network Dynamics 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1 Role and Function of the ESOP 
The role and purpose of the NurseryCo ESOP was presented by the network as a 
mechanism to secure a harmonious working environment. The appearance of 
harmony within the group at NurseryCo was therefore evidently of great 
importance to its members, many of whom had come to NurseryCo to escape 
disharmonious working environments elsewhere. However, the importance of a 
harmonious impression was not just for outside observers, but was of integral 
importance to the cohesion and maintenance of the group, and of the ESOP, as 
this harmony was the rationale for the ESOP and for the group. It was their means 
of cohesion in the face of harsh alternatives, as work experience had taught the 
network members that alternative work opportunities elsewhere were unfriendly 
and antagonistic. 
The ideology of harmony at NurseryCo was therefore so strong an identity within 
the network that the members worked hard to maintain its impression. In many 
ways, the group had a strong hand in the formation of the network and the 
maintenance of its collective identity. In the first instance, they chose new 
recruits that were know to at least one of the current members and who would fit 
in with the network identity, but on a deeper level they maintained the network 
through the instilling of joint goals. The collective identity "for the NurseryCo 
network members was therefore constructed via their network - their reality was 
that the network was a hannonious, close group of friends who worked together. 
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However, the responsibility for the maintenance of this ideology fell most strongly 
on Gill. The burden this placed on her, and therefore on the network, was clear. 
When Gill returned to work from a short holiday, she said jokingly that if she 
hadn't taken a break she "would've had a breakdown". The joking manner in 
which this was said reflected her desire for her difficulties not to been seen as a 
source of tension for the group. 
7.2 Conflict and Network Structure 
However, the form of the network also gave rise to conflict. While conflicts 
between network members were, on the surface, generated by the perceived 
violation of group norms of behaviour, this conflict could take any number of 
forms depending on the relative network status of the parties to the conflict. 
Conflict at NurseryCo was therefore very much a network phenomenon. From the 
data presented, it was clear that the use of various conflict suppression and 
avoidance techniques depended on the individual's network position and location. 
The result of the particular network forms and patterns at NurseryCo was that the 
closer the informal network associations between individuals, the more likely they 
were to use conflict , avoidance techniques rather than resort to conflict 
suppression, or overt conflict expression. 
While it may appear that the source of tension within the group was a result of the 
inclusion of June as a group member, this is an inadequate network explanation. 
As well as being a focus of conflict, June served as a point of cohesion for the 
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others, allowing them to reinforce their group norms against her nonconformism. 
The group needed an 'other' since, with the removal of the traditional ownership 
structure, there was no external other on which to release work tensions. 
Therefore with the removal, through conversion to employee ownership and 
control, of a traditional authority focus and thus a focus for tensions, an alternative 
and socially derived focus was required by the network. June's position as an 
isolate in the informal network served this function. 
7.3 Formalised Conflict Structures: Case Study Two 
However, as case study one was a small, non-unionised network, its expression of 
conflict was largely hidden and infonnal. The impact of employee ownership and 
control on formalised, routinised conflict patterns and procedures (such as 
established industrial relations structures) could not therefore be examined. To 
adequately test for a relationship between employee participation and conflict, a 
case where overt conflicts were the norm was required. Therefore, for the second 
case study, a large unionised firm was chosen in the bus transport industry. While 
this sector has a history of overt conflicts in the form of industrial action by the 
employees, many of the bus companies had been privatised through employee 
buy-outs using the ESOP form. While several had been quickly taken over by the 
large national bus companies, case study two had yet to be swallowed up. 
Significantly, this larger organisation, with its established and formalised conflict 
patterns and routines, also claimed that employee ownership and control had 
reduced conflicts and increased harmonisation between unions and management. 
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Chapter Five 
BusCo 
1. Introduction 
In common with NurseryCo, the BusCo buy-out had been prompted by the sale of 
the enterprise. While, at NurseryCo, a principal rationale for the employee buy- 
out had been to engender a harmonious working environment, the growth of 
harmonious relations between management and unions had not been a primary 
objective of employee ownership at BusCo.. However, the testimonies of the 
Board members indicated that it had become an important and integral perception 
of the impact of employee ownership on the organisation. The accounts by the 
Board members presented in this chapter, indicate that while BusCo had retained 
its formal collective bargaining structures and roles since the employee buy-out, 
the ESOP, and in particular the Worker Directors, had changed the scope and role 
of the informal networks within the company. While these company 
representatives reported that industrial relations were much improved as a result of 
the ESOP, there remained significant questions concerning how much of this was 
simply ESOP rhetoric. The direct testimonies of the Managing and Worker 
Directors were by no means clear as to whether and to what extent things had 
really altered. 
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1.1 Rationale for Selecting BusCo 
To adequately explore the relationship between social networks, collective 
identities and organisational conflicts, the study of covert and hidden conflicts 
alone would be insufficient. Therefore, to complement the NurseryCo case study 
a further study site that presented overt, tangible, sanctioned and formalised 
organisational conflict was necessary. This type of conflict can be found in the 
majority of organisations with establishcd collcctivc bargaining structurcs. Thesc 
structures both sanction and formalise conflicts, while also providing a forum for 
the open expression of tensions. However, to pennit comparison with NurseryCo, 
and for the purposes of this research, the organisation had also to be a recent 
conversion to employee ownership and therefore BusCo was selected. 
BusCo is a large Bus company in the North of England which, at the time of the 
field research (1996), had been employee-owned for two years. At that time, the 
company consisted of around 2,500 employee owners, the vast majority of whom 
were union members, with the TGWU as the largest union represented. The 
organisation was one of many Bus companies that had privatised through the 
employee buy-out mechanism in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see section 5.2). 
BusCo was similar to NurseryCo in that it was also an employee-owned firm, 
recently bought by its employees using the ESOP structure and in both cases the 
shift to employee ownership had come about through the sale of the enterprise, 
which was beyond the control of the employees. In addition, both enterprises 
were situated within the tertiary sector and both sets of workers experienced low 
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pay conditions. However BusCo, in contrast to NurseryCo, was significantly 
different in network structure and size. The company was a large, well established 
enterprise with a long-standing union presence and role. Conflict processes at 
BusCo were therefore situated within an easily recognisable, fortnalised industrial 
relations forum, with established and formalised conflict frameworks which 
allowed the examination of overt conflict processes. Moreover, unlike the initial 
case study, BusCo was a strongly male company, bureaucratic and rigidly 
hierarchical with a dominant 'them-and-us' culture. 
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2. Rationale for the Employee Buy-Out 
2.1 External Forces: Privatisation 
BusCo had been bought from the local authority by all of its 2,500 employees 
including management in 1994, an employee buy-out that had been precipitated by 
a change in government legislation in the mid 1980s which privatised and 
deregulated the publicly owned bus industry. While many Bus companies were 
privatised at this time by conventional means, a significant proportion became 
employee-owned companies. This alternative privatisation mechanism was in 
large part due to a number of local authorities who were opposed to the sell-offs, 
but were legally bound to go through the motions of privatisation. The most 
politically appealing means of privatisation for many local councils was therefore 
via employee ownership. All of the newly converted firms used the ESOP form as 
their template, however, within this template each company forged its own 
proportion and form of employee ownership. In some of the bus ESOPs, 
employees held the controlling share, whereas in others management retained 51% 
of the shares. Few of the ESOPs opted for 100% employee ownership, partly 
since in order to bring management along they required a larger slice of the cake, 
and partly because where venture capital was involved, investors fought shy of 
total employee control. Of this group, BusCo had the greatest proportion of 
employee ownership among the large bus ESOPs, at 80%, spread evenly 
throughout the work force - its Managing Director having the same ownership 
status (however, with more shares) and rights as a 16 year old new starter. While 
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originally, BusCo had been 100% employee owned, by 1996, and just before the 
negotiations detailed in this study began, it had traded 20% of its shares with one 
of the national Bus companies in exchange for a large cash loan. 
2.2 Internal Forces: Protecting the Status Quo 
While the reality of the sale of the enterprise was beyond the control of the 
employees and management, there were a few options open to them. They could 
have waited to see which national Bus company would purchase BusCo, or they 
had the option to be proactive and buy the company themselves. Given the 
scenario that both management and unions feared job losses and wage cuts if a 
national Bus company took over, the employees and management decided to buy 
the company for themselves, using the statutory ESOP formula. The privatisation 
of the bus industry, coupled with rapid deregulation, presented the newly 
privatising companies with a situation where, nationally, public use of the service 
had dropped by twcnty-five percent and the number of buses on the roads had 
doubled. In some regions the statistics presented an even bleaker picture. Added 
to this was a significant cut in public subsidies, which resulted in both a highly 
competitive and often struggling industry. Often the burden for this fell on the 
workers, with pressure to accept reduced tenns and conditions in order to keep the 
companies competitive. Given this general scenario, the workers at BusCo 
supported the employee ownership bid in the expectation that an ESOP would 
protect theirjobs and terms and conditions of employment, 
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I doWt think at the time the ordinary employees were in the 
slightest bit interested, all they wanted was their job carrying on. 
(Finance Director) 
They were interested in protecting their jobs, shares didn't count. 
(Worker Director Three)' 
Management backing was won for the ESOP for two reasons. Firstly, 
management could also see the growth in competition, which as the Finance 
Director pointed out "might have produced a P45 for me", and anticipated that 
employee ownership would protect their jobs also. Secondly, the expectation was 
that employee ownership would raise levels of employee loyalty within the 
company, therefore increasing employee willingness to accept changes to terms 
and conditions to ensure continued competitiveness and thus protect their 
investment. 
Both the management and trade union groups at BusCo felt that the new 
organisational structures, that had been brought about through the conversion to 
employee ownership, would work in their favour exclusively within their 
established adversarial relationship, and consequently lent their support to the 
venture. 
'Platform Staff Worker Director 
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2.3 The Buy-out Process 
As a result, management and the unions co-operated in the buy-out process, and 
the Buyout Group (established to deal with the formation of the BusCo ESOP) 
consisted of both management and employee representatives and incorporated a 
strong trade union representation. A significant outcome of this was the 
protection of the trade union representative and bargaining functions in the ESOP 
Articles, and consequently the principal industrial relations forums, the 
negotiating committees, enjoyed unbroken continuity in the transition to employee 
ownership. The ESOP structure eventually adopted was also designed to 
"minimise the prospect or temptation of anybody making a lot of money out of it" 
(Finance Director) and so management were not awarded vastly disproportionate 
amounts of shares. In addition, the shares were protected for five years after the 
establishment of the ESOP, preventing any take-over bids in that period. 
Therefore, from two quite opposite group goals (both management and unions), 
the employee buy-out gained practically one hundred percent support at BusCo. It 
is realistic to say that BusCo had the change in ownership forced upon it by 
external circumstances and entered into ESOP negotiations as a creative and risk- 
laden route to saving jobs and preserving terms and conditions of employment. 
Therefore, while the changes put in place by the national legislative moves could 
not be prevented, the employee buy-out was achieved primarily to prevent change 
from occurring. Democratic decision-making and participation rights were 
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initially far from a prime consideration, although the nature of the organisational 
form they were investigating meant that it was a probability. 
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3. Formal Networks 
3.1 Established Networks at BusCo 
As a result of the buy-out process and rationale, formal collective bargaining 
structures and roles were retained at BusCo. These established collective 
bargaining structures consisted of two distinct fonnal workplace networks, 
management and trade union, with radically different collective identities. As a 
result of these different formal frameworks, direct communication between the 
two groups was largely formalised, due to their limited informal communications 
or social links. Consequently, the main opportunity for communication occurred 
within the collective bargaining arena, where the exchanges were based on formal 
group position and not on personal contacts. 
Management Structure 
Management at BusCo was represented at the collective bargaining forum by 
appointed, functional teams from different management levels. In negotiations 
with the drivers, for example, the core management team consisted of the 
Operations Director, the Depot Manager and the depot operations manager of the 
largest depot, with other management representatives attending on occasion, such 
as the Finance Director. The rigidly hierarchical nature of the management 
network indicated an evidently concentrated network form, with the Operations 
Director occupying the central position. The Operations and Engineering 
Directors were directly involved in the collective bargaining forums for the 
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TGWU and AEEU functional councils respectively. The macro-cultural 
environment of BusCo's management network was one of professional, career 
management, but also a management that had until recently been schooled in the 
public sector. 
Trade Union Structure 
The employees at BusCo were divided into three occupational groups: platform 
staff (drivers), engineering, and administrative/management staff. Each employee 
group was represented by their own union and negotiated with the company 
through their own functional councils. For example, the platform staff, numbering 
over fifteen hundred, were represented by the TGWU. This body of employees 
was divided between five garages, resulting in five TGWU branches. Within each 
branch, there existed a formally hierarchical structure of positions, centering on 
the branch Chair -the composition of the union branches therefore manifested as 
concentrated interaction networks. 
The drivers' Functional Council, known as the Central Negotiating Committee 
(CNC), met approximately once a month to discuss union business. All five 
branches were represented on the TGWU Central Negotiating Committee by each 
branch Chair and Vice Chair. In addition, some branches were allowed additional 
representatives, the number of officials representing each location depending both 
on the size of that location and also on the historical development of inter-regional 
rivalries. Of the members with voting rights, six representatives were drawn from 
the largest regional centre, plus one (a loose cannon politically) from a centrally 
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located satellite site. There were also three representatives from a second regional 
centre and two from the third locality. In addition, there were two lay trade union 
observers without voting rights, one from a BusCo subsidiary company and one 
from the satellite site - to ensure a "fair" representation from those depots. The 
final (non-voting) trade union related member of the CNC was the TGWU local 
full-time officer. As a result, the network composition of the CNC differed from 
that of its constituent branch structures. The equalisation of influence within the 
formal CNC structure indicated a dispersed interaction network pattern. 
Prior to and throughout the employee-ownership period the trade unions had been 
strongly supported by the employees at BusCo. The macro-cultural environment 
of the trade union structure at BusCo had therefore continued to be strong and 
dominant. 
3.2 ESOP Networks at BusCo 
Superimposed on this established collective bargaining framework were the more 
recently introduced formal ESOP structures, consisting of the four Worker 
Directors and the Boards of the Employee Benefit Trusts I and II. The rationale 
for and purpose of these new structures was to represent the workforce as 
shareholders and therefore the ESOP structures possessed a radically different 
macro-cultural environment, one which was neither worker nor management. 
Consequently, while these new structures existed in parallel to the existing formal 
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collective bargaining networks, there was no overlap of formal responsibilities or 
areas of control. 
EBTI and // 
The Employee Benefit Trusts I and II represented 26% of the total shareholding in 
the company. Both the Employee Benefit Trust Boards were made up of 
management and lay union representatives, with the union representatives 
significantly outnumbering management. As the Employee Benefit Trusts were 
constructed to represent employees and management as shareholders, the trusts 
had no formal collective bargaining roles. However, many of the trade union 
officials involved in negotiations also sat as Trustees, therefore informal overlaps 
between the two structures frequently occurred. 
Worker Directors 
As a result of the employee buy-out, the company Board had been reconstituted to 
incorporate a total of four Worker Directors. The engineering employees were 
represented by their own Worker Director (Worker Director One), as were the 
management/administrative staff (Worker Director Two). The largest group of 
employees within the company was the platform staff and, for this reason, the 
drivers were represented by two Worker Directors (Worker Directors Three and 
Four). As company directors, the Worker Directors attended all Board meetings 
and had access to all company information. 
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While all the Worker Directors were former trade union lay officials they were not 
permitted to remain as such while in post as Worker Director (they were however 
allowed to retain their union memberships). Consequently, on acceptance of the 
post of Worker Director they were required to resign membership of the trade 
unions' Functional Councils. Furthermore, while the Worker Directors were part 
of the formal Board of Directors structure they were not members of the formal 
management network, and therefore had no remit to directly manage employees. 
Therefore on entry into the formal ESOP network the Worker Directors had exited 
from the formal union negotiating structures, without formally entering the 
management negotiating network. The ESOP had thus created a new and parallel 
formal network, consisting of the Worker Directors and EBTI and II, which had 
no official or formally sanctioned negotiating role or responsibility. 
However, while the formal Worker Director network existed separately from the 
formal negotiating networks, the nature of the new ESOP posts meant that the 
Worker Directors were closely associated with both unions and management. On 
the one hand, while the Worker Directors retained their original jobs (i. e. as bus 
drivers or engineers), their formal roles as company directors also included 
attendance at middle management level meetings, with a view to disseminating 
information from the Board at these meetings. Consequently, while the Worker 
Directors sat as Board members, and therefore had company management 
responsibilities, they did this without belonging to the formal management 
network. From the union perspective, even though the Worker Directors had 
resigned from their formal union positions, they were selected and voted for by 
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their unions. ' In addition, the Worker Directors continued to attend Functional 
Council meetings, but in an advisory and non-voting capacity. 
2 Each sat for two years and could then stand for re-selection, or be de-selected. 
In practice any employee could become a Worker Director but, in large part 
because the unions controlled the selection procedure, only union officials had 
been chosen. 
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4. Perceptions of Employee Share Ownership 
4.1 Claims for Harmony 
While the growth of harmonious relations between management and unions had 
not been a primary objective of the employee buy-out, the testimonies of the 
Board members indicated that it had become a significant perception of the impact 
of employee ownership. The forces behind the establishment of the BusCo ESOP 
had meant that the trade unions remained a major force within the company. 
Consequently, the formal place of the unions in industrial relations had not been 
altered by the ESOP. What had changed however was the company's view of 
their relationship with the unions. This they claimed was now more harmonious 
and less 'them-and-us', 
That's entirely different now, you each have still got your own 
traditional things to achieve, but there is a much deeper 
understanding. (Operations Director) 
This 'Let's go and bash the managers' has dissolved. I'd say the 
industrial relations in engineering has never been as good as it has 
been today. (Engineering Director) 
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Both Managing and Worker Directors believed that employee ownership had 
achieved this improvement in industrial relations by producing a greater 
understanding between the two groups, 
Both parties now understand each other better and why each side 
has to do certain things. There's probably more understanding of 
each other's roles ... in negotiations and just about everything you 
can think of. (Worker Director One)' 
However, this movement towards harmonisation appeared to involve only an 
alteration in the unions' frameworks of understanding and notably no claims were 
made for an alteration in how management approached industrial relations at 
BusCo. 
4.2 Harmonisation Processes 
The reported new understanding in the industrial relations sphere was attributed 
by the Board members entirely to the new ESOP structures, even though the 
formal ESOP structures had no formal industrial relations position or role. These 
new structures had been established in order to represent workers and management 
solely as shareholders and this was in large a reflection of the initial goals of the 
ESOP, which were to protect the status quo within the company and not explicitly 
'Engineering Worker Director 
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to improve the industrial relations between management and trade unions. Yet, 
the harmonisation of relations between unions and management was presented by 
the company as a significant impact of employee ownership. The picture the 
Board presented of employee ownership at BusCo was one of the organisation 
having successfully bridged the chasm between fundamental, adversarial 
management-workcr relations and the superimposed relations of employee 
ownership to foster an atmosphere where both the original and new regimes co- 
existed hannoniously. Given that the ESOP had no fonnal industrial relations 
role, the perceptions of the process of harmonisation that were presented by the 
Board were significant in deterinining how this harmonisation had occurred. 
Aftered Decision-Making Processes 
The Board felt that, as a result of employee ownership, the outcomes of decision- 
making at BusCo had been improved, "simply because we haven't made a decision 
which hasn't been fully thought through" (Engineering Director). While the 
company did not claim that all employee shareholders held the same views, they 
did claim that in the decision-making process "there's a consensus at the end of the 
day" (Engineering Director). The Engineering Director asserted that, before the 
ESOP, decision-making would have involved managers, 
'going down that route' and then about five steps along the way we 
start to hit problems because we hadn't considered that we hadn't 
considered this and since we've been an ESOP I can't remember 
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any massive industrial relations issues - simply because of the 
processes that we're involved with. (Engineering Director) 
The Managing Directors' perception of the usefulness of employee ownership was 
not therefore in including as many employees as possible in strategic decision- 
making, but in improving the efficiency of company decisions. To do this they 
consulted with the ESOP representatives, but the ESOP "hadn't made the actual 
driver of the bus any more understanding of management's problems, it's perhaps 
changed the level at which that is communicated to the individual" (Finance 
Director). The Board also felt that middle management believed that the changes 
the ESOP had produced in the company structures had made the decision-making 
process much longer because of the consultation that was now involved. 
However, middle management's concerns were overridden by the Board's 
impression of an overall improvement in decision-making outcomes. 
Altered Attitudes 
The greater understanding between the management and worker networks at 
BusCo which facilitated this improvement in decision-making had reportedly 
grown because, as all employees were now also owners, both management and 
unions had "all got one goal at the end of the day and that's a profitable BusCo" 
(Worker Director Threef The convergence in management and union goals 
(associated by the Board members with improved communications between the 
two networks) was attributed to the representation of employees at Board level by 
" Platform Staff Worker Director 
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the Worker Directors. The four Worker Directors were "able to put an input in 
from each part of the business" (Engineering Director) and, alongside the 
Employee Benefit Trusts, were able to represent the interests of the employee- 
owners to the Managing Directors. 
A closer understanding between the two groups was also seen as a product of the 
increased involvement of workers in company decision-making processes, where 
part of the impact of the ESOP had been to "involve a lot more people" (Worker 
Director One). At levels below the Board, management held discussions with 
staff at garage level "to try and draw people's ideas" (Operations Director), 
meaning that the employees were asked for their input into decisions for example 
on cab layout, or the positioning of grab handles on buses. The main channel for 
information from the Board to the shop floor was via the 'Group Updates', 
documents which were sent out monthly from Head Office to each garage - either 
to the Worker Directors or to local management. In addition, communications 
within garages had also been improved, for example some Area Managers would 
now eat in the employees' canteen, whereas "an Area Manager five years ago 
would never have sat in a canteen and had his dinner w' lads" (Worker Director 
Three). 
Worker Directors'Role 
While the main rationale for the employee buy-out had been to preserve the formal 
collective bargaining processes and relationships, the new communications 
channels at BusCo were, in large part, a product of the new ESOP structures. At 
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the very highest level, the change in ownership had altered the composition of the 
Board of Directors to include four Worker Directors and, as a result, the ESOP 
had altered how, and what, information made its way into the Boardroom. Most 
significantly, the Worker Directors provided "that missing interface" (Engineering 
Director) with the employees. More significantly, the Managing Directors felt 
that the main channel of information from the shop floor to the Board had become 
the ESOP representatives and not the union representatives (who were part of the 
preserved collective bargaining structure). The Worker Directors' unique 
contribution was seen as being able to bring people together from both sides of the 
industrial divide and facilitate their reaching an agreement, with the Worker 
Directors reportedly acting as mediators between the two sides of the industrial 
relations sphere. It was apparently common for senior management, when they 
were experiencing conflict with one of the unions, to ask a Worker Director to 
"smooth the waters" (Worker Director Three). This involved the Worker Director 
concerned talking to both parties "and get them to both bend and come to some 
agreement that doesn't cause major problems" (Worker Director Three). 
In particular, the Board reported that the role of the Worker Directors was crucial 
to the improved understanding between management and unions (and thus to the 
perceived convergence in collective identities). The perception was that the 
unions now felt more at ease with their relationship with management, 
213 
In fact, they [trade unions] probably feel more secure now in that 
they've got a representative on the Board. I think they feel more 
secure that they are involved in the process. (Engineering Director) 
Informal Relations 
While relationships and communications with the Worker Directors were seen as a 
replacement for communications and links with the trade union representatives, 
these new channels of communication between the Managing Directors and the 
employees were largely informal. Therefore, the employee buy-out had instigated 
a significant shift away from formal relations through an increased focus on 
informal relations and communications within the organisation. The Worker 
Directors reported that employees would oflen ask them to speak to Managing 
Directors on their behalf, which was represented as a positive impact of employee 
ownership on company communications. Therefore, as a direct result of the 
establishment of the ESOP, the informal communications channels within BusCo 
had grown in both number and importance, centred on the new ESOP 
representatives, 
It's a problem in the formal line of communication, because of the 
way the Worker Directors are appointed, I mean Chris's 
background is at Easton and the people at Easton know he's very 
very approachable, and people will talk to me less, so that's the part 
that has developed more than the official line. (Operations Director) 
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The Worker Directors in their turn also reported positive developments in 
informal communications arising directly from the establishment of the ESOP, 
I think you can do a lot more informal than you can formal, and I 
think that's a great benefit to the company. It's not a value you can 
put in money, but Owen [Operations Director) can probably 
evaluate in morale terms and in communication terms what I do, 
and the communication has probably helped him at the end of the 
day get passed something that he would never have got passed two 
years ago. (Worker Director Four)' 
A NewRealism' 
The unanimous perception of company industrial relations presented by the Board 
was that the "old regime", the traditional them-and-us relations with "management 
one side, trade union the other" (Engineering Director), was an element of the past 
at BusCo. Under this old regime of industrial relations, a predictable pattern of 
negotiations had been adhered to every year. This involved the trade union tabling 
their pay request, to which management's initial response had always been "well 
that's a real load of rubbish ... can't afford that, away with you" (Operations 
Director). Five or six meetings would then follow before a general agreement was 
arrived at to go back to a ballot. The view of the Managing Directors was that the 
wage deal would then be greeted by the shop floor with "Huh, they're not telling 
the right answer, they're not telling you hatf the story, get back there and do a 
'Platform Staff Worker Director 
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decent one" (Engineering Director). The balloting procedure would then be gone 
through a further two or three times before an agreement was finally reached. 
However, with employee ownership the Managing Directors claimed that, 
We don't get claims like that any more, and certainly not of that 
order, simply because under the old regime they had no idea of 
how the company was performing, and for us to turn up in a 
meeting and say "look we're not making profits", it was - no one 
believed it. But now through the ESOP mechanism and through 
the Group Updates that we have, and the whole series of other 
things where the Worker Director's involved, they can see that that 
is the truth, they know that at any one moment in time what our 
financial health is. (Engineering Director) 
The impression presented by the Board, and especially by the Managing Directors, 
was therefore that the union representatives had altered their attitudes towards the 
company and towards negotiations with management as a consequence of 
involvement in the ESOP, and were now more willing and able to see 
management's point of view. In effect, that the collective identity of the union at 
BusCo had unilaterally converged with management's unaltered goals. A major 
benefit realised by management as a result of their new industrial relations culture 
was that the workforce had (largely) foregone traditional pay rises since the 
employee buy-out. Instead, the company had introduced profit-related pay. The 
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Board suggested that before the ESOP any attempts at introducing PRP would 
have resulted in industrial action. The majority of the Managing Directors 
attributed this change in industrial relations to the trade unions becoming much 
more aware of business issues and "commercial realities" (Operations Director) 
through involvement in the ESOP. This onslaught of 'realism' in the unions' 
approach to industrial relations was attributed to the change in ownership position 
of the workers who, if they were to choose industrial action or a work to rule, 
would be "wrecking the company that they own" (Operations Director). As a 
result, the trade union had become "more realistic, less traditional" (Operations 
Director). The popular "traditional trade union - bang the table and say we want 
something else" (Operations Director) had apparently been abandoned in favour 
of, 
A different sort of a conscience, previously they could close their 
eyes to the well-being of the company, now they can't do that, now 
they've got to go back and explain management. (Operations 
Director) 
As a result, the Managing Directors' view was that both management and the 
union representatives were "actually saying the same things" (Operations 
Director). In effect, the belief among the Board members was that there had been a 
convergence in management and union collective identities within BusCo as a 
direct result of the employee buy-out. 
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Local Bargaining 
As a result of this new realism attributed to the unions, another significant 
development in the direction of harmony voiced by the Managing Directors was 
that the increased openness introduced by the ESOP had "a little bit diluted the 
trade union's traditional role within the company" (Engineering Director). 
However, the Board was not interested in de-recognising the unions as it still 
considered that the unions had an important role to play in facilitating the flow 
through of ideas and information in each garage. In fact, the change in role, 
alongside the continued presence of the unions, suited the company as each garage 
union branch could now be dealt with individually, whereas, 
In days of old we'd never do that, any decision had to come back 
before the central cormnittee and they had to vet it and agree it and 
argue it, and we don't have that now. There's a whole host of 
things we've put in on engineering post-ESOP which pre-ESOP 
you wouldn't have had an earthly. (Engineering Director) 
The Managing Directors therefore felt that employee ownership was facilitating 
the introduction of organisational changes by breaking down some of the 
company-wide collective identity of the workforce and their representatives. This 
break down of union collective identity was represented as increasing harmony 
within the company and lowering levels of conflict between management and 
unions. As such, the ESOP was portrayed as altering the informal structures 
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within which the overt and sanctioned conflict processes operated and this in turn 
was influencing the conflict itself 
The Worker Directors also supported this view. From their perspective, closer to 
the union processes, they also believed that the ESOP had facilitated 
harmonisation in the company's collective bargaining procedures. As evidence 
they stated that since the conversion to an ESOP both wage deals had gone 
through on the first ballot, rather than on the third or fourth. Worker Director One 
attributed this phenomenon to the fact that the Worker Directors, and the EBT1 
union members, were able to say to the workforce "we can't afford any more, it's 
this or nothing". As one of the platform staff Worker Directors explained, 
because we did that [i. e. communicate informally], people accepted 
it, reluctantly albeit, but they understood the reality of it and they 
accepted it. (Worker Director Four). 
However, the positive and direct influence of the ESOP was not clear cut and not 
all Board directors agreed with this perception. The Finance Director held a less 
positive view and expressed his opinion that, 
we've used the profit related pay scheme both years to enhance the 
wage. If I'm a cynic, I'd say the reason it went through on the first 
ballot is because it was very difficult and nobody understood it 
anyway. (Finance Director) 
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With employee ownership, management had reportedly also become more flexible 
in their approach to negotiations. Before the employee buy-out, the Managing 
Directors reported that they would have insisted that an offer tabled within the 
collective bargaining forum, for example on sick pay, was accepted by all garages 
or by none at all. However, with the ESOP they claimed to have become "much 
more relaxed and if some garages want to take it, OK go with it and if the other 
doesn't, OK we'll leave you" (Operations Director). 
A growing flexibility among the workforce was also reported by the Worker 
Directors, a flexibility which was resulting in a reduction in the intransigence of 
the old regime, 
I remember being a shop steward, and we'd go to Brian 
[Engineering Director] and say "We don't want to clock in and out 
any more", and Brian would say "Go away, you've got to clock in 
and out". And I also remember when Brian came to us and said 
"Right, don't clock in and out" and when I went back to shop floor 
they said "Oh no, we want to clock in and out! ". (Worker Director 
One) 
While these claims made by the Board for the harmonising influence of employee 
ownership were remarkably consistent, this was contradicted by their accounts of 
continued conflict at BusCo. The reported improvements in relations (and thus 
alterations in collective identities) were therefore not as clear-cut as they 
220 
frequently suggested. While the culture within BusCo was ýperceived to have 
altered, replacing the 'old regime' with a new climate that was "really quite open" 
(Engineering Director), the formalised conflict process had remained untouched, 
It's a game that we play every year, at the end of the day they know 
they're going to ask for that, they know they're going to offer that 
and we start off. (Worker Director Three) 
4.3 Continuing Conflict 
The apparent unitarist trend, and associated convergence of goals, at BusCo was 
however contradicted by the Directors' claims that the company was no less 
pluralist as a consequence of employee ownership. The Board reported that both 
management and union continued to approach their common goal from "different 
aspects" (Worker Director Three), reflecting their different expectations of the 
ESOP and consequently the Engineering Manager was keen to point out, 
Please don't think that everybody on the shop floor and all the 
drivers are all one happy bunch as a result of it. I mean, we still 
have disagreements, we've got 2,700 people all working with their 
own ideas and their own views on everything but that's what the 
ESOP's about. 
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Conflict had therefore been an aspect of employee ownership from the start of the 
ESOP. The continuity in the formal collective bargaining structures had had 
immediate conflict consequences for the company on its transfer to employee 
ownership. While the Board members believed that employee ownership was 
now, after two years, making a significant contribution to harmonious relations 
with the trade unions, they were also transparent about the fact that this had not 
been an overnight success, 
The interface, it's now working very well, but I wouldn't kid you, in 
the early days -a lot of suspicion - "What's he doing in a 
management meeting? Why do they need to be involved, they've 
got no line responsibility they're just checking up on us", so there 
was that fear and suspicion. (Engineering Director) 
When it was announced that I was going to be Worker Director, the 
rumours were that I was going to be going round garages telling 
managers what to do. We had so much trouble with that, that I'd be 
rifling through everybody's desks and demanding keys. I'd never 
said anything, neither had anyone else, it was just one rumour 
escalated absolutely. (Worker Director One) 
The cultural changes that the Managing Directors and the Worker Directors saw in 
the company had therefore reportedly taken some time to establish, indicating that 
collective identities had not altered immediately on conversion to employee 
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ownership, but had adapted to it over time. This gradual acclimatisation was 
partly attributed to the Worker Directors' previous attachments to the established 
trade union network within BusCo, where they had been "battering on the door" 
and then with the ESOP, "the next day he turns up in a management meeting on 
this side of the table and there's this 'Well it can't be right this'. " (Engineering 
Director). However, despite the acknowledgement of some remaining differences, 
the overriding impression given by the Board's accounts was one of a continuous 
and growing harmonisation of goals between the union and management at 
BusCo. 
Experience and evidence of conflict within the ESOP also apparently depended to 
some extent on depot location as well as hierarchical position. For instance, 
within some garages the 'Group Update' from Head Office would be sent to the 
local Worker Director, but there was no coherent policy in this regard since not all 
garages had a resident Worker Director. At the Weston garage, the group update 
was sent to the drivers' Worker Director since he worked there, while at other 
locations the Group Update was "just pinned up on the notice board, which is 
where you get the criticism ... in all honesty in some garages it works very well, 
in others it's very poor" (Engineering Director). 
The impression of harmony presented by the Board was therefore contradicted on 
a number of levels by their own testimonies. Despite the explicit 
acknowledgement of some tensions with the ESOP, where conflict occurred it was 
allegedly "only on a professional level not on a personal level" (Worker Director 
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Three). In other words, claims were being made for a significant alteration in 
relations between the networks at the infonnal level, and these infonnal changes 
were seemingly driving the move into harmonisation of attitudes within the 
company. As a result, the Board members claimed that prior to the ESOP "there 
was always mistrust" (Chief Executive) between management and union, while 
with the ESOP this wariness had retreated. 
However, there was only evidence that this new informal interface, and the 
resultant collective identity changes, had been experienced at senior company 
levels. Significant changes to relations were only reported at the highest levels 
within the company, involving the EBTI and the Worker Directors. As the 
Finance Director pointed out, general employee involvement in decision-making 
had remained at a fairly low level, 
that doesn't make very much difference, that's not a key 
decision. So to some extent it goes on the same way it's always 
gone on. 
Consequently, "the typical bus driver or typical engineer is having no more say in 
running the business today than he did pre-1993" (Engineering Director). This 
continuity of collective identities at the shop floor level was accompanied by a 
continuity in the workers' relationship with their local and senior management. 
Notably, while the Worker Directors reported that employees often asked them to 
speak to the Managing Directors on their behalf, on hearing this story recounted, 
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the Finance Director interrupted with, "I think to be fair, nobody ever does", to 
which the Worker Director concerned responded "No, I know they don't". 
The ESOP's failure to create an impetus for change in shop floor level collective 
identities was also evidenced by the level of apathy within some employee groups 
towards any form of involvement, including employee ownership, 
A lot of the employees don't want to get involved whether it's on the 
shares or in the trade union or anything else, all they want to do is 
drive the bus, make sure it's comfortable, they don't like it with a 
dirty wheel and all this sort of thing. (Finance Director) 
As a result, it was clear that despite the Board's claims for and belief in 
organisational harniony, below Board level a significant proportion of the 
company had not experienced the transformation in collective identities or 
therefore in worker/management relations, 
There are some shop stewards who have not been able to come to 
terms with that position, they still want to bang the drum. (Worker 
Director Four) 
I think you'll find that there's some trade union representatives who 
would rather not be in an employee-owned company, they are the 
less bright ones. (Operations Director) 
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4.4 New Areas of Conflict 
However, the experience of conflict within the ESOP was not just one of conflict 
continuity. In fact while the ESOP was hailed as the means by which greater 
harmony had been brought to the company, it was also blamed for introducing 
new areas of conflict into the management/worker relationship, 
I can identify people who haven't changed one bit, in fact they've 
probably gone in reverse. (Operations Director). 
The Operations Director's experience of employee ownership was "that it can 
build in certain animosities" which had resulted in "undoubtedly a little bit of 
tension" (Operations Director). Therefore, the changes in the fonnal structures of 
BusCo which resulted from employee ownership were both claimed to be the 
genesis of the harmonisation of relations within the company, and were also cited 
by some as the source of the new areas of conflict. 
While the fonnal, collective bargaining structures at BusCo appeared to be 
weathering the advent of employee ownership relatively unscathed, there was 
evidence to indicate that informal structures within the company were 
experiencing greater flux. Despite the fact that the Directors had suggested that 
alterations to the informal networks at BusCo were the drivers of hannonisation, 
their testimonies provided direct evidence to the contrary. 
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Tensions within the Board 
The picture the Board presented of harmony at the senior levels of BusCo was 
notably tinged with suspicion and tensions. The very arena where employee 
ownership was claimed to be producing the harmonisation of relations in BusCo - 
its informal communications network - was also revealed as the source of new 
conflicts within the company. While the Board members claimed a new 
understanding between senior management and the unions, there was a residual 
resentment and unease expressed by some Managing Directors at the inclusion of 
employee representatives in the running of the company, which ran counter to 
their claims for harmony. These new tensions came to light when the Managing 
Directors complained of a 'leakage' of information from high level meetings, 
I'll call it leakage - if we're talking at a Board meeting about issues, 
or some of the other forums where we have employee involvement, 
somehow that can get out. The Worker Directors say something 
[to the shop floor] which hasn't given the whole game away - 
you're only discussing it but soon that builds up and before you 
know where you are it's a major explosion that can happen and 
then the rumours arise. (Engineering Director) 
From the Managing Directors' point of view, the employee representatives were at 
fault for using informal communications to undermine the organisation's formal 
information channels, 
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One of the down sides I'd say, that's happened with regard to an 
ESOP is the rumours that are always circulating. I mean, at least 
once a week, once a fortnight the latest half dozen rumours, and I 
think it's this information flow. What's happening under this of 
course, a lot of people get to hear about things and decisions and 
processes before the managers, you know because of our 
constitution. (Engineering Director) [emphasis added] 
This leakage of infonnation was accredited in part to the union histories of the 
Worker Directors and the resultant pressures they were under from the shop floor 
to report back on Board discussions. The Managing Directors' view was that the 
Worker Directors were selected by their trade unions to "go and bash those bloody 
managers and those directors and tell them what for" (Engineering Director). The 
Worker Directors in part supported this supposition - they were chosen by the 
unions, and were therefore accountable to them. Consequently, the Worker 
Directors reported that the unions would ask them to tell management "This is not 
what we want, we want something different" (Worker Director One), but they 
denied being the source of leaked information. While the Managing Directors 
believed that the problem with leaked information lay in the Worker Directors' 
close, informal relations with the union representatives, the Worker Directors' 
story was quite different. They claimed that after a Board meeting they would, 
come away and have a private talk with Owen or Brian or Mike 
[Managing Directors], you know and just say "Look if you're going 
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to have this line, we're going to have huge trouble" so we solve the 
problem, we get round it you know. (Worker Director Four) 
Tensions on the Shop Floor 
These new areas of conflict were not just experienced at Board level but 
throughout the company. The dissonance between the apparent collective identity 
changes at senior company levels and identity continuity at shop floor levels had 
created new areas of tension within the organisation. On the shop floor, the 
employees were apparently finding it difficult to accept the new relationship 
between management, unions and Worker Directors, 
People on the shop floor now say "Ah, they're not giving you the 
correct infonnation", so you have to stand up and be counted and 
say "I'm sorry but the directors have got no option, you either trust 
me or you don't". (Worker Director One) 
The apparent widening gap between shop floor workers and their representatives 
involved in the ESOP was also supported by the accounts given by the Managing 
Directors, who indicated that workers saw those union representatives who were 
participating in the ESOP as "one of the managers now". Consequently, the 
Finance Director expressed his concern that all the ESOP had achieved was to, 
Move the communication problem down a tier, if you like. The fact 
that we're an ESOP company doesn't make the pay negotiation any 
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easier because the people to whom the negotiation group come to 
sell the deal perceive some of the negotiators as being on the side of 
management and therefore distrust them., . 
However, the belief that the conversion into an ESOP would achieve 
harmonisation was supported by the Finance Director, who reported that the 
continued mistrust of management was "most disappointing in an employee- 
owned company". Particularly when senior management's relationship with the 
union representatives had reportedly improved so much, 
The difficulty then comes that if they then support whatever 
management says, they in turn get disbelieved and their credibility 
comes to be at stake. (Finance Director) 
Despite their claims for harmonisation, the accounts given by the Board members 
thus indicated that employee ownership was in fact dissolving the collective 
identity of the workforce and creating a split between the employee 
representatives and their constituencies. This generation of mistrust between 
employee representatives and workers had meant that some attitudes had 
"probably gone in reverse" (Operations Director) as a result of employee 
ownership. This indicated not only new areas of conflict among the workforce, 
but a polarisation of attitudes at shop floor level, pointing to a widening gap 
between both shop floor and employee representatives' and shop floor and 
management collective identities. 
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Tensions at Middle Management 
To some extent, the Worker Directors' testimonies supported the Managing 
Directors' assumptions concerning the polarisation of collective identities at shop 
floor level. However the Worker Directors believe&that the problem lay 
principally with middle management and not with the workforce. It appeared that 
the shop floor workers were not the -only group experiencing some difficulties 
with the new ESOP structures, and apparently middle management in particular 
believed that their role was being squeezed out by the new understanding between 
the unions and senior management. They were reportedly finding it difficult to 
adjust to the concept that shop floor workers were now shareholders and employee 
owners, and the notion of "I'm the boss, you do what I tell you" was slipping away 
from them and with it their authority. For example, part of the employee 
ownership process had been to replace the monthly management group meetings 
with meetings which "mixed the trade union in" (Worker Director Three). As a 
result, whereas previously middle management "knew what, was happening so 
they could go back, smile, because they had all this information" (Worker Director 
Four), with employee ownership the information was now also held by the 
unions. ' The opinion of the Worker Directors was that middle management felt 
that employee ownership was eroding their traditional authority and power. 
'The aim of involving the unions in these meetings had been to get both groups 
to present their constituencies with the same information. However, this 
hadn't happened and so a written briefing, the Group Update, had been 
introduced. 
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The Worker Directors therefore believed that the source of the problems lay with 
local management "trying to release the information the fastest ... whoever can 
release the information the fastest has the most power" (Worker Director One). 
The engineering Worker Director claimed that, while he might be found 
discussing Board decisions with workers, this was because middle management 
had already made the workers aware of the discussions going on at Board level, 
and he indicated that the middle managers "put one or two rumours about to wind 
things up - to enjoy -I think that's what's happening". These accounts by the 
Worker Directors were in direct contrast to those provided by the Managing 
Directors who, while also expressing concern about leakages of information, 
maintained that this resulted from the Worker Directors' informal relationship 
with the unions. Therefore, despite their common agreement over the actual 
problem of leaked information, the Managing and Worker Director's accounts 
differed significantly, indicating a notable divergence in their collective identities 
(in contrast to their claims for harmonisation) and a lack of agreement and trust 
between the two parties. 
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5. Conclusions 
5.1 Attitude Alterations at BusCo 
Harmonisation was therefore an important aspect of the Board's perceptions of the 
impact of employee ownership and control at BusCo. Significantly, the employee 
buy-out had resulted in a perceived reduction in the 'them-and-us' culture within 
the organisation, thus indicating an alteration in the collective identities of the 
major organisational networks. This had been achieved through a convergence of 
collective identities between management and unions, but notably without any 
claims made for alterations in how management (senior and middle) approached 
negotiations with employees. Therefore, identity convergence, as it was reported, 
had been provided by unilateral identity movement from the trade unions at 
BusCo. 
Identity convergence at BusCo was described as a 'new realism' within the 
industrial relations sphere. However this new realism was ascribed solely to the 
unions, and the alteration in union attitude was attributed directly to the influence 
of the ESOP. As all employees were now company owners, this had apparently 
altered their attitudes towards industrial action. In addition, employee 
communications with senior management had been facilitated by the introduction 
of the four Worker Directors. The unions' understanding of the 'commercial 
realities' facing the company was therefore ascribed to an increased flow of 
information from management through these ESOP structures and representatives. 
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5.2 Informal Network Changes 
These new communication channels between management and the union were 
largely informal and centred on the introduction of the Worker Directors and 
EBTI and 11. Consequently, the impact of the employee ownership and control 
had been felt principally on and through the informal networks at BusCo. The 
mechanism by which this had been achieved had been the alteration of how the 
formal decision-making and power structures within BusCo related to each other. 
While the company had retained its formal networks, the advent of the ESOP had 
apparently altered the informal network structures, resulting in a greater 
understanding between senior management and the unions. As there were no 
claims for modifications to direct communications between the formal networks 
involved in collective bargaining itself (in fact, the Board's testimonials asserted 
that this arena had experienced no alterations in conflict processing operations), 
the influence of employee ownership on collective identities at BusCo could 
therefore be said to operate principally through infonnal channels. The success of 
the harmonisation aspect of the BusCo ESOP was therefore dependent on a 
change in those communications processes that did not belong to the formal 
conflict arena. While the new ESOP structures had no formal industrial relations 
role, their impact was achieved through informal influences on relations between 
senior management and union personnel. The Worker Directors themselves 
reported that workers expected them to put pressure on the Board "to screw that 
group of people into actually doing something, coming to a compromise about the 
issue they're concemed about" (Worker Director Four). 
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Unsurprisingly, since the rationale for the establislunent of the ESOP had been to 
protect the established formal networks and network positions, formal decision- 
making and power structures had survived the conversion process relatively intact. 
However, changes to the fonnal networks were reported - through the 
fragmentation of trade union solidarity within the organisation. This breakdown 
in company-wide union collective identity ran parallel to the increased 
representation of employees as individual shareholders and owners by the ESOP 
employee representatives (Worker Directors and EBTI and II). Therefore, the 
fragmentation of labour's collective identity could be associated with the growth 
in individualised relations between the organisation and the employees. However, 
to test the causal relations between these two occurrences, a processual. approach 
to the study of relations at BusCo was required. 
5.3 Evidence for Disharmony 
The positive presentation of the effects of employee ownership could not however 
prevent a few cracks from showing in this smooth veneer of harmony and there 
were a number of discrepancies in the perceptions of how employee ownership 
was influencing and changing the internal processes of the company. The 
continuation of the established mistrust between management and union'was 
apparent in the narratives. The expected increase in employee loyalty with the 
introduction of employee ownership and control had not been realised at BusCo, 
instead there was a seemingly widening gap between ordinary employees and 
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management. Perhaps the most significant discrepancy in the accounts outlined 
was the distance between the claims for harmony and the suggestions contained 
within the narratives that collective identity convergence was only apparent at 
certain company levels, particularly at Board level. Below this, transformations in 
collective identities among employees and their management were not reported, 
resulting in new areas of tension within the company. The reality of 
organisational. harmony was called into question on the shop floor and at middle 
management levels, where the effects on collective identity had been remarkably 
different, resulting in a polarisation of collective identities at these levels. Even at 
Board level, tensions were being created by the existence of the new ESOP 
structures. There was evidence that the reported harmonious relationship between 
the Managing and Worker Directors was not as congenial as they claimed. 
Significant areas of tension and mistrust were apparent concerning leakages of 
information and the mechanisms by which this information escaped. 
Conflict between different collective identities within the company had therefore 
been relocated down a tier of the organisational hierarchy, to settle principally at 
the middle management/shop floor level. These conflicts were thus at a distance 
from the relatively more - harmonious relations that existed between senior 
management and senior union personnel. However, the discrepancy between 
collective identity convergence and identity polarisation at these different 
organisational levels was also creating conflicts between ordinary employees and 
their union representatives. Employee ownership had therefore altered the 
collective identities of senior management and union personnel without apparently 
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making a deep impression on wider attitudes within the company as a whole. 
Consequently, the accounts given by the Board suggested that the leaderships of 
the union networks were diverging from the collective identities of their 
followerships. Significantly, in order to be re-elected, these union representatives 
relied on being voted for by their membership and therefore had to represent the 
interests and views of their followership. As the collective identity of the shop 
floor membership was apparently increasingly hostile, towards any movement in 
the direction of harmony with management, this called into question the likelihood 
that union representatives could remain involved in harmonisation processes for 
much longer. 
5.4 Impact of the ESOP on Collective Identities 
To explore beyond what the board members themselves were willing and able to 
divulge about employee ownership, and to uncover why their narratives contained 
so many conflicting images of the effects of the ESOP, it was necessary to explore 
the underlying and subconscious reasons why employee ownership had such 
divergent images. To achieve this, a more systematic investigation of decision- 
making in BusCo was needed. The inconsistencies in the reported effects of 
employee ownership and the claims for a fundamental alteration in the collective 
identities of the management and union networks were impossible to explore or 
validate without observing the network processes themselves in action. The 
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informal network structures and the networked collective identities could therefore 
only be explored if t4e network processes could be observed in action. 
Therefore, to examine BusCo's claims for employee ownership and control, 
further exploration was required in an arena where the network processes involved 
in the formalised and overt conflict forum of the industrial relations structures 
would be in action and observable. Consequently, a pivotal point of interaction 
between the representatives of the unions, management and ESOP was chosen for 
further research. To this end, a series of negotiations between management and 
the platform staff Central Negotiating Committee were observed. This processual 
approach meant that any effects of the ESOP on the collective bargaining 
structures and processes within the company, both formal and informal, and the 
impact of employee ownership on conflict and collective identities at BusCo, 
would become apparent. 
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Chapter Six 
BusCo Network Dynamics 
1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the network dynamics at BusCo through the medium of 
collective bargaining. The issues of harmonisation of industrial relations and of 
organisational conflict are dealt with through an examination of the collective 
identities of the management and union bargaining teams. The role of 
communication channels, fonnal and infonnal, in identity conversion processes in 
a formalised collective bargaining forum is discussed. The chapter suggests that 
communication channels are the basis of the influence structures that drive the 
identity conversion process. Special emphasis is placed on the trade union 
network at BusCo, as the initial data gathered (presented in Chapter Five) 
indicated that collective identity change of any significance had only occurred in 
this group. 
The issue of identity conversion is paramount in this chapter, principally 
movement between an established adversarial identity and a more harmonious 
ESOP identity. Identity convergence between the management and union 
networks is examined in search of evidence of this harmonisation. Following this, 
the chapter turns to evidence of the continuation of conflict and analyses this 
through the frameworks of identity divergence and identity dissonance. The 
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evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, while employee ownership was 
the main influence in moves towards the convergence of collective identities at 
BusCo, it was also the source of new areas of conflict. It was precisely these new 
conflicts that caused the networks to reassess their new positions and return to 
their forfeited, pre-ESOP, identities and relationships. In particular, the 
discrepancies in the perceptions of the effects of employee share ownership, 
which were expressed by the Board (Chapter Five), become clear through the 
analysis of the negotiations process. 
In the formal negotiating arena, the actualities of employee ownership were 
notably different to the ESOP rhetoric presented by senior management at BusCo. 
On the surface at least, established conflicts between management and the union 
continued unabated, with no apparent identity convergence between management 
and the CNC. 
1.1 Background 
Early in 1996 the platform staff Central Negotiating Committee (CNC) was asked 
to consider a management proposal to expand the number and scope of 'low cost 
units', already operating in some garages, as a means of dealing with the fierce 
competition over local authority tendered work. The existing low cost units were 
located within the central district, City, but were only operated by BusCo's two 
subsidiary companies, Merryhill and Fastline. These two subsidiary companies 
operated out of a small City location called Halfway. Management's proposal 
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was to expand these low cost units to core BusCo operations. The use of the 
subsidiaries, each with different and low rates of pay, alongside the parent 
company had led to a confusing array of employment arrangements. ' The 
Operations Director pointed out that, 
The company has a problem of increasing costs and labour is our 
biggest cost. BusCo staff are already paid more than our 
competitors, and we want to expand the low cost units that already 
exist. What we plan is to expand low cost units to provide a lower 
cost arrangement than minibuses. The problem with minibuses is 
that the progression up the rates of pay increases costs. To keep 
work we need to have low cost units to compensate for the highest 
rate of pay. As far as tenders are concerned, they do not make 
much money but they do keep jobs and if these routes are lost we 
will lose income and we don't want to risk that. 
'Terms and conditions of service differed vastly between the core BusCo employee- 
owners and the employees of the two subsidiary companies. Drivers at Merxyhill and 
Fastline started on a notably lower rate, had different grades of progression, and were faced with a progression ceiling - they could not reach the core BusCo senior rate of 
pay no matter what length of service. In addition, only the core BusCo TGWU 
branches had voting rights on the CNC, with the Halfway representative having only 
observer status and no voting rights. On top of this contrast of terms and 
conditions, drivers were also demarcated according to what type of bus was driven. 
Bus drivers were divided into three categories - minibus, bus, and big bus. BusCo 
minibus drivers could gain the senior rate of pay without having to move up to driving big buses. 
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1.2 Union Negotiating Team 
Management's proposal, and the subsequent negotiations, occasioned the formal 
assembly of the Central Negotiating Committee over and above its regular 
monthly meetings for a period of six months. During this period, the drivers were 
balloted three times: initially on management's first amended proposal, for a 
second time on a further negotiated proposal, agreed by both management and 
CNC, and for a final time on strike action. At the first meeting in this series, 2 the 
matter of extending low cost units to the peripheral garages was raised as part of 
the standard CNC agenda. Even at this early stage, an indication of the conflict 
that was to dominate the negotiation process was evident. As this was a regular 
CNC meeting, without an activated negotiating duty, the structure and process of 
the meeting has been taken as the point of departure - for the terms of this analysis 
- for what occurred during the negotiations. A microcosm of the interplay of the 
different structures and processes of communication at BusCo was apparent from 
the very start of the industrial relations situation in which the company found 
itself, early in 1996. 
The CNC was composed of Transport and General Workers Union 3 Branch 
Secretaries, Chairs and other officials from the four regional centres served by the 
company, City, Southton, Weston and Easton (Table 1). 
2 30, h January 1996. 
3TGWU membership among platform staff stood at 99%. 
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Table 6.1 Central Negotiating Committee Structure 
Branch Name Position Held 
city Wilf 
City Mike 
city Mick/Tony 
City Ron 
City Saul 
City Calum 
Branch Secretary, CNC Vice Chair, 
EBTI Chair, 
TGWU General Council 
Weston Alf 
Weston Darren 
Easton Mark 
Easton Stan 
Southton Ewan 
Southton (observer) Tim 
Halfway (observer) Barry 
Chris 
Dan Evans 
Jerry 
Branch Secretary, EBTII Chair 
Branch Sccretary, CNC Chair 
Branch Secretary 
Branch Secretary 
Worker Director 
Worker Director 
TGWU Full-time Officer 
Under normal circumstances, the CNC met every six weeks, and the numbers of 
officials representing each location depended on the size of that location. Six 
representatives were drawn from the largest regional centre, City, plus one from a 
central satellite site, Southton. There were also two representatives each from 
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Weston and Easton. In addition, there were two (non voting) observers, one from 
Southton - to ensure a fair representation of views from that depot, and one from 
the TGWU branch representing the BusCo subsidiary companies, Merryhill and 
Fastline. On top of this, the two drivers' Worker Directors and the TGWU Full- 
time Officer attended the meetings in an advisory capacity. The Worker Directors 
themselves were selected by the CNC to represent employee owners in 
management meetings and on the Board of Directors. Each worker director had a 
two-year period of service, at the end of which they came up for re-election. 
CNC members also sat on the Boards of EBT14 and EBTII. Ten of the twelve 
EBTI directors were senior shop stewards, with an EBTI representative in each 
garage. The Chair of EBTI, Wilf, was also Vice Chair of the CNC. The EBTI 
met once a month and followed the same agenda as the preceding Board meeting. 
In addition, it had power of veto over certain company decisions concerning the 
sale of the company or major financial issues "to give shareholders protection 
from themselves and from other outside influences" (Dan Evans). The EBTI 
trustees also appointed the directors of EBTII, which was a much smaller group of 
5 
only three directors, of which the Weston branch Chair, Alf, was Chair. As a 
warehouse for BusCo shares, it bought shares from leavers and reissued these 
shares at the end of each year. The EBTII consequently met only twice a year to 
confinn the share allocations. 
4 EBTI held 26% of the total company shareholding. Individuals within the 
company held 54%, and FirstBus held 20%. ' Two senior shop stewards and one senior management. 
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The CNC meetings to address the question of low cost units were held at the 
company's central (City) depot. The depot, a large bus warehouse, had its 
administrative and social facilities spread around its rim to make way for the 
teams of 'deckers' which were parked, refuelled and repaired in its vast interior. 
The various trades occupied separate spaces, the engineers had their own mess 
room, the managerial and clerical staff worked on the ground floor, and the 
drivers by their sheer numbers dominated the canteen on the first floor. The union 
meeting room was the only other room on the first floor, immediately adjacent the 
canteen. While relatively spacious, the room itself was purely functional and 
doubled as a storeroom for spare canteen chairs - which were stacked up around 
its walls. Light entered the room from four high'windows along one wall and, 
apart from the canteen chairs, it was furnished with tables and chairs arranged in a 
circle, and a telephone. 
Without exception the Chair and Vice Chair of the CNC and TGWU Full-time 
Officer sat at the far end of the room, facing the door, with the Worker Directors 
or the management team occupying the opposite side. The representatives of the 
City and Southton districts sat facing the windows, on the Chair's right hand side, 
while Weston and Easton representatives invariably sat to the left of the Chair. 
1.3 Management Negotiating Team 
The management team were led by BusCo's Operations Director, Owen Jones. 
Apart from the Operations Director, the management negotiating team was not a 
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fixed group of personnel but was drawn from a flexible pool of middle 
management, consisting of garage managers and Personnel staff. While there 
were only limited informal relations between the management and union 
networks, the formal relationship in the collective bargaining sphere was well 
established and understood by both negotiating parties. 
1.4 Established CNC Collective Identity 
While the CNC itself constituted fonnally a whole and unified collective identity, 
within the CNC the branch officials also defined their identities infonnally in 
relation to their specific work locations, and the close personal ties these 
produced. The Committee structure, with its separate area reports, highlighted the 
recurring issue of regionality throughout the course of the negotiations. It was 
significant that the issue of low cost units was introduced first as a regional 
problem and only later, following a collective identity alteration, as a company- 
wide matter. That it was first brought up as a divisive issue highlighted the 
regionally divided nature of the group. 
In addition to the BusCo branch structure, a wider influence was at work on CNC 
collective identity. While the structurally defined regional divisions within the 
committee ensured that these antagonisms were expressed at a localised level, 
broader concerns connected with a general dissatisfaction with management 
united the CNC. These broader concerns linked the BusCo TGWU 
representatives into the wider TGVYIU and the wider labour movement. The 
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identity of the CNC itself was therefore also influenced by concerns and issues 
beyond the scope of the company, linked to broader issues of the relationship 
between labour, capital and the state. These matters were directly fed into the 
CNC through two principle routes. Firstly, through each representative's 
individual membership of the TGWU, and therefore their identities were formed 
by an organisation which held influences and concerns outwith their single 
company. Secondly, one CNC member, Mike, sat on the TGVvrU General Council 
and was therefore directly involved in these wider influences and concerns. 
Standard to all CNC meetings, a representative reported from each of the four 
locations, City, Weston, Easton and Southton. While the official rationale for the 
reporting system was to highlight area-specific problems and share advice, their 
actual function was to express and share a general disenchantment with BusCo's 
management. The one common theme running through all four area reports, each 
of which contained area-specific problems, was an anti-management concern 6, 
Alf, "There's been an increase in assaults, and management have 
fobbed off employee concems" 
* 
Wilf, "Management are doing it area by area - we should get the 
branches together on this ... on the issue of assaults, I have written 
to Owen Jones requesting a meeting; one again that we haven't had 
a reply to" 
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On the same theme, the Branch Chair of Southton, Ewan, added, 
"We are sick and tired at Southton that any legitimate approaches 
about problems, we are constantly reminded that that would 
increase costs, and all we get from management is 'we're sorry we 
kept you open' and I says and that's not the way to conduct 
industrial relations" 
* 
Mike, "Management insistence on low cost units using Fastline 
and Meffyhill is a ploy to break the CNC and the CNC must have 
the right to negotiate for all drivers" 
Therefore, there existed an established, adversarial 'them-and-us' identity to the 
relations between management and the drivers' union, one typified by the CNC's 
general mistrust of management. Jerry, (TGWU full-time officer) localising the 
'them-and-us' theme, further implied that the management at BusCo were using 
union members to "prop up their own jobs and pay". He indicated that the 
introduction of more low cost units issue was a ploy by management to protect 
their own members, and their own incompetence. The impression given by the 
union group was thus of the duplicity, implied laziness and ineptitude of BusCo's 
management. 
6 Collections of related quotes illustrating a point are separated by an asterisk between quotes, 
where not separated by an asterisk, quotes are sequential. 
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2. Influence of the Formal ESOP Structures 
2.1 ApPearance of Harmony 
However, in line with the Board's reported impression of the influence and effect 
of the BusCo ESOp, 7 employee ownership did appear to have had an influence on 
the industrial relations and collective bargaining sphere within the company. A 
particularly strong influence of the ESOP on the formal negotiating procedures 
had been the CNC's belief that the existence of equal ownership of the company 
would alter management's attitude towards the employee body within BusCo. In 
effect, they hoped that employee ownership would alter the collective identity of 
the management group, and thus their actions within the collective bargaining 
sphere. These collective expectations of the CNC (associated with the 
establishment of the ESOP) had caused the group to withdraw from overt conflict 
with management. In this belief, at the outset of employee ownership, the CNC 
had altered its formal attitude towards the negotiations process and had 
consequently held back from directly challenging management on many collective 
bargaining issues. However, experience since the buy-out had shown that, despite 
employee ownership, management's attitude and behaviour had not been changed, 
Tony, "The management, from the supervisors upwards, are now 
treating drivers badly and it's getting bad at the moment. It's also 
because the trade union are letting too many things go by 
unopposed" 
' See Chapter Five 
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A policy of identity divergence was therefore being re-adopted by the CNC as a 
direct response to managements' failure to alter their own collective identity 
towards that of the trade union's. Jerry, frustrated by management's unaltered 
negotiating attitude, exclaimed, 
"In negotiations the management team are at one end of the table 
with an agenda and they have another one in the bag, and it pisses 
me off. It is an employee owned company therefore management 
has responsibilities but they have not changed one iota - they are 
the same as FirstBus and Stagecoach. All along they're taking it to 
the line and I'm absolutely appalled that he's try to create 
confrontation and set us on the road to industrial action" 
The union was therefore frustrated with managements' developing policy of by- 
passing the fonnal collective bargaining channels that involved union 
representatives, thus reducing the fonnal influence wielded by the union bodies. 
The members of the CNC also believed that they, themselves, had allowed this 
situation to develop within the fonnal collective bargaining structure. 
Management's proposal to extend low cost unit coverage throughout the company 
therefore proved a timely opportunity for the CNC to avenge themselves of the 
humiliation they had allowed management to heap upon them through their own 
altered approach to collective bargaining since the buy-out. The general feeling 
expressed by the union group was of a need for a strong arm response from the 
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CNC, since management had grown in influence not through its own endeavours 
but by capitalising on the CNC's withdrawal from formal conflict with 
management. The solution suggested by sections of the CNC was to remove the 
problem managers and replace them with staff more amenable to the goals of the 
union. Notably, this strategy did not in any way involve an alteration to the 
CNC's attitudes towards management or in their collective identity. While this 
solution was rejected as unworkable, it did represent the union's hopes of securing 
a more harmonious relationship within the industrial relation sphere, one which 
could be achieved without involving any identity alteration by the union. 
The impact of the ESOP on the formal collective bargaining sphere had therefore 
been to remove the collective resistance of the union to management, 
Wilf, "Management are trying to make people feel elitist 
negotiating is being forgotten on items like this - we're being 
inactive! " 
However, the framework of understanding for BusCo negotiations had not altered, 
only the CNC's willingness to engage in conflict. The ESOP-engendered 
appearance of harmonisation had occurred while leaving both formal networks' 
collective identities unaltered, therefore the CNCs negotiating procedures had 
changed but not their attitude towards management. The belief that the ESOP 
could achieve harmonisation without an alteration in CNC or management 
collective identities had thus fed on and perpetuated the union's feelings of 
alienation from management. While the realisation that the negotiations remained 
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largely unaffected by employee ownership was a disappointing realisation to the 
CNC, it was one that the union had a large body of experience to fall back on to 
deal with. Accordingly, the CNC had opted to re-establish their influence and 
presence in the formal collective bargaining sphere. 
As a result of the unaltered nature of management's formal collective bargaining 
attitudes and strategy within BusCo, the CNC's intention to 'get tough' was an 
expression of its desire to reassert the legitimacy and importance of the formal 
union communication channels. To re-establish the centrality of these channels 
the CNC was resorting to established, adversarial forms of conflict resolution, 
Wilf, "Management are headstrong because the lean time is over 
and we need to get headstrong now too because it's not just a 
management company" 
Due to the CNC's attempts to reinstate the established formal collective bargaining 
patterns and routines, overt mistrust of management was being re-established as a 
negotiating framework. Consequently, an atmosphere had evolved within the CNC 
where new ideas outside established routines and responses were suppressed. 
When management failed to operate as the CNC expected within the established 
collective bargaining sphere, this was taken as a deliberate provocation to the 
union, challenging the legitimacy of its formal communications role within the 
company. This prompted a number of angry outbursts from the CNC, 
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Tim, "This is not just a management company! " 
* 
Ewan, "A lot of people at Southton put hard work in at Southton to 
make it work, but not if industrial relations are thrown out of the 
window. The constant fear of closure is held over our heads" 
The image of harmonisation between management and union had therefore been 
transient and misleading. As the union's expectations of employee ownership (in 
the industrial relations sphere) had not been met, and the CNC had realised no 
traditional gains from their altered approach, the influence of the ESOP had 
therefore been to occasion first apathy and subsequently increased militancy 
within the union. What the ESOP had not achieved at any point leading up to the 
low cost unit negotiations was the harmonisation of the goals or collective 
identities of management and union. 
The apparent harmonisation of industrial relations during the initial years of the 
ESOP had therefore occurred not through any convergence in collective identities, 
but through the CNC's altered industrial relations strategy at that time. The 
expectations of employee ownership, not the new ESOP structures in themselves, 
had altered CNC behaviour. Unsurprisingly, based on the perceived abuse by 
management of the union's ESOP-engendered collective bargaining approach, the 
need to reinstate the established formal collective bargaining framework was cited 
by the CNC as a primary objective in the conflict resolution process. In this 
instance, the decision to return to established processes must be seen as a negation 
of the influence of the ESOP over CNC actions. 
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2.2 Use of Formal ESOP Structures 
While employee ownership had the potential to alter the structure of industrial 
relations, through the addition of further formal channels of communication 
between union and management representatives, the ESOP was mentioned 
extremely rarely in the negotiations, and significantly only by the union 
representatives and never by management. The ESOP did however play a formal 
role, in so much as the established formal negotiating structures were overlapped 
by newer, formal ESOP structures, the EBTI and EBTIL These ESOP structures 
represented employees as equal-rights shareholders in the company and 
communication via EBTI with the shareholders ran parallel with communications 
between the union and its membership via the CNC. 
Formal input from the ESOP was integrated into the CNC through reports to the 
committee from EBTI, EBTII and the worker directors. The CNC Vice Chair, 
Wilf, was also Chair of EBTI, while Alf, Weston Branch Chair, was the Chair of 
EBTIL In addition, the majority of the remaining CNC members were also EBTI 
trustees. It was the Chair of EBTI, in his role as Vice Chair of the CNC, who 
initially suggested using the formal ESOP channels of communication to address 
the problems that the union was experiencing with BusCo's management. In his 
role as bridge between EBTI and the CNC, Wilf represented the integration of the 
established collective bargaining formal structures and the imposed employee- 
ownership formal channels, 
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Wilf, "We should petition the shareholders on the way 
management is treating workers, and also EBTI should send the 
worker directors to raise it at the Board" 
Saul, "It's a problem with one manager" 
Wilf, "We could raise it at EBTI" 
The formal ESOP structures were therefore being used by the CNC to strengthen 
its own collective identity and associated goals. In this respect, the mechanism by 
which the 'ethos of the ESOP' (or ESOP-identity) was to achieve a hannonisation 
of identities at BusCo was through an alteration to management and to 
management's collective identity, while leaving the CNC's collective identity 
unchallenged. The CNC's conception of the 'ethos of the ESOP' therefore 
included a movement towards a unitarist identity for the organisation, but one 
which mirrored the CNC's established identity and goals. However, significantly 
the attempts made to explicitly introduce ESOP structures into the negotiation 
process were repeatedly ignored and rejected by the CNC members, and quickly 
discarded in favour of established adversarial channels. 
Yet, however modest their impact, these new formal structures of representation 
and communication had been inexorably imposed on the established industrial 
relations structures at BusCo. While the formal ESOP structures appeared to be 
incidental to the formal negotiating process and were peripheral to the thoughts of 
the majority of those involved in the negotiations, they did play a formal 
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negotiating role. The realised impact of the formal, ESOP structures was 
occurring not through an increase in harmonisation in the collective bargaining 
sphere, but by incorporation of the ESOP structures into the established, 
adversarial them-and-us framework for the negotiations. The ESOP was being 
utilised as a union tool with which to expose management's 'dishonesty' in not 
adopting what the union conceived of as an ESOP identity. In his 
communications with management, the TGWU Full-time Officer emphasised that 
the management policy of lowest pay was "Against the ethos of the ESOP". By 
using ESOP rhetoric as a stick with which to beat management, the overlap 
between the established and new formal structures was completed through the 
CNC incorporating the ESOP into its traditional opposition to management. The 
'ethos of the ESOP' cited by the CNC was therefore an ESOP-identity which 
involved management identity alterations towards the goals of the union and not 
vice versa. 
Ultimately, however the CNC rejected the use of the formal ESOP channels and 
continued with a promise to increase its militancy within its established pattern 
and routine of tackling management-union disputes. While the formal ESOP 
structures had impacted on the CNC through the addition of new formal networks 
and roles to their portfolio of communications, the extra ESOP networks had 
resulted in no real changes to the established formal negotiating framework at 
BusCo. Therefore, despite the overlap between the formal ESOP structures and 
the formal negotiating networks, the unions remained suspicious of these ESOP 
structures. With the continued, unaltered existence of the various established 
formal communication channels and structures within and around the CNC, it was 
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unremarkable that a 'them-and-us' relationship - based to some degree on 
cynicism, muscle-flexing and power play - had remained central to the industrial 
relations picture, 
Wilf "We left ourselves in limbo at the last meeting. We need a 
definite action plan for today's meeting with management. If it's 
not accepted by management then we must go for industrial action" 
It was clear that the additions to the formal network structures occasioned by the 
employee buy-out (the shareholder representative bodies) had not affected - in the 
formal sphere - the established relations between management and the CNC. 
While employee ownership had generated an increased amount of information 
sharing, this had not significantly altered the fundamental form of direct relations 
between management and the unions in the collective bargaining forum. They 
were still communicating - and blocking communication 
8_ along established 
routes and within established patterns of interaction. 
2.3 Established Conflicts Continue 
While the formal network structures at BusCo had been enhanced by the advent of 
the ESOP, this had only marginally affected the functioning of the industrial 
relations structures. Even though the employee buy-out had occasioned the 
introduction of new formal structures of representation, formal communications 
'For example, managements' faRure to respond to communications from the union. 
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between management and union had continued to follow established routes and 
patterns within established collective identities. 9 It was not surprising therefore 
that established conflicts continued to manifest themselves in the negotiations, 
Jerry, "What you have been observing is a standard negotiating 
procedure here - to the precipice each time and then withdrawing. 
Other companies take a more conciliatory approach" 
Established relations in the collective bargaining forum at BusCo between the 
platform staff and their management were therefore typified by a dichotomous 
relationship of identity divergence between the two formal networks. Embedded 
mistrust characterised the formal relations between management and CNC, 
Alf, "They've always got another document, they always start with 
the lowest offer" 
* 
Stan, "You can't just go - it's part of the psychology. Once you go 
they know they've got you" 
Alf, "This is standard management practice" 
Darren, "There's more time spent in recess during meetings than in 
meetings themselves" 
' The apparent harmonisation of industrial relations during the initial years of the 
ESOP had occurred not through any convergence in collective identities, but through 
the CNCs altered industrial relations strategy at that time. 
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Consequently, a 'quid pro quo' framework continued to typify negotiations at 
BusCo, where the agreements reached were based on identity divergence not 
convergence and where the satisfaction of one group could only be achieved to the 
dissatisfaction of the other. The negotiations were therefore formulated around a 
win/lose framework not a win/win approach, 
Alf, "Where's the next one? " 
Owen Jones, "Trust me, there isn't one Alf The alternative is to 
expand Merryhill drivers at current rates. You wouldn't like it. 
You'd run away and complain and do things I'd expect you to do" 
2.4 Summary 
Notwithstanding the fact that the employees and managers were equal partners in 
the ownership of the organisation, the dissatisfactions expressed by the CNC 
within the collective bargaining sphere were situated within a traditional 
adversarial relationship between workers and management. The CNC were 
therefore primarily concerned with monitoring the influence of management 
within the accepted and established formal spheres of influence within the 
company. Jerry demonstrated this negation of the influence of the ESOP through 
repeatedly references to the BusCo management as "the employer", 
Jerry, "The employer is failing in its duty of care" 
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As an employee-owned company with equal-rights ownership regardless of 
formal hierarchical position, the 'employer' at BusCo was in reality the employee 
body - when in fact the full-time officer was referring to the company's 
management, not its owners. 
In the same vein, the CNC were also of the habit of referring to the company as 
'them' or 'they', and not as 'us', so maintaining the established 'them-and-us' 
atmosphere within which collective bargaining had developed at BusCo, 
Mike, "a low paid BusCo would mean that they couldn't attract the 
staff ' 
Within the formal collective bargaining sphere there was therefore a negation by 
the CNC of the formal realities of employee ownership. That the management 
was not in fact the employer within an employee-owned organisation was 
overlooked in favour of maintaining established spheres of influence and 
adversarial patterns of interaction between the CNC and BusCo's management. 
As the union's expectations of the impact of employee ownership and control on 
management's attitudes and identity had not been realised at BusCo, 
harmonisation was not associated with the formal influences of employee 
ownership and control at BusCo. 
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3. Influence of the Informal ESOP Structures 
The ESOP did, however, have an influence on altering the established form and 
procedures of the negotiations but this was not to be found in the formal collective 
bargaining sphere. The failure of the negotiating parties to reach an agreement 
over the low cost units issue, and subsequent extension of the negotiations into 
February, occasioned the worker directors to intervene and conduct informal 
discussions with both groups involvcd. 
Through the influence of worker-director-led informal discussions, held outside the 
formal negotiations forum, there was evidence of nascent identity convergence 
between the two formal networks involved in the negotiations. The achievement 
of the worker directors was to broaden the scope of the negotiations beyond 
established topics and therefore beyond the matter of extension of low cost units to 
core BusCo operations and to the peripheral garages. Through the informal 
advocacy and facilitation of the worker directors, the formal networks agreed to 
address the wider issue of company labour organisation and costs. 
The basis for the informal influence of the worker directors was drawn from a 
number of sources. Both the platform staff worker directors had close historical 
ties with the CNC, having sat on the committee as branch representatives. Their 
histories as TGWU shop stewards (Dan at Weston and Chris at Easton) provided 
them with strong and well established informal ties with the CNC members. While 
formally, the worker directors were linked to management through their positions 
as company directors, in the formal collective bargaining sphere the worker 
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directors and management team had no formal relationship. However, the 
relationships established round the Board table and through committee 
memberships provided the worker directors with informal links to the management 
negotiating team members. These close links to both the networks involved in the 
negotiations gave the worker directors informal access to the formal collective 
bargaining sphere, but with no formal negotiating right or role. Yet, their informal 
authority provided the worker directors both with an outsider's view of the 
negotiations and with a formally neutral role. 
Coupled with the informal authority to influence the negotiations framework, the 
worker directors' ESOP positions provided them with an alternative identity to 
their union or management colleagues. In the cases of the EBTI, EBTII and 
management links with the CNC, there was formal representation on or to the CNC 
- the EBTI and EBTII representatives were members of and had voting rights on 
the CNC, while the management team had official rights to negotiate with the 
CNC. Where the worker directors' role differed was that they had only observer 
status on the CNC, with no voting rights or official role in the negotiations. Their 
identity was therefore formulated from different structures and relationships, 
namely that they represented an alternative ESOP identity. This alternative ESOP- 
led identity was also based on the belief that a collective unitarist identity was a 
possibility for the entire organisation, but unlike the harmonisation mechanism 
assumed by the CNC, the worker directors' harmonisation strategy involved 
collective identity alterations from both management and union. Such an identity 
convergence mechanism would involve both union and management relinquishing 
their established collective identities and re-establishing a new common collective 
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identity as co-owners of the organisation. This alternative ESOP-identity was used 
by the worker directors to facilitate a new ESOP-led framework of understanding 
for the negotiations. 
The neutral and external position of the worker directors with regard to the fonnal 
negotiating groups and procedures, coupled with their ESOP-led framework of 
understanding, enabled them to take a more holistic view of the low cost unit issue. 
The worker directors' solution to the low cost units problem was therefore not 
situated within the dialectical 'them-and-us' negotiating framework but was 
premised upon an alternative understanding where the goals of management and 
union were commonly held. Their solution, while still presented to and remaining 
within the formal collective bargaining arena, encompassed and encapsulated an 
alternative framework of understanding for the negotiations. This was indicative 
of a new (to BusCo) ESOP identity, premised upon an understanding of 
management and union where all shared a common identity as owners of the 
organisation, and not as employer and employee. 
Within this altered negotiations framework, the CNC identified two issues of core 
importance to the trade union: a minimum rate of E4.05 an hour; and the matter of 
progression of drivers through to the senior rate of pay. The new proposallo 
" The proposal involved internal company reorganisation, bringing into the core 
BusCo operations those drivers who were working for BusCo's subsidiaries. These 
drivers received less pay and poorer terms and conditions (less sick pay, holidays etc. ) 
than BusCo drivers, even though they had the same duties. The new plan 
incorporated them into the core drivers' group on the lowest pay rung, but with better terms, conditions, and promotion than they presently had. On top of this, the 
proposal suggested withdrawing the demarcation lines between drivers' jobs so that 
any driver would drive any bus, big bus to minibus. This would deliver cost savings 
through increased flexibility and therefore extra staff would not be needed for cover. 
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incorporated the savings required by management for the tendered routes without 
the introduction of the low cost units, and also included the incorporation of BusCo 
subsidiary company employees into the employee-owned core. The worker 
directors' solution consisted of staff at four different pay grades, and a progression 
between each level. " 
3.1 Identity Convergence 
Since the role of the worker directors in the collective bargaining sphere was 
entirely informal, access to infonnation and negotiations influence was also 
infonnally based, 
Dan, "May I speak? I have had informal discussions with myself, 
Chris and Paul Smith [management representative], and I would 
like to show you what we've come up with" 
The worker directors' proposal involved three rates of pay at BusCo: 
New Starter (L4.05 with three weeks holiday), 
Level Two (L4.29 with four weeks holiday) 
Established BusCo rate (L4.79 with five weeks) 
There would be no progression to the current BusCo senior drivers' rate. As one 
New Starter moved up to Level Two, one Level Two employee would move to the 
BusCo rate. Progression would be by numbers not years, but if there was no 
turnover of staff after two years, a driver would automatically move up to the next 
rate. Within some garages, there would remain a proportion of staff in the low cost 
units (new starters at L4.05 with Merry Hill sick and holiday pay). Garages would decide what routes to operate as low cost units, negotiated locally. All drivers would 
drive any type of bus. The subsidiary companies would cease to exist and become 
part of BusCo. 
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The underlying rationale of the worker director's informal intervention in the 
negotiations was based on an agenda to alter the negotiations framework, and thus 
to facilitate identity convergence between the management and union formal 
networks. The common framework of understanding between two formal bodies 
was significantly. different to that established informally between the worker 
directors and the fonnal networks. While the fonnal collective bargaining 
framework was an established dichotomous and conflictual relationship, the 
worker directors' informal relationship with the two networks was led by their 
understanding of the 'ethos of the ESOP', where every member of BusCo shared 
the same goals for the company. 
The tangible element of the worker director's ESOP-led collective bargaining 
frarnework alteration was the introduction by the worker directors of a new way of 
solving the negotiations deadlock, 
Dan, "The worker directors were unhappy with managements' 
document and have tried to come up with a new alternative that is 
less difficult in all respects" 
However, given the formal decision by the CNC at the outset of the negotiations 
to realign themselves with their established, adversarial collective bargaining 
patterns and routines, the worker directors' attempts to construct an alternative 
framework for the negotiations (based on union identity alterations) was initially 
met with union resistance. Yet, despite the group's reservations, the CNC Vice 
Chair encouraged a conciliatory approach towards the worker directors. However 
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he was quick to point out that he believed it to be a risky approach and was 
willing to fall back on tried and tested means at the first sign that the alternative 
would not work, 
Wilf, "I want to hear from Dan and Chris first and if their idea is 
not different or acceptable then I will support a ballot" 
3.2 CNC Collective Memory 
But the collective memory of the CNC, scorched by its humiliation at allowing 
management the upper hand in the collective bargaining sphere, was not readily 
persuaded, 
Saul, "There is a possible problem with this idea: a similar idea has 
been tried once before! " 
Where the union had attempted harmonisation before, their collective memory 
was therefore one of failure and this coloured how the worker directors' 
alternative was received. To distance this new idea from the negotiations that had 
gone before - both in this round and in previous years - Dan emphasised that the 
worker directors had "tried to start again". Their solution was presented as 
something untainted and new, with no one's fingerprints on it yet, 
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Dan, "The worker directors have spent hours listening to things 
people have said to us and we are just turning things on its head, a 
different angle - it is only an idea, a starting point. We are only 
trying to help and assist the CNC with a position that is a problem" 
Yet, the alternative identity frameworks of the worker directors and the CNC, 
coupled with the historical anxieties that the CNC felt, colourcd their reception of 
this new proposal. In this light, the innovative nature of the pay level 
restructuring solution was seen as a threat to the union position, 
Ewan, "In the past such alternatives haven't worked so why should 
this? In the long term if it does work we will be stronger - it has 
very strong points to it" 
* 
Mike, "You've discussed with Paul Smith, but we negotiate with 
Mr Jones, what authority does Paul Smith have? " 
Ewan, "Has Owen Jones had an input? " 
The worker directors responded by reassuring the CNC that control would remain 
in the union's hands only and, to reinforce this, pointed out that the ideas 
contained in the new proposal themselves were not new - they were the CNC's 
ideas and therefore the CNC should be able to support them without fear, 
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Dan, "Owen Jones knowsjully of the ideas because the ideas I've 
picked up are ideas you've floated round the table" 
To overcome both the CNC's collective memory of failure and the tension between 
the worker directors' and union's identity frameworks - and thus to dissolve the 
group's resistance to the new proposal, the worker directors used two approaches. 
The first was to persuade the CNC that ownership and control of the new proposal 
would remain in their hands. The worker directors therefore supported the CNC's 
moves and confirmed that if the union decided to pursue a strategy of identity 
convergence, and yet the scheme failed to achieve what the union wanted, it would 
be the failing of management and not the CNC. This point was largely accepted by 
the CNC. Jerry promoted the worker directors' new proposal by pointing out that 
any movement from there on in would be "the CNC's initiative" and ownership of 
the proposal would rest with the CNC and not with the worker directors. 
Therefore, any influence accrued would be to the CNC alone, 
Jerry, "If the committee feel they want to go forward with the 
worker directors' option and management are aware of it, I hope the 
CNC and the worker directors take the initiative and put some 
proposals together. Therefore it will be the CNC's initiative, 
putting a document forward. Then this committee gets a document 
to present to management with "that's our proposal", therefore 
there will be qudos for the committee because the latest idea is a 
damn sight better that this! I suggest that we phone Banks and tell 
him that the CNC is drawing up a document" 
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The worker directors' second strategy was to play on the CNC's fears of its 
current weaknesses and failures. To persuade the CNC to accept the new identity 
conversion framework, the worker directors had to highlight the danger of 
divisions within the employee body - using this as a scapegoat for the union's 
problems. If these divisions were to be resolved then the union would 
automatically be stronger. But, to resolve these divisions, the CNC would have to 
alter their collective identity. The worker directors therefore emphasised the 
advantages of accepting the new framework of understanding and the worker 
directors' proposal, 
Dan, "That's easily solved and I agree with your sentiments but we 
have the anomalies now, and lets utilise and move through these 
anomalies. Lets look at it in its totality. Our idea is the minimum 
position, but all in Merry Hill and Fastline will immediately jump 
up to BusCo" 
Jerry, "I would like to congratulate Dan and Chris on their idea 
and I support the restructuring of wage rates and the incorporation 
of the separate companies and I consider that the idea is a good 
negotiations starting point and principle" 
Dan, "We've shown management savings within the system, it 
needs flexibility addressing and once the company is profitable we 
can aim for the senior rate" 
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Jerry, "The worker directors have provided a laudable alternative, 
and it would be folly to ignore it because we want meaningful 
negotiations with the company. And that this proposal is not the 
tablets of stone. This is a positive proposal and I back the worker 
directors putting it to Owen Jones to break the impasse" 
Wilf, "It's something worth looking at, but don't let's get carried 
away with this and Jones won't run with this as it is on the board. I 
think Dan should phone Jones to see how he has interpreted the 
proposal" 
Mark, "I suggest that Dan sorts it out, and that we meet again on 
Friday the first of April at Olive Grove" 
By accepting the worker directors' alternative proposal, one formulated within a 
radically different identity framework to the CNCs established pattern of 
responses to management proposals, the informal authority of the worker directors 
had therefore been ratified by the CNC. 
3.3 Summary 
The Board's rhetoric and assertions of harmonisation therefore appeared to be 
supported on two counts. Firstly, by the CNC's admission that they had 
withdrawn from collective, formal conflict with management as a direct result of 
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the employee buy-out. While this diminution of -conflict in BusCo's industrial 
relations had proved to be a temporary phenomenon of employee ownership, it 
was being replaced by worker director-led moves towards organisation-wide 
identity convergence. This second aspect of harmonisation was demonstrated by 
the informal influence of the worker directors over the formal collective 
bargaining framework. The approval by the CNC of the worker directors' 
alternative solution to the low cost units issue was indicative of a move away from 
an established, adversarial identity towards the worker director-led identity 
convergence ESOP ideology. 
However, this apparent harmonisation constituted just the first level of the ESOP 
influence. If this were all that was observed at BusCo one could conclude that the 
ESOP had been successful in reducing conflict within the organisation. However, 
further investigation of the formal and informal social networks which made up 
the negotiations relations at BusCo indicated that the image of harmonisation was 
just that, an illusion, and conflicts continued to be expressed and generated within 
the collective bargaining sphere. 
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4. New Areas of Conflict: Identity Divergence 
Despite the indications of hannonisation at BusCo, and however strong and 
persuasive the informal influence of the worker directors over the CNC, it was not 
sufficient to broker either an immediate or a harmonious resolution to the conflict. 
By March, management had responded to the CNC's alternative proposal with a 
plan of their own. While the management alternative incorporated the CNC 
proposed removal of driver demarcation, it did not include employee integration 
into BusCo, or the issue of progression to the senior rate of pay, and offered a new 
starter rate of E4 where the CNC had proposed E4.05. The result was the creation 
of fresh areas of conflict within the collective bargaining forum. 
4.1 Management Identity Unaltered 
It was clear that the infonnal influence of the worker directors over senior 
management's actions in the'formal collective bargaining arena was significantly 
weaker than their influence over the CNC. Consequently, management 
demonstrated no formal evidence of adopting a new ESOP-led identity for the 
negotiations, and therefore no identity convergence with the trade union was 
evident in their document. Accordingly, they had responded to the CNC's new 
proposal within the established, traditional pattern, 
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Ewan, "The basis of the document is no different to Chris and 
Darf s idea but the substance is very different! The detail doesn't 
bear looking at and he has got to have something else up his sleeve. 
As it stands it's a nonsense" 
Darren, "He's reading the same script [as previous negotiations], 
they've no idea what to do. They haven't come up with any 
original ideas of their own" 
Alf, "He's kidding with this! We don't want tenders if they are at 
E3.30! At least not at Weston, Powells can have it! Dan's idea was 
better and simpler! " 
Darren, "I don't know why they don't just start with their proper 
document. It'd make things a lot quicker! " 
Alf, "Managements' document is an insult. He's just gone down 
one avenue and there are other avenues he can go down. We 
should go to a ballot right away" 
4.2 CNC Identity Restoration 
This gap between the identity convergence overtures of the CNC and 
management's use of the ýestablished collective bargaining framework of 
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understanding, and its roles and routines, created within the CNC an entrenchment 
into those very established patterns and understandings. As a result of 
managements' unreconstructed response to the CNC's attempts at the worker 
director's new ESOP-led identity framework for the negotiations, the two networks 
were re-experiencing identity polarisation - falling back into established, even 
caricatured, roles and conflict patterns. Consequently, they re-engaged in standard 
collective bargaining tactics within the, fonnerly abandoned, established collective 
bargaining framework. As the resulting identity divergence between the two 
formal networks re-established traditional areas of conflict between the groups, 
Wilf waved management's document in the air, 
"This crap! I've better things to do, take it back to the membership 
and get on with it! " 
Jerry, "It's no way to carry on industrial relations - it's not a two- 
way situation, no discussion. Will the Committee endorse me in 
writing to Owen Jones? " 
* 
Alf, "The management use and abuse and then chop the legs off 
when they start demanding. They use us and then kick us in the 
balls! " 
While management had taken on board the CNC's document, which was based on 
a premise of identity convergence, they had altered it to fit their own collective 
identity - which remained unchanged and unconverted. Such a management 
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response matched the Board's reported perceptions 12 of the mechanism of 
harmonisation under employee-ownership. For management, harmonisation was 
achieved not through alterations to their own goals and ideologies but through an 
alteration to the union's collective identity in order to bring it in line with 
management's goals. The influence of the worker directors over BusCo's 
management had not therefore been sufficient to engender compliance with the 
worker directors' conception of ESOP-led identity convergence by both 
management and trade union. 
By adopting the worker directors' identity convergence mechanism, the CNC 
believed that they had moved their aims towards those of management, had made 
an attempt to address management's cost reductions, and that their new document 
had presented BusCo with unique opportunities. However, management's 
unaltered collective identity had failed to recognise these changes, 
Stan, "There are as many different groups in [management's] 
proposal as we've already got, this was not the idea. There is an 
opportunity here to rectify many problems. The cost is that some 
will loose a few days but in the end they will keep their jobs. The 
document is a bloody hodgepodge and I don't think they're capable 
of arguing it! " 
The resultant atmosphere within the CNC was one of outrage and also surprise 
that the CNC's new proposal had been rejected. The union group became 
" Chapter Five 
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increasingly concerned that they were receiving a restricted flow of information 
from management and this suspicion directly informed the CNC's return to a 
strategy of identity divergence. Doubts were expressed about the veracity of 
management's figures, and suggestions made that management had deliberately 
calculated them to represent a particular, erroneous picture to the CNC. While 
this fear of management's agenda was running particularly high among the CNC 
members, it also served a purpose. The CNC needed to cultivate a suspicion of 
management in order to vindicate their return to an identity divergence strategy. 
While management was secure in their collective bargaining strategy, since it was 
firmly situated within the established framework of divergent identities, the CNC 
on the other hand had become involved in an attempt to reconstruct the general 
collective bargaining framework. This alteration had taken the CNC outwith its 
usual, established negotiating patterns and, while it had allowed them to present 
new ways of resolving the low cost unit problem, without a corresponding 
response from management the CNC believed that their new offer was simply 
playing into the hands of management. At the root of this was a fear of their 
ability to share power (even with employee ownership) with management, , 
Mike, "We've got ownership but no control" 
The disappointment at managements' response (due to the worker directors' 
inability to secure the new ESOP-led identity for the negotiations) could not fail 
but remind the CNC of the former strategy which it had adopted with the 
establishment of the ESOP, of retreating from formal conflict. At that time, the 
ideology of employee ownership had encouraged the union to withdraw from 
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fonnal collective conflict with management. Managements' current response to 
the CNC's new negotiations approach was apparently repeating this process. The 
history of the collective bargaining process under employee ownership therefore 
meant that the CNC perceived management's response as a consequence of the 
union presenting too weak a front to management in the formal arena. As a 
corollary, the appropriate union response to the problem was to present a strong 
aspect, 
Mike, "We've slipped up. We've allowed garages to deviate, to 
negotiate separately. The company don't want the rates of pay to 
be market leaders, we've lost a lot of conditions and must say to 
them 'Look somewhere else for your savings' ... we've got the whip 
hand. We've got to start saying no for a change! " 
Consequently, the CNC rejected management's offer unanimously and went on to 
ballot the membership, with the recommendation that the membership rejected the 
offer. The result was an overwhelming rejection of management's proposal, 13 
which left the CNC in a traditional position of strength. The return to an identity 
divergence stance had apparently worked in the CNC's favour and they believed 
that they now had the upper hand to move forward with the negotiations and 
achieve their goals, 
Tim, "We have the higher ground after the ballot" 
" Votes for rejection of management's plan: 96% (1052). Votes for acceptance: 
4%(48). 
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The negotiations were now coloured with the recognition by the CNC that their 
efforts at identity convergence had not been reciprocated. At this point in the 
negotiations, the tensions between the established-formal and the ESOP-related- 
infonnal spheres of influence in the negotiations process had resulted in victory 
for the established, formal collective bargaining framework. Consequently, the 
CNC had rejected the worker directors' ESOP-led identity framework for the 
negotiations and opted instead for a return to a traditional identity divergence 
strategy and identity, 
Mike, "The ballot was a vote of no confidence in the management, 
it was more than just an industrial relations matter" 
As a result of this return to established negotiating identities, management's 
rejection of the worker directors' proposal, and with it the worker director's 
conception of the 'ethos of the ESOP', had become incorporated into the CNC's 
mistrust of management. Consequently the CNC had rejected the informal role 
and influence of ESOP and opted for industrial action rather than continue to 
listen to the worker directors' pleas for continued negotiations, 
Tim, "It is an anchor round our necks that we are partners in an 
ESOP" 
With the CNC's rejection of identity convergence, and with it the worker 
directors' ESOP-identity convergence framework, an alternative route to a final 
278 
decision was suggested, incorporating the CNCs conception of the mechanism 
for harmonisation - one which did not involve union identity alteration, 
Mike, "ESOP articles force the company to recognise industrial 
relations structures. Can we hold the company to go through the 
shareholders body? " 
However, the use of formal ESOP structures was perceived as a lengthy and 
problem-strewn process. Given the CNC's mistrust of the influence of the ESOP 
over the collective bargaining process, the use of formal ESOP channels, even if it 
was to conclude the negotiations and resolve the low cost units problem, was 
ultimately rejected as a possible course of action, 
Wilf, "Still, four weeks notice is necessary for an EGM" 
Jerry, "But in an EGM the floor can express no confidence in 
management and if management force the issue then they could put 
their necks on the block" 
Wilf, "Management can overturn a no confidence vote during the 
first five years of the company" 
Jerry, "Therefore we are back to the dispute" 
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4.3 Summary 
While the response of the union membership provided a strong rationale for 
continuing with the established, adversarial patterns of interaction between the 
formal networks, the CNC's new found strength within the negotiations came 
from ratification of their identity divergence policy and so the potential for 
adoption and acceptance of a new, ESOP-led framework of understanding for the 
negotiations was in jeopardy. However, in mobilising the use of established 
collective bargaining identities, patterns and routines, the CNC was ignoring the 
changes to the collective bargaining framework that the employee buy-out had 
affected, notably the growing impact of the worker directors' ESOP-led 
framework of understanding for the negotiations. With a return to identity 
divergence, the CNC perceived the negotiations process as dividing up a finite 
amount of organisational control and not as creating new identities or forms of 
influence. 
The negotiations were therefore being re-conceptualised by the CNC within a 
'them-and-us' framework, creating the conditions for papering over the cracks 
within the union group and allowing them to work together to provide a unified 
and strong union response - in other words, a unity of disunity. There was 
nothing unusual or different about how the CNC was responding or how it was 
manoeuvring its own members to confront management. This was a typical union 
response to a typical confrontation with management, a response in which there 
was apparently no formal or informal part for the ESOP to play. 
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5. Formal ESOP Structures 
5.1 Atmosphere of Mistrust 
As a consequence of information gained through the overlap between membership 
of the CNC and the Boards of EBTI and EBTII, conflicts had not only continued 
to exist within the established formal collective bargaining forum but had spread 
to encompass new tensions. The suspicions held by the CNC of management's 
agenda, which went above and beyond a normal them-and-us mistrust, were based 
on evidence from these alternative formal sources, 
Ron, "The problem with the CNC is that some of them are on 
EBTI and therefore have confidential information. Therefore some 
of the CNC know the issue and management information and 
figures but the others don't and those who do won't divulge and 
explain because no one wants to be seen to make a decision. 
Management are untrustworthy and are vying for influence 
amongst themselves because they all want to be the king pin and 
keep their job when FirstBus takes over" 
At the EBTI meeting following the union ballot, Mike and the Chief Executive 
had come to blows over company finances, and their heated argument had 
temporarily halted the meeting. Consequently, the atmosphere of mistrust still 
pervaded the negotiations and the CNC did not believe, and disputed, 
management's calculations on the necessary profit levels, 
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Mike, "The ballot result is a question on how the company is being 
run. We've seen at EBTI the costs of running buses .... and ES 
million to run buses is excessive and you could do more to get the 
figure down. Unlike Stagecoach, there are no shareholders to pay 
off. I'm not convinced by your argument ... The ballot reflected no 
confidence in how management are doing this" 
The belief among the CNC members was that BusCo senior management were 
searching for cost reductions to make the company more attractive to potential 
outside buyers, 
Mike, "Your [management's] agenda is to boost the profit level 
higher than we see necessary for BusCo - there is another agenda. 
I've learnt from the worker directors that the budget for next year 
the forecasting means that they expect fl. 8 million profit without a 
reduction in platform costs, without a fares increase and so on, 
therefore they've found a bit extra and why is fl. 8 million not 
enough? But, especially in an employee-owned company, driving 
down driver costs is not acceptable. We've got to befirm and say 
no to reductions in wages terms and conditions" 
The issue of management's hidden agenda was again mooted when management 
rejected all the union's proposals to reduce costs. Wilf suggested that the budget 
was camouflaging costs and used information obtained as Chair of EBTI to accuse 
the Chief Executive of shifting his salary costs onto ESOP costs. The CNC felt 
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that they had tried identity convergence and it had failed - in the eyes of the CNC 
- because not only had management's collective identity remained unaltered, but 
because information gained via the ESOP structures suggested to the CNC that 
management had an additional and alternative agenda, one which served 
management's intcrests alone, 
Wilf, "The burden is not as great as you [management] are 
making out" 
* 
Jerry, "The management ethos is not acceptable and the work 
force don't believe in you, they believe you have alternative 
motives" 
* 
Mike, "I question where you [management] are coming from! " 
The CNC would not - therefore continue with an identity convergence strategy 
since they believed that management were hiding their true intentions. The origin 
of this belief lay in information gained through the formal ESOP structures, EBTI 
and the worker directors, which suggested that the goals of the union and 
management, far from converging under any mechanism, were in fact polarising 
and that management's alternative agenda was indicative of this polarisation. 
These suspicions concerning management's intentions reinforced the CNC's 
anxieties that an identity convergence proposal might unintentionally play into 
management's hands by giving management a result it wanted regardless of 
whether it was also something that benefited the union (a quid pro quo 
283 
framework). Furthermore, the alternations over the previous months between 
convergent and divergent negotiating frameworks meant that the CNC were now 
unsure which were their own proposals and which were management's. The 
confusion over identities and identity convergence mechanisms meant that the 
union group feared that their own ideas were playing into management's hands. 
The difference between the CNC's and the worker directors' conceptions of what 
was meant by identity convergence meant that the CNC had ultimately become 
suspicious that management had in fact created the CNC's identity convergence 
action, 
Mark, "The original document said that ... " 
Alf, "The original idea was sparked by a management comment" 
Consequently, the negotiations had become paralysed by new tensions and 
suspicions arising out of the overlaps between the ESOP and the negotiating 
networks. 
5.2 Summary 
The addition of the formal ESOP structures to the BusCo organisational networks 
was therefore a major factor in the CNC's identity divergence resolution, with the 
information that came via these routes contradicting that received through the 
formal management channels, even though the ultimate source - the Board - was 
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the same. Consequently, the CNC felt that the formal management channels of 
communication were withholding information and, as such, the CNC felt unable 
to adopt an identity convergence strategy without being fully confident that 
management held the same intentions. For the CNC, this meant no alternative to 
identity divergence. 
New areas of conflict had therefore been introduced into the negotiations through 
an underlying and hidden aspect that had added a new dimension to the 
negotiations, the ESOP. While the CNC had rejected the overt introduction of the 
fonnal ESOP structures into the collective bargaining sphere, by providing an 
important additional source of information for the union these very structures 
were being used by the CNC to inform their negotiations strategy. 
Throughout March, the atmosphere of suspicion became entrenched within the 
CNC and informed how the union group approached the negotiations. As the 
worker directors were not involved in the formal CNC meeting during March, 
these union moves into identity divergence were unmediated by the informal 
influence of the ESOP structures. However, the exclusion of the worker directors 
could not negate the reality that ultimately the collective bargaining framework 
had been altered by the informal introduction of the ESOP into the conflict 
resolution process. Therefore, an absolute return to established patterns of 
interaction was not going to be possible since the collective bargaining framework 
now incorporated new ESOP-related elements. 
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6. New Areas of Conflict: Identity Dissonance 
As carly as March, the movcments in the CNC's collcctive idcntity (and the 
decisions taken within these frameworks) had consequently resulted in conflicts 
within the collective bargaining process. Identity dissonance produced by these 
identity shifts became apparent as the cause of many of these observed conflicts 
within the negotiations. Despite the CNC's reservations, the renewed presence of 
the worker directors at the negotiations during April and May meant that identity 
convergence and identity divergence became increasingly interchangeable 
collective identities for the CNC, as the group wavered between the two 
bargaining frameworks. The demarcations and movements between the CNC's 
established collective identity and the worker directors' ESOP-led identity 
convergence moves produced new areas of conflict. This identity dissonance 
underpinned and directed the outcome of the negotiations and provided a further 
area of conflict for the CNC, but one without any established conflict-resolution 
roles or pattems. 
Four formal CNC meetings were held in April alone and, by the final meeting of 
that month, the CNC had presented to management (with the guidance and aid of 
the worker directors) two more alternative proposals. Both of these had been met 
with management's own, unreconstructed ideas, and no agreement was on the 
horizon. By the beginning of May, the negotiations had formally broken down and 
the CNC were exhibiting signs of severe tensions both within their own network 
and with the negotiations process. However, despite these conflicts, the behind the 
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scenes influence of the worker directors finally re-established a common 
negotiating framework and brokered an agreement on 9 th May. 
6.1 New Collective Bargaining Framework 
The established, expected collective bargaining framework at BusCo was 
understood to contain two divergent collective identities (management and union) 
which negotiated arrangements where the satisfaction of one party occurred only 
at the cost of the other. These arrangements were arrived at within the commonly 
understood collective bargaining framework of divergent identities. As the 
contradiction between the two formal identities involved in the negotiations was 
the gelling agent in this commonly understood collective bargaining framework, 
this had created an arena of common understanding within which representatives 
of the two formal networks could negotiate. 
The alteration in collective identity by the CNC through the introduction of an 
identity convergence framework (and the resulting offer on the table) stood 
outside this established framework of understanding. By initially adopting an 
identity convergence strategy, the CNC had unwittingly achieved two ends. First, 
their new identity convergence framework had effectively altered the terms of 
engagement within the collective bargaining arena. Even though the CNC had 
subsequently retreated from their convergent negotiating framework - as a result 
of management's unreconstructed response to the CNC proposal - the 
management and union relationship in this forum (and thus the collective 
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bargaining framework) had been altered by its very existence. Secondly, this 
strategy had introduced the worker directors' ESOP-related conception of an 
identity convergence process into the formal, established collective bargaining 
framework, where it had not had a purchase before. The previous CNC retreat 
from formal conflict with management had been through a withdrawal from 
engagement with the formal collective bargaining process and not through the 
convergence of identities. This time around, the difference was that the ESOP 
was actively influencing the formal collective bargaining framework itself and the 
identities of which it was composed. The system of opposites that had made up 
the collective bargaining framework that had allowed the two divergent identities 
to interact in understanding had therefore been added to, contaminated and 
complicated. By altering its identity, and its approach to the negotiations, the 
CNC had removed one of the two poles in this dialectic system thus fracturing the 
social reality that allowed the interaction in understanding between the two 
groups, and replacing it with incomprehension. 
Given the lack of stability within the collective bargaining framework at this time, 
the identity and decisions of the CNC swung between identity convergence and 
identity divergence. There was clear evidence of uncertainty among the CNC 
about the new collective bargaining framework and appropriate courses of action 
within it. Indicative of this uncertainty was the CNC's decision, early on in this 
stage of the negotiations, to use an identity convergence proposal to obtain 
polarised identity divergence objectives. While this betokened a confused and 
contradictory policy, it also indicated their subconscious awareness that the 
collective bargaining framework had changed and therefore needed a new type of 
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approach. However the CNC had, within their re-established identity divergence 
identity, tried to manipulate this new collective bargaining framework to achieve 
identity divergent aims and ends. The strain of a new collective bargaining 
framework and a polarised identity divergence policy resulted in the CNC opting 
for both identity convergence and identity divergence policies - as a route to CNC 
'unity'. The tensions between identity convergence and divergence, coupled with 
the weak unity - or unity of disunity - that was the CNC, escalated the conflicts 
and tensions experienced by the CNC. 
6.2 Formal Relationship Dissonance 
Many of the conflicts experienced by the CNC were underpinned by identity 
dissonance within the formal collective bargaining sphere. As April passed, the 
collective identity changes and conflicts within the CNC created a dissonance 
within the patterns and framework of the-forrnal arena of collective bargaining, 
with both networks accusing the other of 'moving the goalposts' of the 
negotiations. 
Management Team Dissonance ' 
From a management perspective, the introduction by the CNC into the collective 
bargaining forum of an alternative identity convergence agenda and proposal, and 
the CNC's associated expectations of management identity changes, caused the 
management team to accuse the CNC of having gone beyond the established 
collective bargaining framework, 
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Owen Jones, "We moved from 0.79! " 
Jerry, "Laudable, but not far enough! " 
Owen Jones, "You're moving the goal posts! " 
The alterations to and uncertainty in the formal negotiations process was 
maintained, by the management network, to be a failure of the CNC to understand 
management's approach to the negotiations and consequently as a failure to honour 
the established, expected and understood framework of collective bargaining. 
While management had not altered their approach to collective bargaining, the 
framework in which they were now negotiating, and the CNC's actions and 
expectations therein, had changed and the new collective bargaining framework for 
the negotiations was an untried and unknown system. 
By altering their collective identity the CNC had therefore altered their approach to 
collective bargaining, which the unreconstructed management network perceived 
as unfairly altering the pattern of relations. Management's anxiety over the CNC's 
goals and purpose transposed itself into accusations, principally directed at the 
CNC for not playing fairly. As the management group had not altered their 
collective identity towards convergence, they viewed the CNC's proposals with 
suspicion, and continued to accuse the CNC of 'moving the goalposts'. 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, management's concept of a harmonisation 
mechanism, where CNC identity alteration was achieved alongside unchanged 
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management goals, meant that the management team were asking the CNC to 
come forward with more alternatives to management's established and predictable 
proposal, 
Owen Jones, "Our ideas have been unacceptable to you. I 
requested that you present an alternative. If you don't like my 
proposals I want you to suggest alternatives" 
Unsurprisingly, this request was bom out of the fact that management were unsure 
of and did not understand the CNC's actions and expectations. The identity 
convergence strategy, and subsequent alteration in approach to the negotiations by 
the CNC, were not within the union's established patterns of interaction. 
Management's request for another CNC proposal can therefore be seen as an 
attempt to establish where the new borders of interaction lay, in other words, they 
were trying to re-establish a pattern of interaction and a commonly understood 
framework within which they could operate and move forward with the 
negotiations. 
CNC Dissonance 
The cause of this impasse in the formal negotiations was therefore a lack of 
understanding, by both management and trade union, of the alterations to the 
collective bargaining framework. Rather like management, in their turn the CNC 
externalised their discomfort over the bargaining process and focused on the 
shortcomings of the other formal network. The dissonance within the collective 
bargaining sphere was thus causing both management and union networks to 
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refocus their anxieties and tensions upon external factors, and these tensions were 
projected onto the other network in the fon-nal negotiations arena. On one 
occasion, Daffen stuck one finger up at management from behind his lottery 
ticket, while Mike remarked, 
"You don't know how to run a profitable business" 
The external focus of the CNC's anxiety centred on a confusion about what the 
other group's aims were, 
Mike, "You [management] refuse to look at the good points! " 
* 
Wilf, "We could argue all day, we say it is a saving, you say it is a 
cost" 
As a consequence of the CNC's identity alterations, and the ensuing changes in the 
way they viewed and approached the collective bargaining framework, the CNC 
were - from their perspective - in dissonance with management. Since the CNC 
had shifted their perception of the purpose of the negotiations, and were now 
experiencing and operating within a new collective bargaining framework, they 
were unable to respond to or find a common ground of understanding with 
management concerning the purpose of the negotiations. Consequently, in their 
turn, they accused management of departing from the negotiating fonnat, also 
using the terminology of 'moving the goalposts', 
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Wilf, "But you questioned what we'd balloted on. You've moved 
the goal posts and if that was your intention then you should have 
said. Lets get it straight" 
In their defence, management maintained that they had not been dishonest and for 
them, they had simply remained rooted in the established, adversarial and 
dichotomous collective bargaining framework. Therefore, management believed 
that it was not them who had moved the goalposts. 
The fear and anxiety within the CNC concerning the purpose and form of the 
negotiations meant the CNC had to work hard on their approach to the 
negotiations because of the unpredictability of the new collective bargaining 
framework, 
Wilf, "He's changing the goal posts and if we don't get it right he 
will walk all ovcr us" 
This uncertainty was also expressed as a strong anxiety over the framework within 
which the CNC had been taking its decisions, 
Mike, "It's a dangerous situation at the moment and if you think 
there will be a negotiated settlement today over wages, you're 
wrong. You've [the CNC] made concessions - meeting 
management over their low cost demand" 
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Ultimately the identity dissonance within the CNC, caused by the CNC's anxieties 
within the collective bargaining sphere, found expression as anger, 
Saul, "They've moved the goal posts and we're top heavy with 
management! " 
Darren, "They're incompetent" 
Alf (shouting), "Let's get the ballot box out! " 
Tony, "He's treating you with contempt! " 
Wilf, "More than! He's changing the goal posts. Let's stop pissing 
about and get out there! " 
Such fervent anti-management feelings were a refuge for the CNC from the 
uncertain collective bargaining framework that they found themselves within. 
The return to a comfortable, predictable and established identity, where the 
patterns of interaction and the expectations of action and reaction were clear and 
solid, presented the CNC with a stable identity. Therefore, since the CNC's 
disquiet within the collective bargaining sphere had resulted in their inability to 
pursue or continue with the worker directors' ESOP-led mechanism for identity 
convergence, they returned to their established collective identity, one of identity 
divergence. However, since this divergent identity was a product of the 
established collective bargaining framework of understanding, which no longer 
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existed in its old form, it could no longer be sufficient for the current, ESOP-led, 
negotiations. 
It was significant that a sharp increase and sustained discussion of management's 
failings were occurring at this point in the negotiations. The CNC needed to 
reinforce its own conviction that its renewed policy of identity divergence was the 
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correct strategy and so reminded itself that management was both incompetent, 
immoral and had an alternative agenda. The attacks on management counteracted 
and suppressed the CNC's feeling of uncertainty. The CNC's dilemma, was 
expressed concisely by Tim, 
Tim, "[He] has asked for our alternatives to low cost units and we 
can't and won't suggest one" 
However, the collective identity of the CNC was in such dissonance that they 
were unable even to predict the outcomes of, or management responses to, their 
proposals. This climate of fear within the CNC resulted in a questioning of the 
very basis of their fon-nal influence - the membership - and there was fear that the 
dissonance was not restricted to the negotiating team. The movements that had 
been made towards identity convergence by the CNC may have taken them out of 
step with their membership - if the membership perceived that the CNC had 
accepted too many 'concessions' for few immediate gains, 
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Stan, "But out there some don't want integration and non- 
demarcation. Who are we representing? Ourselves! And they'll 
vote something different" 
* 
Mike, "If we continue like this we won't be able to sell it to the 
members" 
Dissonant Frameworks 
The basis of the dissonance within the collective bargaining sphere was therefore 
the confusion - on both sides - over why the other party was acting as they did. 
From within management's view of the collective bargaining process they could 
not understand why the CNC were pushing for integration, 
Mark, "We've gone through your document. We would like to 
know why you are reluctant to integrate Fastline, what your fears 
are" 
Owen Jones, "Your proposal increases costs ... we were only 
concerned with new starter rates! You've come back and said lets 
roll the whole thing together - but not with cost reductions" 
In their turn, the CNC could not understand why management would not accept 
their aims, 
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Ewan, "But, Mr Jones, you've brought Merry Hill into the 
equation" 
* 
Mike, "We're trying to address your concerns and ours" 
Ultimately, the negotiations were in dissonance because the negotiating parties 
were working in dissonant frameworks of understanding, 
Mike, "Unless you withdraw the proposal and give us something 
else we're a million miles apart" 
* 
Stan, "At the moment we're going parallel but there's a 
fundamental difference" 
* 
Dan, "In his eyes you're taking more than you're giving" 
Therefore, neither party could proceed with the negotiations since they did not 
fully understand the new framework for the bargaining process. There was a 
growing awareness in the formal collective bargaining sphere that neither the 
union nor the management group any longer understood what the other group 
wanted from the negotiations. The shift in the collective bargaining framework 
meant that each network felt and accused the other of not taking the negotiating 
process seriously, indicating an anxiety over the changed patterns and 
expectations in the formal collective bargaining sphere, 
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Stan, "I think we're going back to '86 here" 
Alf, "1886! " 
* 
Owen Jones (annoyed, exasperated), "I'm not sure you've been 
listening! Are we going to talk sensibly? " 
Mark, "We are talking sensibly" 
Owen Jones, "You are notr' 
Stan, "This negotiating process is a strange convoluted exercise ... 
a hodgepodge has developed over the last 10 years and I thought 
this was a discussion on a unified way forward. But you want ring 
fencing! We're not sorting it! " 
While the accusations of management incompetence served as a pressure release 
for the union group, they failed to address the cause of the tensions, i. e. the 
changed collective bargaining framework. Consequently, when they met in the 
formal arena, the two groups could converse but failed to communicate any 
understanding. The gulf of understanding now established between the networks 
meant that the CNC remained confused about why management were failing to see 
the advantages of the CNC's negotiating approach, 
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Stan "We have responded to management's overtures. We do have 
a commitment to save money, how we save it is important and 
there are alternatives to lowering rates. I'd like management to do 
all they can first but they are working the wrong way round. I'm 
not convinced that management will make these savings. The 
problem now is a highly divided work force within and among 
BusCo, Merry Hill and Fastline" 
The loss of a common framework of understanding and the resultant dissonance in 
the formal collective bargaining sphere was producing a centrifugal force in the 
negotiations. This centrifugal force was driving the two networks apart, 
separating their frameworks of understanding beyond any formal means of re- 
establishment. As the incomprehension between the two parties took on its own 
momentum and force it was unsurprising, given the forces at work, that both 
groups felt that the opposing party was working to another agenda because that 
was precisely what they were doing, 
Stan, "I thought we were here with responsibility to increase 
profits, not through wage cuts but through practice alterations. His 
and our ideas don't gel" 
Tim, "Our future here is looking very bleak" 
As the two networks were no longer able to communicate in a forum of common 
understanding, and as the proposals from either party were unintelligible to the 
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other group, the negotiations inevitably became deadlocked, 
Jim Banks, "We are not understanding each other. We're miles 
apart. You think you've given us the earth and we see a minor 
saving and major cost increases" 
Consequently, while the discussions between the formal networks were 
continuing, the movement was in a circular direction - the negotiations were not 
moving forward towards a conclusion. This dissonance in the formal collective 
bargaining sphere was acknowledged by the CNC as an inability to move the 
negotiations forward, 
Tony, "I've not been here for three weeks and we are no further on 
from that! " 
The circuitous nature of the negotiations was expressed by the union group as a 
belief that, despite their efforts to move the negotiations forward, they had not 
progressed from their starting point, 
Wilf, "We're back to where we started. No room for movement" 
* 
Chris, "I suggested a group system but they [management] say 
they cant even afford that, therefore there's a clear impasse" 
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6.3 Role of the ESOP 
While both the CNC and management believed that the mechanism for 
harmonisation under employee ownership involved identity convergence, this 
assumed convergence from only one of the two formal networks involved in 
industrial relations within the organisation, thus leaving the opposing networked 
identity unchallenged. As the rationale for the employee buy-out at BusCo had 
been to protect the status quo of the formal networks, while both management and 
trade union believed that a new organisation-wide collective identity would be the 
outcome of employee ownership, both also expected that this new collective 
identity would be fashioned in the image of their own network identity. However, 
the worker directors, with their alternative identification as representatives of both 
management and workers as employee shareowners, held a significantly different 
belief about the mechanism for harmonisation under employee ownership and 
control. This mechanism for harmonisation involved and invoked an entirely 
new, organisation-wide collective identity. The assumption was that under the 
new ESOP-led collective identity, management and CNC shared the same goals 
since all held equal ownership rights. It was this alternative vision of 
harmonisation that the CNC had initially adopted during the negotiations, before 
management's failure to correspond had resulted in the union's retrenchment into 
its established and divergent identity. A significant aspect of the CNC's 
experience of formal dissonance was therefore that, having adopted the worker 
directors' ESOP-led mechanism for harmonisation through identity convergence, 
the CNC believed that their identity change should have been mirrored by 
management. The basis of the formal dissonance experienced by the CNC was 
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therefore their adoption of the ethos of the ESOP as a negotiating identity, and 
that management had not responded in a likewise fashion. As such, the CNC felt 
that management's response was out of step with the form and function of the 
organisation. Consequently, they accused management of not reciprocating in a 
manner acceptable in an employee-owned company, 
Jerry, "Managers have acumen to manage but only mandated to do 
that at acceptable rates. Therefore ask Owen Jones for a proposal 
that's acceptable" 
The CNC firmly believed that they had acted honourably, in accordance with the 
ethos of the ESOP, but that management had not reciprocated within the same 
framework of understanding. The CNC interpreted management's tactics - 
maintaining identity divergence while the CNC attempted identity convergence - 
as dishonesty, 
Ewan, "Owen Jones's been dishonest in his approach to us last 
Thursday regarding integration. I still say Owen Jones was 
dishonest about integration" 
* 
Mike, "If management will show us fairly the figures, but they're 
the Bosnian Serbs! " 
* 
Mike, "Your [managements'] answer to Wilf - not increase costs 
for integration -I don't believe was an honest answer" 
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Whereas, in fact, this misunderstanding between management and the union was 
caused by their dissonant expectations of the harmonisation mechanism under 
employee ownership. The consequent lack of a common framework of 
understanding for the two networks to work within meant that the negotiations had 
reached stalemate. The only possible means by which the negotiations could have 
been restarted would have been to re-establish a framework of common 
understanding. 
6.4 Role of the Informal Network 
To break this negotiations deadlock would have taken a leap of understanding 
from both sides, one which the formal networks could not provide, constrained as 
they were by their states of dissonance. Given the lack of understanding between 
the two formal networks, any forward movement in the negotiations was going to 
have to be externally generated. 
Since the CNC had altered their collective bargaining strategy through their initial 
movement into identity convergence, they consequently did not have a clear route 
or plan for the negotiations; By having initially adopted the worker directors' 
ESOP-led identity convergence proposal, even though the CNC had rejected the 
informal influence of the worker directors by re-establishing identity divergence 
with management, the retracted proposal was still in existence - its appearance on 
the table could not be deleted - and the negotiations framework had been 
irreversibly altered. 
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However, the CNC alone were unable to forge the new roles, patterns or 
framework needed to take the formal negotiations forward. For this they required 
the direction and influence of parties not fonnally involved with the negotiations. 
The only other party involved in the negotiations, but not in the formal sphere, 
were the worker directors. Therefore, the CNC still needed the direction of the 
worker directors to help them create a new path through the negotiations. In 
recognition of the integral role of the informal ESOP network in the new 
negotiations framework, the CNC called for worker director guidance in the 
negotiations process, 
Tim, "We could do with Dan and Chris as mediators" 
Saul, "They're better negotiators than that lot! " 
While the dissonance in the formal sphere meant that the CNC could no longer 
understand management's negotiating strategy or goals and therefore perceived 
management as dishonest, the worker directors' informal network position meant 
that they were able to access both frameworks of understanding, 
Dan, "I'm trying to explain their side - that the savings are not until 
the sixth year, which is unacceptable to them" 
* 
Chris, "That's their point" 
* 
Dan, "I'm trying to help both sides" 
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The worker directors were therefore in a better position to comprehend the social 
realities of both the two collective identities. Consequently, their 'Perception of 
management was less damning, 
Dan, "Chris and I have said all along to management that a 
reduction in the new starter rate needs progression. Your thoughts 
are ours too. I don't think that management is dishonest, they said 
that minibus rates are too high. I said the best we could hope for 
this year was integration. I believe I'm out of step with the CNC. I 
know the Fastline suggestion is out of order but consider it" 
As the worker directors' influence within the CNC could only be informal 14 and 
not formal, the worker directors were strictly outsiders to the formal negotiations 
process. It was notable that, up to and including this stage in the negotiations, the 
worker directors had sat mute during the formal decision-making meetings 
between the CNC and management. 
The worker directors therefore posed no fonnal threat to the authority of the CNC. 
As formal outsiders, a position they repeatedly emphasised, the worker directors in 
fact occupied the only position that could achieve a common framework of 
understanding for the fonnal networks to work within. Their position was unique 
within the negotiations given that they were not connected in any fonnal way with 
the CNC's internal rivalries or tensions. Neither were the worker directors 
" Dan claimed that while the worker directors attended the CNC they did not attend 
the formal negotiations between union and management because it would have 
meant "sitting uncomfortably on the fence". 
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connected within the formal negotiations to the management negotiating team. By 
distancing themselves from management, repeating "their side ... their point ... if 
we are firm", the worker directors were signalling that their information and advice 
was not associated with or driven by management's collective identity, and that 
they fully supported the CNC's fonnal decisions. The worker directors therefore 
posed no threat to the formal power allocations within the formal network, 
Dan, "One of the CNC gave me a good idea the other day" 
* 
Dan, "We will support any CNC decision" 
* 
Dan, "I agree totally" 
The repercussions for the worker directors of these tensions between the formal 
networks was that they had to repeatedly emphasise the CNC's formal authority in 
the collective bargaining sphere, 
Saul, "We're going too deep with the bottom rate" 
Dan, "I insist that rates negotiations must be with the CNC. 
You've got to negotiate the rates not me! Let me finish! The 
agreement will be with each garage committee or with the CNC -I 
don't mind, it's up to you" 
To avoid being perceived as a threat to the CNC - and thus excluded from the 
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negotiations - the worker directors emphasised both their informal position and the 
CNC's formal authority in the collective bargaining forum, 
Dan, "Just trying to help" 
Mark, "We understand you. Originally we had three rates and 
progression option" 
Dan, "That's one way of doing it, quite right" 
As a consequence of CNC anxiety concerning external influences over their 
collective identity, the worker directors clearly demarcated the distinction between 
their informal influence and the CNC's formal arena of decision-making, 
emphasising their lack of formal authority and their neutrality in this area, 15 
Dan, "I support everything you've said and we've argued it as you 
have but they won't budge" 
In order to achieve their (ESOP-related) aims, the worker directors had to allay the 
anxieties felt by the CNC over the informal influence of the ESOP structures. 
They worked towards this by emphasising their neutral role within the fonnal 
collective bargaining forum. To retain influence, the worker directors stressed that 
their goals were the same as those of the CNC, 
15 However, Chris reported that Dan did the all talking at the CNC meetings because 
"he can soft soap them". 
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Chris, "Dan and I will support you in whatever decision you take 
and your tactics" 
The worker directors were also mindful not to suggest an idea outright, but phrase 
it as outsiders. This allowed the CNC to take the formal decision. By verbally 
representing and presenting their goals as queries, the worker directors were 
making explicit their disassociation from the formal decision-making process, 
Dan, "Bear in mind... " 
* 
Chris, "It's only a suggestion" 
Through urging the CNC to consider the details of their proposal, while at the 
same time indicating that they were trying to help the CNC achieve its goals, the 
worker directors were informally pushing the CNC to stabilise their collective 
identity within the new framework of understanding for the negotiations. 
However, to secure and safeguard this influence, the worker directors had to 
subtly control the formal decision-making. They achieved this by withdrawing 
from the formal decision-making and allowing the CNC to move the idea forward, 
Dan, "Here's how you handle it, you'll probably shoot me down! " 
Since the worker directors were able to access both formal networks, they could 
also cut across the dissonance that was paralysing the negotiations. In their 
capacity as translators of management's message to the CNC, the worker directors 
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were therefore able to demonstrate that while management's goals were quite 
different to the CNC's, this did not mean that management actively did not want 
the CNC to achieve their goals, 
Dan, "Ever since day one the negotiations have been on reducing 
costs to maintain the services. On Friday we changed the goal 
posts. Their exercise is to reduce tenns and conditions. If a way to 
integrate Merry Hill and Fastline is cost effective it will be fine 
with management, but on Friday integration increased the costs" 
* 
Dan, "All I was saying was - don't curse etc. - the one criteria is the 
tender price is now too high to win work and without winning it 
puts pressure on pay higher up the scale. It happened at Weston. 
His intention was a low starting rate - his only point! " 
The worker directors were therefore the only party to the negotiations who were 
able to operate outwith the formal collective bargaining sphere. In their informal 
capacity they had access to both union and management frameworks of 
understanding, and were able to bring this knowledge and comprehension to the 
formal negotiations process. Their informal access to both formal networks meant 
that the worker directors were able to indicate to the CNC how far management 
would move within the negotiations. The CNC recognised the worker directors' 
influential role in steering the negotiations towards a conclusion through their 
ability to formulate a path within the new negotiating framework. As a result, the 
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group frequently and explicitly sought the worker directors' leadership in their 
informal discussions, 
Mark, "Dan would you lead [the meeting]? " 
* 
Dan, "What do we want to be? BusCo as one integrated group, is 
that what we want? " 
Tim, "And the conditions? " 
Dan, "He would be prepared to consider those" 
* 
Dan, "I spoke to Jim Banks this morning and management will not 
discuss senior rates today. I think you've brought management 
along a long way and you're not far off an agreement" 
6.5 Informal Relationship Dissonance 
While the worker directors had been associated with the negotiations process from 
an early stage, this involvement was tinged by the oscillations of the CNC 
between accepting and resisting the involvement of the worker directors. 
Consequently, reinstatement of the ESOP-led collective identity was not an easy 
ride for the worker directors as identity dissonance was not restricted to the fonnal 
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sphere. Dissonance in the formal collective bargaining sphere was underlain by 
dissonance in the CNC's externally focussed informal relationships. 
Notwithstanding the continued informal influence of the worker directors over the 
direction and form of the negotiations, the CNC were also experiencing tensions 
with these informal ESOP representatives. 
As a result of the two directions that union collective identity had taken - initially 
towards identity convergence with management and then towards polarisation - 
new areas of conflict had arisen within the CNC as a result of the ESOP networks 
and influence. Suspicion of ESOP informal influence, an authority not under the 
command of the formal union network, had grown parallel with and as a 
consequence of the disillusiomnent and confusion of the CNC with the new 
negotiating framework. 
Despite their emphasis on formal neutrality, the strong informal influence of the 
worker directors continued to create anxieties amongst the CNC, centred on the 
influence of the informal network over the collective identity of the group. While 
the formal and informal spheres of influence within the CNC were clearly 
demarcated, the informal influence of the ESOP was not fully accepted by the 
formal networks and this resulted in tensions between the formal and informal 
authority networks. 
The structural conflict between the gatekeepers of the formal and informal ESOP 
communications channels was increasingly apparent. Wilf, as Vice-Chair of the 
CNC and Chair of EBTI represented the formal channels, while the worker 
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directors, without official negotiating positions, represented the informal channels. 
For the informal network to have a meaningful input into the negotiating 
procedure, the worker directors had to ensure that their role as representatives of 
that system was accepted by the representatives of the formal system. This was 
facilitated by their conciliatory and formally neutral approach, which ensured that 
the CNC did not feel their sphere of influence threatened by the worker directors' 
informal channels, 
Dan, "I'm not trying to lead the CNC" 
* 
Dan, "It's just a principle yes" 
However, as the worker directors' informal network was beyond the direct control 
of the CNC, its influence created anxieties. Despite the worker directors' formal 
neutrality, nevertheless their informal network and access to information bypassed 
the formal influence of the CNC. Since the worker directors occupied a more 
influential informal communications role than any of the CNC members, and 
therefore presented a greater threat to the formal influence of the CNC, this 
instilled mistrust in the worker director's informal influence. Consequently, the 
CNC disputed their source of information, 
Dan, "I believe that Owen Jones believes tenders cannot be won 
unless they have low cost, and he has serious a competition 
problem in Easton and Weston" 
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Alf, "You're lying" 
Dan, "I'm not" 
As far as the CNC were concerned, the fault for the difficult situation that the CNC 
found themselves in regarding the formal negotiations lay with the worker 
directors and the use of their informal communications channel, rather than the 
CNC relying on their own formal, established channels. The tension between the 
CNC and the worker directors over communication routes was exposed by 
management's inability to convert to an identity convergent framework. The 
influence of the worker directors over the collective identity of the group was seen 
by the CNC to have moved the union away from an established, identity 
divergence response. The CNC were aware that their confusion was the result of 
worker director influence over the groups' identity. They believed that this 
confusion was playing into the hands of management and began to view the worker 
directors as management's tools, 
Saul, "We'll still be here tomorrow given that! " 
Stan, "They will bring out another document in a bit" 
Saul, "Their other negotiating team is the worker directors" 
The CNC's disappointment in management's response to their document also 
found expression in their hostility towards the worker directors, and prompted 
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angry and defensive outbursts from the CNC, 
Mike, "Mr Jones' comment on profits are different to EBTI and 
Dan's calculations. It's different messages from different 
management! " 
Tim, "Dan was lying to us" 
* 
Alf, "Point of order - there are two guests here to advise us only 
and can we forget about these two!? " 
This exposed dissonance-related conflicts between CNC members and the worker 
directors' informal influence, 
Darren, "Bin the worker directors, that would save money! " 
Mick, "Bin the managers! " 
Alf, "Send Dan Evans away for a week and we will get one 
hundred percent support! " 
The accusation that the worker directors were management's other negotiating 
team indicated that the CNC feared that the worker directors were working in 
collusion with management. In effect, that the identity convergence moves 
produced by the adoption of the worker directors' proposal had not in fact been 
314 
situated within an alternative ESOP-led harmonisation mechanism, but had in fact 
been situated within management's conception of harmonisation, involving union 
identity change only. Consequently, the informal influence of the worker 
directors within the CNC was curtailed, 
Alf, "Can we call the worker directors in to tell them they've led us 
up the garden path? " 
An additional aspect of the genesis of the dissonance in these infonnal 
relationships was the union's fear that relying on the worker directors' infonnal 
communications channel was simply lengthening the negotiations, 
Alf, "Who invited them? That'll mean an extra four meetings! " 
The worker directors however, trod a thin line, determined by their ability to 
deflect hostility. It was clear already that the CNC continued to worry that the 
worker directors' access to information was removing the CNC from the 
organisational communications network. Management were also apparently 
concerned about the authority that the worker directors could command, 
Dan, "I'm the one who gets the blame more than anyone" 
Alf, "Sometimes Dan oversteps the worker director mark, but I 
don't find this a problem" 
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Dan, "Peter Smith (CEO] is not fhendly with me at the moment 
and has said I'm wielding too much influence" 
These tensions over authority were never far from the surface, and the freedom of 
speech granted to the worker directors (as a result of their influential informal 
position) often proved to be a long enough rope to hang them with, 
Chris, "And Jim Banks doesn't want ambiguity in the progression. 
Your proposal must be positive. Management have felt that the 
trade union has had negative reaction till now" 
Alf, "If we don't see the management point we are labelled 
negative. The money saving ideas of ours are unacceptable to 
management. Management want one avenue, which is reductions 
in the pay and conditions of drivers. Because we won't follow the 
management line we're being unreasonable! We want an increase 
not a decrease in pay! But some people around this table believe 
we need low cost drivers. I don't believe in that" 
Chris, "I was trying to say that a negative response to the ballot 
would have been a negative response. You need a proposal for a 
positive response. Cleared that up" 
The animosity directed at the worker directors was therefore robust and presented a 
serious obstacle to the influence of their informal network over the negotiating 
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process. The union's hostility was an attempt to limit the influence of the worker 
directors over the CNC's collective identity and to cut down on the flow of 
information from that source. In doing so, the CNC hoped to regain influence by 
regaining control of the negotiations framework. 
6.6 Negotiating Tactics 
Partly resulting from the hostility aimed at these informal communications, and 
partly due to their alternative agenda for the negotiations, the worker directors used 
a particular form of negotiating tactics, notably counter to that utilised by the 
networks engaged in the formal bargaining process, 
Dan, "I want all to be on the top rate but I'm certain that they 
[management] will not agree to it this year. Let's get everyone into 
BusCo this year and then next year push for top rates when all are 
in BusCo and will benefit. I'm just putting a point, it's tactics" 
This difference in 'tactics' between the CNC and the worker directors equated to a 
different common framework of understanding for the negotiations. The CNC's 
established negotiating tactics were weighted towards the confrontational, 
adversarial procedures of traditional collective bargaining, whereas the ideology of 
the ESOP, represented by the worker directors, invoked a more conciliatory and 
less combative approach to the negotiations. The worker directors operated from 
within this unitarist and harmonious framework of understanding, one that 
317 
encompassed both union and management collective identities, and yet was distinct 
from both. The change in the formal negotiating tactics that the worker directors 
were advocating therefore equated to a new collective bargaining framework for 
the negotiations. It was this alternative framework of understanding that the worker 
directors were attempting to persuade the CNC to adopt, 
Dan, "The only difference is tactics Wilf - I'm just putting a point" 
But in order to move the negotiations forward, the worker directors had to 
establish a new common ground where the CNC and management could 
understand each other's goals and worldview, 
Dan, "I agree there's no costs but in two years the costs out weighs 
the cost of the agreement. That's their point" 
To achieve this, the established divergent identities of the two formal networks 
had to be replaced with convergent identities. In other words, the CNC and 
management had to identify primarily with the ESOP and not with their 
established adversarial identities. In order to accomplish this identity change, the 
worker directors had to refute the CNC's perception of the negotiations, 
Dan, "I read it differently" 
The worker directors were clear that the crucial issue that had to be decided on at 
this stage of the negotiations was what they tenned the 'tactics', in other words, a 
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decision concerning the identities of the formal networks. Without re-establishing 
a common framework of understanding for the formal negotiations, the worker 
directors stood little chance of achieving their ESOP-led goals. Yet, the worker 
directors could only achieve this common understanding within the formal 
negotiations sphere if they could impose their informal framework of 
understanding on the formal proceedings. This could occur only if the CNC 
accepted the informal influence of the worker directors over their collective 
identity. 
6.7 Worker Director Dissonance 
However, despite their tactics of neutrality and equanimity, the worker directors 
also encountered tensions in the negotiations process. The collective identity of 
the ESOP, embodied by the worker directors and their informal authority, 
experienced dissonant relations with the CNC. Upset by the fonn the negotiations 
were taking, the tactics used by the CNC and by their exclusion from influencing 
them, the worker directors frustrations eventually surfaced, 16 
Chris, "I'm not standing for this, it's out of order! " 
Dan, "They're just going to argue with us today, if there are going 
to be arguments I don't want to be part of it! We're qfJ7 I'll be in 
" Significantly however the worker directors suppressed their anger during the formal proceedings. 
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Weston in the Credit Union office. I'm going to get some work 
done! " 
Dan's comment about getting "some work done" implied that he felt that the CNC 
were operating in a different collective identity from the worker directors, 
excluding the worker directors from influencing it. With no formal authority 
within the negotiations, the only sanction the worker directors could apply was to 
withdraw from the informal negotiating process, which they did by leaving the 
negotiating room and departing for their own offices at Weston. However, the role 
of the worker directors was of too great an importance for the CNC to let them 
depart. In fact, the worker directors had only made it a few steps outside of the 
room before they were intercepted by CNC members and persuaded to return, 
Dan, "We're back! " 
Chris, "Are we leaving, are we staying now or what? " 
Dan, "You're back up again! " 
However, tensions in their relationship with the CNC was not the only area of 
conflict experienced by the worker directors, they were also experiencing 
dissonance in their relations with the formal management negotiating team. 
Unfortunately for the worker directors and their ESOP-led goals, management's 
formal response to the CNC's overtures of identity convergence was not in the 
same spirit. While the worker directors' informal influence over the management 
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group was reportedly 17 robust, when it came to the formal collective bargaining 
process, the informal authorities were sidelined and their suggestions, ideologies 
and goals were ignored. In the formal sphere, in which the worker directors had no 
authority and into which they did not step, the established, divergent approach 
from management dominated. Consequently, the worker directors experienced 
their own degree of dissonance with the collective bargaining process, 
Dan, "I'm very angry with this document. This is not what we'd 
discussed and agreed with Owen Jones earlier. I'm off downstairs 
... sort him out" 
The worker directors' efforts at building up CNC trust in their informal authority 
had therefore been dealt a blow by their inability to foster a commonly understood 
framework of understanding within which the two formal networks could 
negotiate. This rend in the picture of harmony that the worker directors had 
painted for the CNC shook the CNC's confidence in the worker directors' 
leadership of their collective identity by exposing the precarious nature of 
informal authority in a formal sphere. As the formal negotiations with 
management were yielding no progress, the worker directors used their informal 
influence to keep the negotiations open, with the tacit agreement of the CNC. 
While management were willing to continue the debate with the worker directors, 
this was not in the formal decision-making forum. To achieve this, the worker 
directors had to meet informally with management, outwith the formal 
negotiations and therefore without any CNC members present. The management 
" Reported by the worker directors themselves. 
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team did not feel confident discussing these issues formally, however, they were 
happy to utilise the worker directors' informal communication channels, 
Dan, "Must discuss this outside the CNC" 
Owen Jones, "I understand you" 
Consequently, the informal negotiations took a turn that excluded the members of 
the CNC. The union was therefore nervous and suspicious of the informal 
influence of the worker directors and expressed the concern that, 
"... hope Chris and Dan are not telling the management how far the 
trade union will bend" 
The group's fears were therefore that the worker directors would misrepresent the 
CNC's formal negotiating position, that the worker directors would offer 
management too many concessions in return for an agreement and that the worker 
directors would come to an arrangement with management without first consulting 
the CNC. This situation clearly illustrated the fragile hold that the worker 
directors' informal authority had over the collective identity of the CNC. The 
CNC's continuing anxiety about loss of formal influence was relayed to the 
worker directors on their return, 
Chris, "We've been told you're not happy with us going down 
there" 
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Dan, - "We've been trying to argue the point. We had a lengthy 
discussion and they don't think that this [the CNC proposal] is as 
good as you do and we've spent the last twenty minutes arguing 
loudly with them - as you probably heard! " 
Chris, "We tried to arrange a framework ... He [Owen Jones] 
didn't explain it properly" 
Dan, "We argued that it was an ESOP not a back-of-the-door 
company" 
Despite the informal efforts of the worker directors, the intransigent collective 
identity of management coupled with the anxieties of the CNC meant that a 
common framework of understanding for the formal negotiations was not 
forthcoming at this stage. The negotiations were however still open due to the 
informal position of the worker directors, able to communicate with both formal 
networks. While this itself constituted a common framework of understanding, it 
was an informal one and transposing this into the formal sphere was fraught with 
obstacles. 
6.8 Transposition of Informal Influence 
The stagnation of the formal negotiations, due to management and union 
differences in agenda and the disengagement of the CNC members, prompted the 
323 
worker directors to take part in the formal negotiating process at this juncture. In 
order to push for the transposition of their informal framework of understanding 
into the formal arena, the worker directors broke with their established form and 
entered into the formal decision-making process in an effort to bring the two 
formal identities together under one common framework, to broker a solution that 
enabled both sides to achieve their goals, 
Dan, "I'm trying to help both sides" 
Unlike the previous formal negotiations meetings at BusCo, the meeting where the 
worker directors entered into the formal negotiations saw a new seating format. 
Previously, the worker directors had removed themselves from the table at the 
arrival of the management team, and had reseated themselves against the wall. 
Once management had withdrawn and the formal proceedings were over, the 
worker directors had come back to the table. On this occasion, the worker 
directors remained seated at the table with the arrival of the formal management 
negotiators. The central placement of the worker directors in the formal seating 
arrangements was indicative of their repositioning into the formal negotiations. 
Significantly, while their statements were noticeably not on elements of direct 
relevance to policy at this stage, the legitimacy of their formal intedections was not 
challenged by either negotiating team. 
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7. Internal Dissonance 
The CNC, in order to accept that it could achieve a framework of understanding 
within which it could negotiate with management, needed to trust its own strength 
of purpose and unity. While the strategy of externalising their conflicts focused 
the CNC's attention on a common enemy (at times both management and the 
worker directors) and allowed the group to gaze outside the CNC, it also prevented 
the CNC from examining its own shortcomings, divisions and dissonance. These 
internal divisions directly contributed to and grew out of the stagnation of the 
formal negotiations. 
As the negotiations stagnated during April, the CNC's struggles with identity 
dissonance exposed conflicts which became increasingly centripetal, running along 
the lines of existing schisms within the union group. These internal conflicts 
centred on identity supremacy, and created strong and negative emotions within 
the CNC. The result was the reinforcement of schisms within the network - which 
largely followed the fault lines of the regional identities. 
7.1 Unity of Disunity 
While the CNC itself constituted formally an undivided collective identity, the 
CNC collective identity was not in fact a harmonious one and was based on a 
fundamental weakness within the CNC. There were established and significant 
schisms within the network which, while obvious from the outset of the 
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negotiations, grew in significance as dissonance within the collective bargaining 
process developed. These internal tensions were products of the union's regional 
power spheres, where the CNC was composed of five separate TGWU branches, 
each representing a different location. 's As a result of the history of the make-up 
of the CNC negotiating team, the CNC network form and type had inherited and 
maintained internal schisms. The Committee structure, with its separate area 
reports, highlighted the recurring issue of regionality throughout the course of the 
negotiations. 
Within the CNC, the branch officials also defined their identities in relation to their 
specific work locations. Consequently the close personal ties these produced and 
the five subgroupings within the CNC held their own lateral allegiances within the 
network. The City and Southton representatives voted together while the Weston 
and Easton members represented the opposing faction within the CNC. 19 The 
rotating character of the key CNC positions, the Chair and Vice Chair, ensured that 
no one sub-group within the network developed dominance. It was also group 
policy that the Chair and Vice Chair were never from the same garage. 
The unity of disunity that was the CNC had acted as a robust network in so far as 
it had performed an established and commonly understood function within the 
established collective bargaining framework. This function had called on a single 
wider identity than those generated from within BusCo and its separate branch 
locations and was therefore not as subject to the CNC's internal divisions. The 
City, Southton, Easton, Weston, and Halfway. 
The Chair of the CNC at this time was an Easton member, and the Vice Chair was 
a City representative. 
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identity the group had adhered to was a commonly recognised union identity 
involved in traditional adversarial industrial relations. The patterns, routines and 
expected responses were therefore commonly recognised not just within BusCo, 
but within any number of other similar companies. The CNC identity within the 
established collective bargaining framework was therefore also externally 
generated and maintained by the CNC's position within and membership of the 
wider union movement. 
However, the movements towards an ESOP-led identity convergence meant that 
this established framework of understanding for the negotiations had been altered. 
The dissonance this had created within the negotiations process exposed the 
hidden disunity of the network since it meant that the CNC had to rely more 
heavily on its internally generated identities, i. e. those associated with the 
company itselL 
7.2 CNC Formal Schisms 
CNC factionalism divided into two conflicting identities. Part of the CNC was in 
favour of adopting the worker directors' ESOP-led identity convergence plans, 
however a significant portion of the union group remained attached to a collective 
identity more closely associated with its wider labour movement environment, i. e. 
its established divergent identity. This faction perceived identity convergence as 
playing into management's hands. This split resulted in identity dissonance 
within the group which exposed its inherently divisive network structure, 
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Mike, "I'm concerned at what I'm hearing ... people are talking 
that the original proposal - management's - was slightly better so 
we'll accept that! Management is reeling you in, you've accepted 
the urgency of accepting wages bill cuts, why have you changed 
yourtune?! " 
The consequence of the different identities at war within the CNC was that the 
factions interpreted the information that reached them differently, 
Dan, "Brilliant speech, but the world we live in is different. One, 
where is the money for the goals? Two, as good trade unionists we 
must have a hope to win and there's not a hope here" 
* 
Mike, "I do not accept the argument that this increases costs; Get 
real! We haven't cost management a penny but you've been 
listening to management who are a dishonest bunch who don't 
have the interests of the employees at heart. They have betrayed 
us and shouldn't be allowed to run this company. The 
management's agenda is bumping up the share value of the 
phantom shares and to deliver the company to FirstBus. How can 
we agree to this? I have no confidence in this management" 
In addition, the strain of formal dissonance was causing sites of tension within the 
group to become exposed. These tensions followed divisions between the TGWU 
Branches, in particular, Alf, as Chair of the Weston branch, became increasingly 
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agitated at the identity vacillations experienced by the CNC and repeatedly 
threatened unilateral action, 
Alf, "There will be no agreement from the Weston Branch! I want 
a ballot! I'll not be sat here! I can easily carry this one! " 
Darren, "No problem carrying this one" 
As the negotiations stagnated, the strain of operating to established patterns within 
a changed collective bargaining framework exposed the fracture lines within the 
CNC, with the divide between Weston and City the first (and most significant) to 
widen. At this time, the Weston branch was prepared to follow its own course and, 
at the cost of dissolving the coalition that was the CNC, demonstrating no 
weaknesses to either management or the rest of the CNC, 
Alf, "Some branches may pull out! " 
While the Easton members silently observed and waited for the outcome of this 
intemecine conflict, unable to either criticise or support either subgroup's actions, 
the City representatives were able to speak out, and demanded that the Weston 
representatives retracted their threats, 
Wilf and Mike, "You can't do that! It's a company-wide proposal" 
Mick, "No, you can't! " 
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Alf, "We're leaving! I'm not accepting low cost units at Weston! 
Will go it alone and ballot! " 
This illustrated that not only was there a five-way branch structure contained 
within the CNC but within that, two of the Branches had particularly antagonistic 
relations with each other, while the remaining three were more cautious about 
who they overtly challenged. The centripetal forces caused by the wider identity 
dissonance in the collective bargaining sphere were therefore resulting in 
internally generated reasons why the CNC was unable to move forward with the 
negotiations, 
Wilf, "We are back to the first document and work on that to get 
something satisfactory to the CNC" 
Alf, "I never go back, let's go forwards from the last document" 
Dan, "Alf saysdon't look back'but we can't because we've already 
come in a complete circle. Let's start from the original proposal 
and the improvements you've gained" 
One manifestation of the CNC's internal dissonance was the lack of ability of 
some members to speak out in meetings. Jerry, looking around the table, asked 
incredulously, 
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"Why are you being so quiet? If management won't move then 
you must adjourn the meeting and possibly ballot the workers on 
industrial action" 
As soon as the formal meeting was in recess, it was significant that a couple of the 
City representatives who had remained silent, Mick and Tony, voiced their 
opinions in support of Weston. Within the informal atmosphere of the canteen, 
these previously suppressed opinions - which diverged from the formal position 
uttered by their vocal City colleagues - were aired, suggesting that these tensions 
(while unvoiced during the formal process) underlay many of the formal proposals, 
actions and voting patterns. While Weston and City were at loggerheads formally, 
some City representatives did informally support Weston's actions - although this 
was never demonstrated in formal discussions. However, it was clear that the 
regional loyalties were so firmly established and enforced within the CNC that 
they could override personal opinion. 
A vicious circle had therefore developed within the CNC network, where the 
fragile nature of its coalition of Branches kept decision-making at arms length in 
order to preserve unity. However, this inaction only exacerbated the internal 
strains and schisms within the union group, 
Chris, "the CNC politics mean that people won't agree or support 
others or say what they mean due to political stances" 
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The defensive positioning by the different cliques highlighted the CNC's inability 
to move within the formal negotiations. No one sub-group would take the risk of 
expressing an opinion in case it exposed an internal weakness to the others. It was 
safest - given their internal rivalries - to do and say nothing. 
Furthermore, the inherent disunity of the CNC under the altered negotiating 
framework meant that its formal unity was increasingly fragile since the basis of 
this unity - identification with the wider union movement, was being challenged 
by the new negotiations framework and identities. 
7.3 CNC Informal Schisms 
The internal schisms within the CNC also resulted in externalised hostility towards 
the informal networks, and towards one of the worker directors in particular, with 
Chris being cast as a formal threat to the CNC, 
Dan, "Chris and I must go to Weston, could one of us stay? " 
Jerry, "Can we choose?! " 
The threat presented by Chris was cited as his close infon-nal association with the 
formal management network. Since, to the CNC, Chris represented a part of 
management's channel of communication, the aggression directed towards Chris 
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overtly fell into the traditional them-and-us conflict category between the two 
formal networks involved in the collective bargaining forum, 
Darren, "There is a problem with a worker director because he 
appears to be supporting low cost units. We need to speak to the 
worker directors about them not supporting the trade union over the 
low cost units" 
Furthermore, within this framework there were, obviously, only two possible 
positions one could occupy - 'with us' or 'against us' - and Chris had been placed 
with the opposing management network, 
Mike, "I don't believe, Chris, the maths he's communicating to you 
and you must be careful in communicating management maths to 
us 
" 
Once this repositioning of Chris had happened, the possibilities of acceptance by 
the CNC diminished because the boundaries were imposed so absolutely. In 
effect, the CNC were involved in the scapegoating of a non-CNC member and 
therefore in placing the blame for the CNC's negotiating problems outside of the 
CNC's own sphere of responsibility. Scapegoating of a non-CNC member was 
also a safer option than intemalising the conflict since to remove a worker director 
was relatively easy and non-confrontational. The worker directors were not 
formally part of the negotiations process and were only involved at the invitation 
of the CNC. To blame a worker director therefore externalised the tensions and 
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created a common enemy, and therefore a commonality of experience for the 
group thus helping to bolster its sense of unity. 
The CNC obviously believed that the involvement of the worker directors, and 
their direct, informal and non-CNC contacts with management, was letting 
management intrude into the union's closed meetings, 
Mike, "You're a messenger for management" 
Chris, "I disagree with thafl! " 
Mark, "Stop this personal slagging offl" 
Mike, "I wasn't! " 
However, while the dissonance expressed towards Chris was on one level a simple 
scapegoating exercise, designed to increase CNC solidarity, it also possessed 
strong aspects of internal conflict and was underlain by the conflicts associated 
with the CNC's internal divisions. The network form and practices of the CNC, 
with its inherent divisions and overt recognition of the tensions between the power 
centres, 20 allowed some branches to employ the identity dissonance they were 
experiencing as a group in the pursuit of their own sectional interests. Restricted 
and bounded as the subgroups were by the CNC's fonnal practices and unable to 
" Through the standardised and codified use of a rotating Chair and Vice Chair and 
the ruling that no one branch could occupy both positions at once. 
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accrue any dominance of the group through the formal network, an alternative 
route to dominance was to be found via the infon-nal authority structures within the 
company, principally those associated with the ESOP. The formal ESOP 
structures, EBTI and EBTII, while providing information for the CNC did not 
provide their office holders with any great amount of influence within the CNC 
itself, as the CNC had repeatedly rejected the use of the formal ESOP structures 
within the formal collective bargaining sphere. However, the hub of the informal 
BusCo network, with influence in both management and union formal networks 
and over the collective bargaining process itself, was the worker directors who 
could and had exercised dominance over the CNC's actions and collective identity. 
The possession of informal authority was therefore the key to assembling 
dominance within the formal CNC network, and this infort-nal authority could be 
gained by stepping into a central position within the infon-nal network. 
Significantly, the platform staff worker directors served a three year term of office, 
selected and elected by the CNC. However, their dates for reselection were 
staggered, with Dan's reselection not due for a further two years, whereas Chris's 
reselection was imminent, occurring in June. Chris was therefore the natural target 
for a CNC subgroup eager to accrue dominance within the network. While a CNC 
member was required to resign their formal position if they were elected as worker 
director, the informal authority within the collective bargaining process that the 
post would bring could significantly advantage the agenda and goals of the branch 
to which they belonged. Therefore, while the CNC regional tensions were 
internally generated, their expression was also externally focussed. In particular, it 
manifested itself as overt conflict between the dominant City representatives, Wilf 
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and Mike, and the worker director, Chris, who was based at Easton and therefore 
had no regional support from City, 
Wilf, "I strongly object to this committee being described as 
negative! " 
Chris, "I didn't! " 
Wilf, "I strongly object to this committee being described as 
negative! " 
City's overt attacks on Chris were recognised by the CNC as deriving from an 
alternative agenda. Wilf s desire for the worker director post was recognised not 
only by the worker directors themselves, but also by CNC members from City and 
its rivals, 
Chris, "Wilf is trying to discredit me in front of the CNC and 
improve his chances of election. He wants the post for the money 
only" 
* 
Ron, "Mike and Wilf are getting at Chris because the worker 
director elections are coming up" 
* 
Alf, "City want a City worker director so they can dominate 
decision-making" 
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* 
Dan, "Wilf is after the worker director post, the election is in two 
to three months and the procedure starts at the next CNC" 
In the forthcoming worker director elections, Weston and Easton were certain 
backers of Chris and could be relied on to vote for an Easton worker director over 
a City candidate. The City representatives on the other hand were definitely going 
to back Wilf's election campaign in preference to a candidate from Easton or 
Weston. Numerically, this equally divided the group and left the CNC in limbo, 
therefore the crucial and casting vote came from the one remaining Branch, 
Southton. While the allegiance of the Southton voting representative was not as 
determined as the City, Weston and Easton members, their location on the outskirts 
of the City region meant that they tended to follow the lead of their larger 
neighbour. Despite intensive lobbying from Weston, Easton and from Dan in 
support of Chris's campaign, when the time came to vote Southton voted with City 
and Chris was deselected in favour of Wilf. 
7.4 Negotiations Deadlock 
The regional splits within the CNC were therefore coalescing into two competing 
subgroups, with the conflicts between the two seriously threatening the unity of 
the CNC. The strain produced by the dissonance in the collective bargaining 
forum was creating powerful centripedal forces within the CNC, focusing the 
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tensions inwards. These tensions were then following existing lines of weakness 
within the network and re-activating inherent conflicts within the group, 
Mark, "This meeting on this side, this on the other" 
Consequently, the CNC's negotiating tactics and collective identity were in 
disarray and the CNC's structure was in danger of unravelling if the group failed to 
resolve their internal dissonance. As the final stages of the negotiations 
approached, the CNC could not pull their network structure together in order to 
reach a consensus. This resulted in an inability to decide on which identity 
framework to adopt, 
Mark, "Which way are we going then? We still have nothing 
concrete" 
Without a unified identity, the group was so tied up in defensive and internally 
antagonistic efforts that they could not operate externally. As such, the CNC was 
not in a position to be able to make or take any lasting decisions on how to 
approach or progress with the negotiations, 
Alf, "At the moment we're lost" 
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8. The Search for Identity Stability 
While the regional basis for conflicts over the collective identity of the CNC 
achieved greater significance as the negotiations progressed, from within the CNC 
there was also a clear recognition of the centripetal forces at work. The weariness 
of the CNC with constantly revisiting identity convergence only to follow this with 
returns to identity divergence was clearly telling on the network and the longer the 
negotiations and identity dissonance remained unresolved, the stronger the feeling 
became that the CNC were caught in an endless loop - that they were "going round 
in circles" (Alo. This was coupled with an increasing desire to resolve the identity 
dissonance experienced by the network by reaching a final decision (which would 
then indicate which identity framework was dominant within the group) and 
concluding the negotiations. The dominant desire within the CNC to attain identity 
stability consequently aided in moving the negotiations closer to an agreement. 
However, the union group's desire for a decision on identity stability was also 
obstructed by the reawakened and established regionally based conflicts within the 
CNC formal network. 
Despite the internal conflicts and hostility, the informal influence of the worker 
directors over the CNC remained strong and it appeared that their influence with 
management was also beginning to tell. Nevertheless, identity stability was not 
easily attained. By early May, the worker directors had succeeded in brokering a 
meeting between the five branch Chairs and the Operations Director. This behind 
the scenes informal influence resulted in the worker directors' proposal once more 
being put to the collective bargaining process for serious consideration. 
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Management's comments that their suggestions were in line with CNC 
expectations indicated and illustrated the re-establishment of a common framework 
of understanding for the negotiations. The worker directors had therefore managed 
to broker the necessary element for the negotiations to break out of their 
deadlocked state, a common framework of understanding within which the two 
formal groups could meet and discuss the progress of the negotiations. 
8.1 CNC Identity Convergence 
Consequently, the CNC were at a point in their search for a solution to the 
negotiations and in their search for identity stability where they were prepared to 
put aside their regional conflicts in order to facilitate unity and therefore an agreed 
path of action for the CNC, 
Darren, "Management's documents last time were very 
misleading. If you want to amend your original proposal fine, but 
we must stand up soon as a body to them. We fetch the money in, 
we're managing, they're doing deals with this, salting it away and 
so on. They're trying it on" 
Wilf, "And unity is strength and if one goes it alone it'll loose it 
and we'll all loose. You will win it at Weston but you can't win the 
dispute. Let's stay together ... lets get this straight and we've all 
got to sing the saine song" 
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Significantly, the CNC had now become supportive of and not hostile to the 
actions of the worker directors, indicating their desire for identity stability. There 
was widespread recognition of the worker directors' central role in promoting a 
new common understanding for the negotiations, and thus ultimately for identity 
stability for the CNC, by enabling them to approach a final agreement with 
management, 
Alf, "He's [Owen Jones] moved quite a bit, therefore someone's 
been hammering away at him" 
If the CNC had not accepted the use of the worker directors' informal network, 
then their only choice would have been identity divergence, since identity 
convergence under those conditions would have been impossible. In this 
alternative scenario, the CNC would have remained in dissonance with 
management and therefore could not have understood or been aware of 
managementis intentions. Therefore, the CNC would not have been able to 
incorporate management's goals into a holistic agreement. In accepting the 
worker directors' influence and negotiations proposal, the dominant trend within 
the CNC was therefore to agree on a unity of identity within the new ESOP-led 
identity. 
However, identity stability was not readily accomplished. The solution of 
informally brokering an agreement between management and the branch Chairs 
presented one serious problem, the exclusion of the rest of the CNC from this 
decision-making process. In particular, Mike -a noticeably dominant, leading and 
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vocal City member, but not a branch Chair - had not been party to these 
discussions. While the elite meeting of the branch Chairs with management had 
overcome the regional divisions between the branches through reaching this 
common agreement, it had also produced new tensions within the CNC based on 
unequal access to decision-making, 
Mike, "Is this a private conversation between Jerry and the 
Chairs? " 
With his exclusion from the recent cross-regional understanding, Mike was 
unaware of the resolution of the CNC's regional divisions and therefore had lost 
branch support for his unilateral actions. 21 Out of step with these developments, 
he was criticised for not being able to see beyond the regional divisions, 
Tim, "It's not just to do with City, Mike, there're other people as 
well" 
Mike therefore represented the alternative identity version of the CNC, one of 
established identity divergence, and was consequently operating within the 
established collective bargaining reality. His attacks on the branch Chairs were 
therefore aimed at breaking up the new cross-regional clique that had formed 
within the CNC network, and from which he was excluded. Consequently, the 
" Mike had taken unilateral action and had written a letter to the Board criticising the 
actions of Chris, and the introduction of low cost units, without the support of his branch, "Mike wrote it without branch ratification" (Saul). 
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information he received from EBTI was interpreted within a different framework 
of understanding to the other CNC members, 
Mike, "The wage bill reduction is another agenda, told to us in 
EBTI" 
Dan, "His [Owen Jones] agenda is to lower wages cost, if yours is 
to redistribute them you're miles apart! You're not in the same 
stadium, you're playing in different fields! I think there's a vast 
misunderstanding" 
Mike, "We're wavering and selling our conditions" 
Dan, "We're living in a world in a commercial industry. Your 
points are either fundamentally wrong or unacceptable" 
Faced once more with identity dissonance resulting from these vastly different 
interpretations of the collective bargaining situation, the CNC expressed its 
anxiety and agitation over its inability to move towards identity stability, 
Jerry, "We've been going round and round the arguments" 
* 
Mark, "We're all moving in different ways, we can't even agree 
between ourselves on what to say to them" 
* 
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Alf, "Round in circles again - it's upsetting" 
* 
Ron, "Why are we determined to go back and argue principles? 
Please don't go back again! " 
However, the majority of the CNC, including all the branch Chairs had agreed to 
support the worker directors' ESOP-led proposal and accordingly, identity 
divergence was now perceived as a regressive strategy, 
Alf, "If we go with Mike's proposal, it is steps backwards" 
Dan, "We're going round in circles. The CNC has two voices, one 
is Mike and the other is the others. We should vote on if' 
The CNC voted on whether it accepted the worker directors' version of the 
situation, and the motion was carried by a majority vote with only Mike voting 
against the proposal. However, with a number of significant abstentions - Darren, 
Stan, Saul and Ron - this vote did not therefore mean that only Mike supported 
this version of the group's collective identity. As the abstentions indicated, some 
CNC members remained silent in the debate and the voting, opting not to voice 
their opinions in this sphere. Having lost the vote, Mike was now unable to 
express his dissent in any formal manner within the group, and he opted instead 
for an alternative expression of protest and withdrew from the debate, sitting 
silently, scowling, throughout the remainder of the meeting, 
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Alf, "Mike's in a sulk! " 
Dan, "Mike - smile" 
8.2 Management Identity Divergence 
However, despite the common ground which the two formal networks apparently 
now occupied, remnants of the established negotiating patterns of interaction 
remained, 
Owen Jones, "I've given you hayl" 
While the negotiations had apparently reached a common framework of 
understanding, and some identity convergence was acceded by both formal 
networks, the language used by management indicated two notable management 
identity indicators. First, that management believed they had control over the 
allocation of resources within BusCo and were able to 'give' resources to the 
union. Therefore for management, the equal ownership of these resources under 
employee ownership did not come into play in these negotiations. This suggested 
their continued use of an established approach to collective bargaining. Secondly, 
it indicated that management conceptualised the negotiations as a quid pro quo 
arrangement, where the gain for one group was at the loss of resources to the other 
party. Therefore, while the overt approach to the negotiations by the formal 
networks apparently indicated that they had reached a common understanding 
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(and the associated identity convergence which facilitated this), the language used, 
especially by management, indicated otherwise. It suggested that management in 
particular did not understand the new collective bargaining framework and that 
their approach to the negotiations framework remained unaltered by the worker 
directors' informal influences. 
8.3 CNC Response 
From the CNC's point of view, the union group had opted for an identity 
convergence solution to the negotiations and had voted to accept management's 
latest document, with the proviso that the union and management could agree on 
an acceptable wording linking progression to the senior rate of pay for drivers 
with company performance. However, while the motion was carried by a majority 
vote, it was significant that of the three members who voted against the motion, 
Mike had now been joined by Wilf and Ron - all City representatives. This lack 
of unanimity proved not only to be a serious stumbling block for moving the 
negotiations out of deadlock, but at the same time exposed the weakness of the 
CNC in their ability to conclude the formal negotiations with management. 
With the return of the management team, Wilf, who had voted against the motion, 
began to negotiate unilaterally with management for open admission to the senior 
rate, a stance which ran counter to the CNC's ma ority decision on the matter, and i 
notably counter to the advice of the worker directors. This demonstration of 
unilateral action highlighted the fact that the CNC was principally a loose 
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association of regional chiefs, only negotiating together under duress. In this 
instance, the democratic decision of the CNC was negated by Wilf's actions 
within the formal negotiating forum, actions which the CNC could not oppose 
while management were still at the table, since that would expose their internal 
divisions and weakness. Consequently, management (as the worker directors had 
suggested) refused to accept Wilf s terms for progression to the senior rate and the 
negotiations once more stalled. 
With the negotiations once more in deadlock, the CNC voted not to continue to 
negotiate with management without an agreement on opening up progression to 
the senior rate of pay. Therefore, the CNC's identity stance had shifted from an 
acceptance of the worker directors' ESOP-led identity convergence, back into 
their established position of identity divergence. This movement in collective 
identity had been principally engineered by the City members of the CNC. 
However, the CNC's formal decision did not indicate unanimous support for this 
strategy, for while the vote had been carried by a City majority there had been a 
number of Weston and Easton abstentions. As Alf indicated once the formal CNC 
meeting had been dissolved, no one from Weston or Easton had voted for the 
proposal since "they couldn't be seen to do that due to politics". 
8.4 Worker Director Informal Influence 
While an agreement with management had therefore not been reached, the CNC 
were still seeking identity stability and so a final formal meeting with 
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management was arranged. However, even before the meeting began the regional 
divisions within the CNC were tangible, with the City representatives sitting at a 
separate table in the canteen to the rest of the CNC and worker directors. Once 
the CNC met formally, the Chair handed over leadership to Dan, who confidently 
predicted that an agreement would be quickly reached with management, 
Mark, "Right, will you lead Dan? " 
Dan, "Not lead, discuss. I've talked to individuals of the 
committee and then I spoke to Owen Jones the other day. I asked 
him to call the CNC today and present his document. The only 
change is wording about the senior rate of pay. He will present 
even though I think I know the wording in it" 
Since the last unsuccessful attempt to conclude the negotiations, the worker 
directors had therefore been involved in further informal meetings with both 
formal networks and were confident that they had once again secured a common 
framework of understanding within which the groups could reach an agreement. 
However, once management's offer arrived on the table it was clear that 
management's formal response did not indicate any change in their established 
approach as a result of worker director interventions, 
Saul, "May as well piss off now" 
Alf, "Why carry on? " 
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Dan, "I presume his document when he comes is different" 
Saul, "Got today's date on it - this is it" 
Dan, "Not the document I expected" 
Chris, "It's not the one we agreed. They tell us one thing and do 
another" 
Tim, "Not what you were hinting! " 
However, the worker directors remained confident of their informal influence over 
management's identity, 
Dan, "Can Chris and I be excused for five minutes please? " 
As a result of further worker director interventions with management, Dan 
reported that management were rewriting the document, 
Dan, "He's rewriting the document. We exchanged words - there 
was a misunderstanding of the agreement and he's rewriting it 
now, more in line with what we're expecting" 
The ability of the worker directors to manipulate and lead the collective 
bargaining framework did not however end with informal influence and was 
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carried over into the formal negotiations between management and CNC. Dan 
took the lead in the formal negotiations sphere and responded to management's 
negotiating procedure, 
Dan, "I thought you [management] were producing another 
document? " 
Owen Jones, "I want first to agree the wording with you" 
Dan, "Yes, that's the important bit" 
Owen Jones, "Therefore write it from June I" that ... " 
Dan, "That'll do" 
Yet, despite the formal interventions of the worker director, management anxieties 
over the objectives of the CNC persisted, highlighting the enduring dissonance 
between the two fonnal networks, 
Owen Jones, "What you're trying to do - so far you've got me to agree 
to ... " 
Jerry, "Are you saying that new starters are no saving? Owen, 
you're missing the point" 
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Owen Jones, "I must be, I haven't offered that! " 
Jerry, "I believe you have! " 
Owen Jones, "I have not! Maybe you're being thick" 
Jerry, "It is late in the aflemoon, but !" 
With no agreement yet in sight, once management -had retired from the formal 
negotiations the frustrations and divisions within the CNC surfaced. Mike again 
disputed the basis of the document that the CNC were negotiating. These 
obstacles in the path of the CNC's movement towards identity stability resurrected 
the identity anxieties within the group, 
Alf, "Groundhog Day 22 _ we're there! We must be crackers, we 
must bring this to a conclusion and I don't want to go round, go 
there again. Chair, get a grip of the meeting and sort it! " 
Darren, "Fhe difference with Alf's film is the bloke in it learnt 
something and we haven't! " 
" Groundhog Day was a US film released in 1994 wfýich told the story of a cynical 
and jaded newspaper weather reporter (Bill Murray) sent to a small town to report on 
the annual appearance of the eponymous groundhog. The actions of the groundhog 
on its appearance were used by the townsfolk to foretell the weather for the 
forthcoming year. In the film, the reporter spends one day in the town, files his piece 
and retires to his hotel room, only to wake the next morning to discover that he is 
reliving the same day. This one day repeats itself continually, that is, until the 
reporter becomes tired of the same activities, changes his behaviour and becomes a 
'reformed' character - only then does the repetition cease and he is free to leave. 
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To resolve the endless rounds of static arguments within the group, Wilf took 
control of the meeting and suggested a vote on the new wording on progression to 
the senior rate of pay, where progression was linked to company performance. 
This time, the worker directors' proposal was carried by majority vote, with some 
of the City and Southton representatives, Tony, Mike and Tim voting against it. 
The CNC had therefore voted to accept a final document, one brokered and 
negotiated through the strong informal influence of the worker directors. 
However, while the lack of unanimity in the vote indicated that the regional 
divisions within the CNC remained conspicuous, the majority vote meant that 
these regional splits had been overruled by the majority in preference for the 
option of a formal agreement. Thus, the CNC had voted for a stable identity 
within the ESOP-led framework of identity convergence. 
8.5 Consequences for the Negotiations 
At the next meeting of the CNC a week later, these regional splits within the CNC 
had become hardened and well established. Mike, as representative of the 
divergent collective identity, argued that the situation that the worker director 
brokered document presented the membership with was worse than the situation 
that the CNC had started with. Both City and Southton representatives were now 
unanimously supporting Mike and looked to him for their voting pattern, waiting 
to see whether his hand was raised before voting themselves. All of the City and 
Southton CNC members voted against accepting management's offer, while all of 
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Weston and Easton voted for the offer. The Chair therefore had to use his casting 
vote, which he cast with the Weston/Easton cohort, and the (worker director 
brokered) agreement was ratified. It was also decided, as a consolation to City, 
that they were free to negotiate their own deal on the minutiae of the agreement. 23 
The TGWU membership at BusCo were balloted on this final agreement. 
However, the identity dissonance that was apparent in the penultimate meeting 
(where the decision was not unanimous) continued, with the City and Southton 
members of the CNC campaigning to get the agreement rejected by the 
membership even though officially the CNC were supporting the document. City 
and Southton were therefore acting unilaterally and unofficially in campaigning 
for the membership to reject the agreement, while management and the CNC 
together sent out letters to the work force "on BusCo paper - not even T&G! " 
(Mike), advising the workforce to accept the offer. 
Ultimately, the membership rejected the agreement -a result that was especially 
strong in City. Following this rejection, the CNC went on to ballot the 
membership on whether they were prepared to strike over the agreement. This 
ballot result was very close but was "narrowly defeated" (Mike), and therefore by 
default the worker directors' proposal was accepted. 
However, the reservations explicitly expressed by the City and Southton members 
over the alterations in CNC identity that this agreement indicated were mirrored 
by some in the management cohort. Not all of BusCo senior management were in 
" On the non-demarcation of drivers and on overtime pay at City. 
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agreement with the final offer and the alterations in management identity that it 
entailed, and reportedly felt that the management negotiating team had "dropped a 
bollock7 (Chris) and that they wouldn't realise the savings expected from the 
agreement. 
While the influence of employee ownership, operating through the worker 
directors' informal network, had been a major factor in the establishment of the 
new negotiating framework, the divisions within the CNC had proved resistant to 
even these efforts to create a unitarist and harmonious collective identity for the 
CNC and collective bargaining framework. The regional divisions that remained 
within the CNC were reinforced in their collective consciousness by this series of 
negotiations and especially by its particularly divisive conclusion. While the 
ESOP-led identity ended up as the dominant identity, this was not a unanimous 
identity for either the CNC, their membership, or for BusCo's management, and 
therefore could not be a stable identity for either the CNC or the company. 
8.6 Epilogue 
Identity dissonance was therefore a permanent factor of both the CNC network 
and the collective bargaining sphere at BusCo. 
Two years after these negotiations were concluded, the BusCo ESOP ceased to 
exist. The company and its employee-owners voted to accept a takeover offer 
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from FirstBus. 24 While the sale of the ESOP generated large windfall payments 
for its employee-owners, this occurred against the wishes and campaigning of the 
worker directors, especially Dan - who resigned from his post and withdrew from 
any further involvement in the running of the company. While FirstBus continued 
to operate a small scale and minority ESOP, given the insignificant ownership 
rights it conve I yed to the employees 25 and the lack of stability and hold that the 
ESOP-led identity had on the organisation, the CNC or its union membership, it 
was unsurprising that with the sale of the company, the ESOP identity was also 
erased. 
" FirstBus (now FirstGroup) had held 20% of BusCo shares at the time of these 
negotiations, in return for a massive cash injection into the company. " Around 3% employee ownerslýiip within a much larger, national company. 
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Chapter Seven 
Comparative Analysis 
1. Introduction 
The case studies chosen for this research were selected for their similarities and 
also importantly for their dissimilarities. The contrasting features of the two 
ESOPs selected therefore permitted a comparative analysis of the influence and 
effects of employee ownership and control under different circumstances and on 
different network forms and patterns. Any generalisable and constant effect of 
employee ownership and control across different environments should therefore 
become apparent through this comparative analysis. 
1.1 Employee Ownership and Control 
Both NurseryCo and BusCo had been bought by their employees using the 
statutory ESOP mechanism. However, given their difference in size, network 
structures, and in environment, the two ESOPs operated in very different ways. 
The NurseryCo ESOP was often referred to by its members as 'the cooperative', 
and legislation permitting, was largely run along those lines - with direct 
participation formally promoted when possible. The BusCo ESOP on the other 
hand was a much more formalised affair - in line with the more formalised 
relations and culture in evidence within the organisation. 
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Forms of employee control therefore differed between the case studies, with the 
form of employee participation being largely determined by workforce size. 
While at NurseryCo, the small number of employees permitted direct and 
individualised employee participation, the much larger workforce at BusCo meant 
that collective and representative participation was practised, both via the trade 
unions and via the election of the worker directors. 
Apart from employee control, levels of employee ownership were also dissimilar. 
While both ESOPs had been established as 100% crnployce-owned organisations, 
their development and growth had altered this ratio considerably. Of NurseryCo's 
seven employees (six full-time and one part-time), only three, i. e. less than half, 
were employee owners, giving a degree of employee ownership at NurseryCo of 
only 43% of the total workplace network. At BusCo, however, employee 
ownership, while no longer 100%, still stood at 80%, still a controlling 
percentage. The different ownership routes that the two ESOP had taken also had 
implications for the proportions of the workforces who had no ownership rights 
within the organisations. NurseryCo obviously had a majority of workers, 4 of the 
total of 7, who were not employee-owners. In contrast, at BusCo, while employee 
ownership stood at only 80%, all of the BusCo employees were still employee 
owners. The only non-owners were the employees of the subsidiary companies. 
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2. Network Context 
2.1 Context Similarities 
A commonality between the two cases was their enforced propulsion into 
employee ownership and control. Neither were ideologically propelled employee 
buy-outs, but conversions brought about as pragmatic responses to a changing 
environment. In both instances, the organisations used employee ownership and 
control not as a mechanism to achieve change, but as vehicles which would 
protect the established status quo within the employee body. For NurseryCo, the 
rationale had been to protect the atmosphere of harmony that the employee group 
had built up within the workplace. BusCo on the other hand used the ESOP 
mechanism to protect jobs, pay and conditions and importantly the formalised 
conflictual relations within the organisation. Thus, the ESOP protected the 
established power spheres of the two most influential networks within the 
company, the union and the management blocks - and the formal relationship 
between these two networks. In this way, employee ownership and control was 
chosen by these organisations as a means to prevent change from occurring within 
the workplace networks, therefore any change that did occur as a result of the 
conversions was unanticipated. 
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2.2 Context Dissimilarities 
However, the similarities between these two ESOPs extended no further. The 
network that was worth protecting at NurscryCo was the informal network of 
equalised and harmonious relations between the employees. The ESOP had been 
used to prevent any externally imposed members from disrupting the condition of 
the informal network or members' control over the status quo within the network. 
In contrast, the BusCo employee buy-out was intended to protect the formal 
workplace networks and most importantly to prevent change from occurring in the 
established relationships between the networks. In this respect, employee 
ownership and control was used to protect the status quo and collective identities 
of very different network forms. 
In addition, the external environments and histories of the networks differed 
greatly. While the BusCo networks were situated within a larger macro-economic 
enviromnent of established and adversarial relations between capital and labour, 
NurseryCo had no such external or macro associations. The BusCo networks 
therefore had an established history of oppositional bargaining both between the 
immediate management and union networks and between their national 
representative bodies and political parties. NurseryCo, on the other hand, had no 
such formalised and established adversarial relations. For the NurseryCo network 
members, their external social influences were more informally and locally 
generated and centred on family and friendship networks. This external 
environment was common for other, conventionally owned nurseries in this 
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industry also -a traditionally un-unionised and unorganised sector, with no 
formalised cross-cutting relationships between different establishments nationally. 
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3. Network Form and Pattern 
3.1 Social Networks 
The consequences and advantages of using a social network based methodology 
for the study of attitude and identity changes in employee-owned and controlled 
organisations have been considerable. The particular methodology used for this 
thesis has permitted the uncovering of complex and contextual motivations within 
networks of vastly differing sizes and structures. It has also permitted the 
examination of hidden areas of conflict and tension, through the examination of 
collective identities. 
The two case study networks examined differed vastly in terms of network size, 
form and pattern. Whereas the NurseryCo social network was composed of a 
small homogenous group with one principal collective identity for the 
organisation, the industrial relations framework at BusCo was made up of three 
distinct collective identities and three very different social networks. 
Nursery Co 
NurseryCo comprised two workplace network forms, however both networks 
contained the same personnel and therefore there was a complete network overlap 
within the ESOP. The first network used within the organisation was the formal 
network associated with employment contract and job titles. This network was 
formal in that the positions were held separately from those who occupied them - 
this was in turn dictated by legislation, where a certain number of trained staff 
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were required per group of children. The legislation also required a hierarchical 
job structure, specifying the need for an Officer-in-Charge, a Deputy Officer-in- 
Charge and so on. This explicit and predetermined structure created a 
concentrated interaction network pattern within the fonnal network, which 
provided its members with static and relative levels of status. 
The second network form within the NurseryCo ESOP was the workplace 
informal network. While the membership of the informal network was identical 
to the membership of the formal, the network pattern differed significantly. The 
informal network was made up of voluntary, friendship connections between the 
women and exhibited a more dispersed interaction pattern which included a 
number of clear and cohesive subgroups. However, it also created more explicitly 
peripheral positions. Whereas the formal and concentrated interaction network at 
NurseryCo demonstrated a significant number of poorly connected members at the 
bottom of the network hierarchy, the informal network provided the opposite 
structure, with a large number of well connected individuals and groups and a 
small number of isolates. These isolates were therefore relatively more 
disadvantaged, and separated from the rest of the network as a result of the 
peripheral position within the informal network. 
BusCo 
BusCo also possessed both formal and informal networks, with a significant but 
not total overlap between memberships. Therefore, unlike NurseryCo, the 
network overlap at BusCo was incomplete. The industrial relations sphere was 
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comprised of two formal networks - management and CNC, however their 
network patterns differed greatly. 
While the management network exhibited a clearly concentrated interaction 
pattern, based on a job hierarchy within the organisation which centred on the 
leadership of the Operations Director, Owen Jones, the union network 
demonstrated a clearly dispersed interaction pattern. The CNC formal network 
exhibited a number of competing and equally influential leadership positions 
based on the TGWU Branch composition of the union negotiating team. 
The informal network at BusCo was explicitly linked to the ESOP, having at its 
hub the two platform staff Worker Directors. However, unlike NurseryCo, the 
BusCo infonnal network displayed a concentrated interaction pattern, with a 
concentration of informal communications on the central figures of Dan and 
Chris. 
3.2 Influence of Employee Ownership and Control on Network Pattern 
Dispersed Interaction Network Incidence and Influence 
As authority based on ownership and control of resources in an employee-owned 
and controlled organisation is equally distributed among the employee-owners, it 
was hypothesised that employee-owned and controlled firms would exhibit a 
higher tendency towards dispersed interaction network patterns (formal and 
informal). The findings support this assumption and indicate that dispersed 
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interaction networks are common and influential elements in the two case studies. 
While the NurseryCo formal work network was by legal necessity a hierarchical, 
concentrated interaction network, its infonnal, ESOP-identity network displayed 
more dispersed influence tendencies. However, while this informal network 
possessed a number of leadership positions, it also demonstrated notable 
isolationist network tendencies and thus the dispersal of influence was not evenly 
spread. At BusCo, the formal CNC network was characterised by a dispersed 
interaction pattern and also demonstrated a number of leadership positions, but 
with a more evenly balanced distribution of influence throughout the network. 
However, while both ESOPs demonstrated important organisational influence for 
their dispersed interaction networks, these networks were not necessarily 
associated with employee ownership and control. While at NurseryCo, the 
dispersed interaction network was directly associated with the ethos of the ESOP 
and its friendship connections, this was not replicated at BusCo. At BusCo, the 
organisational networks associated with the ESOP displayed both concentrated 
and dispersed interaction patterns, and in this case employee ownership and 
control was not a significant factor in predicting network pattern. While the 
management negotiating team comprised a concentrated (and formal) network 
pattern, the ESOP-led network of the Worker Directors also demonstrated a 
concentrated interaction structure, where informal communications were 
disproportionately concentrated at the centre of the network. This centralisation 
of influence was the primary cause of the City Branch's desire to place a City 
representative in one of the central, influential, Worker Director positions. The 
dispersed interaction network observed at BusCo was the formal union (CNC) 
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network, comprised of its equally powerful and competing Branch subgroups -a 
network which pre-dated the ESOP. 
The two case studies do not therefore suggest a causal link between employee 
ownership and control and the equitable distribution of influence within 
workplace networks (i. e. between ESOPs and dispersed interaction networks). 
3.3 Influence of Employee Ownership and Control on Network Form 
Informal Network Incidence and Influence 
However, the case study organisations did demonstrate a relatively high 
organisational influence for networks, of both patterns, which exhibited direct 
associations with employee ownership and control. This suggested that, while the 
assumed causal link between employee ownership and control and the equitable 
distribution of influence in organisations (i. e. the link between ESOPs and 
dispersed interaction networks) may be false, the association between ESOPs and 
ESOP-led network influence itself held true. 
While the role of the ESOPs in generating the influence and incidence of 
dispersed interaction networks has been largely discounted, the evidence points 
towards the effect of employee ownership and control on the influence and 
incidence of different network forms. The common factor linking both NurseryCo 
and BusCo's ESOP-led networks was their informal nature. Both informal 
networks also demonstrated considerable organisational influence. 
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The main forum for ESOP-associated discussions and the vessel for the ESOP- 
associated values and behaviours, at NurseryCo was the informal network. The 
influence of the informal network with conversion to employee ownership and 
control meant that the significantly influential informal network member, Fay, 
also held an influential position in organisational decision-making within the 
ESOP. The position was reversed for the isolated informal network member, 
June, even though she held a more formally influential position than Fay. While 
the three directors had invited June to become a member of the ESOP, June's 
peripheral informal network position was reflected in her indifference to the 
ESOP and lack of interest in membership thereof, whereas Fay was enthusiastic 
about the promise of an invitation to become an employee-owner. 
The BusCo network situation again differed to that at NurseryCo, in that the 
ESOP-identity-holding network was the Worker Directors' informal network of 
contacts within the industrial relations sphere. Despite the formation of formal 
networks associated with formal ESOP roles - EBTI and EBTII - the established 
formal networks had largely emaciated these structures and co-opted them into 
their established identity frameworks. Only the Worker Directors' informal 
network that had developed as a direct result of the employee buy-out therefore 
held the independent ESOP-identity. Since this informal network was a 
concentrated interaction network, the influence of its leadership - the platform 
staff Worker Directors, Dan and Chris - was significant. This significant level of 
influence within the network created the opportunity to influence the formal 
negotiating networks with which the informal network overlapped and thus 
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extended the authority of the Worker Directors into the collective bargaining 
sphere. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The evidence therefore implies an increased level and influence of informal 
network forms in the employee-owned and controlled organisations studied. Since 
it was the informal networks that held a significant portion of the influence within 
these organisations, the ESOPs therefore demonstrated considerable authority 
vested in their alternative authority structures. Consequently, socially derived 
influence had risen in importance within these employee buy-outs. Therefore, the 
assumed increase in importance of alternative, socially derived sources of 
influence may hold true in employee-owned and controlled organisations, not via 
dispersed interaction networks but via an alternative mechanism and network 
form. 
The overlaps between formal and informal networks meant that employee 
ownership and control had therefore resulted in more communications and flow of 
information throughout the organisations. Due to the influential organisational 
roles of the informal networks, communications and information flow were not 
restricted to the formal networks - either established or ESOP-associated. This 
was despite the preservation in both case studies of the formal management and 
control structures. The improvement in communications had therefore increased 
the influence of employees as a followership within the organisational networks 
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since they were now better informed and connected with the central hubs of 
authority within the ESOPs. 
While communications within the organisations studied had been improved 
through employee ownership and control, this had not occurred in any formalised 
or codified way. Therefore, the preservation of the communications and 
information benefits to employees of employee ownership and control were not 
formalised since they were held within the informal organisational networks. 
Moreover, the nature of the informal network means that it is susceptible to 
alteration and change - the positions which were necessary to facilitate the flow of 
information and communication within the ESOPs were not independent of the 
office holders and were therefore fragile. The fragility of the situation was 
demonstrated by the BusCo Worker Director succession conflict. 
The ESOPs examined therefore experienced significant influence of employee 
ownership and control on their network forms and patterns. While both exhibited 
influential dispersed interaction networks, this network pattern could not be 
attributed to the influence of employee ownership and control. Therefore the 
more equal distribution of ownership and control through the ESOP mechanism 
had not influenced the incidence of networks which themselves exhibited a more 
even distribution of network influence. 
However, the influential positions of the workplace informal networks in both 
ESOPs was attributed to the alternative distribution of ownership and control. 
The influence of informal networks had improved communications within the 
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organisations, but not in any formal or codified manner. Moreover, the improved 
communications had not resulted, as the literature suggested, in improved 
organisational hannony. 
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4. Networked Conflict 
However, in both cases, the end result of conversion to employee ownership and 
control had been less predictable than either network memberships had 
anticipated. Far from protecting the status quo within the organisations and their 
networked relations, the advent of employee ownership and control had resulted in 
significant changes. However, while the changes anticipated by the memberships 
had been towards a harmonisation of the working envirorunent and relations, the 
outcome of employee ownership and control was proving far more conflictual. 
Consequently in both case study ESOPs, despite the claims for harmony, conflicts 
produced by employee ownership and control were apparent. In this respect, there 
was a commonality of experience between the two case sites. However, the form 
and function of the conflicts associated with employee ownership and control 
were quite different - and resulted in large part from the different networks' 
forms, patterns, contexts and collective identities. While both organisations 
experienced conflict as a result of conversion to employee ownership and control 
through the ESOP mechanism, their workplace networks, ESOP-related networks 
and therefore their networked conflict expressions differed significantly. 
While the types of tension most evident at NurseryCo were the covert and 
suppressed conflicts played out between the members, the tensions evident at 
BusCo were principally of the overt and direct types. These differences can 
largely be accounted for by the different network structures apparent in the two 
case study organisations. 
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4.1 Conflict and Network Form 
The conversion to employee ownership and control had resulted in increased 
centrality for workers in both the organisations' influence structures, both formal 
and informal. There was therefore a less immediate equation of organisational 
leadership with company management and a greater association of leadership with 
employees and their representatives. 
BUSCO 
Conflict became apparent at BusCo as a direct result of this increased centrality of 
workers in organisational. leadership roles. When the employee representatives, as 
part of their ESOP roles, became co-opted into the management and running of 
the organisation, although they were not a part of the formal management 
network, conflict within the rest of the organisation resulted. Essentially, as a 
result of the creation of organisational worker-leaders, conflict was relocated 
down organisational tiers at BusCo, and this applied to both workers and to 
management. In effect, shopfloor workers and their immediate management had 
become peripheralised and relatively more isolated by the co-option of the 
employee leaders into the leadership of the company. In this instance, the conflict 
resulted from changes to the influence structures in the organisation's formal 
networks, with the union representatives perceived as having 'gone over' to 
management by their constituents, while middle management also felt 
peripheralised by the introduction of the worker directors into the formal company 
management structure, with their attendance at management meetings at all levels. 
Therefore, while conflict between the formal networks of employees and 
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management would be the expected principal form of conflict observed in 
organisations with formalised industrial relations structures and relations, at 
BusCo, as a result of the changes that conversion to employee ownership and 
control had wrought on the organisational. leadership structures, alternative 
conflicts within these formal networks were also found. Consequently, within the 
formal employee network, conflict was apparent between members with differing 
network positions and influence. Tensions were also evident within the formal 
management network, for the same reasons. 
NurseryCo 
At NurseryCo, the centrality of employee leaders also resulted in conflicts through 
the peripheralisation of organisational members. While the ESOP had succeeded 
in maintaining the appearance of harmony, it had not succeeded in creating a 
robust, harmonious workplace network. Conflict between the staff was apparent 
at all positions and levels within the organisation. In this situation, conflict had 
been transposed onto peripheral members of the informal network, principally 
June. Since the formal network leaders had involved centralised members of the 
informal network in the management and leadership of the organisation, the 
tensions between formal network influence and informal network isolation were 
reinforced. 
As the ESOP had not been intended to create any new forms of relationship 
between the members but to protect the type of relationships that had existed prior 
to the conversion, then the ESOP could be said to have been a success in 
achieving this static purpose. However, in protecting the existing network 
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relations among the employees, employee ownership had brought to the fore the 
importance of the informal network at NurseryCo, and consequently the fragilities 
in this network were being over-exposed. The increased emphasis with employee 
ownership on the informal network meant that the long-term purpose of the 
ESOP, the maintenance of a harmonious working environment, was being 
undermined by the very structure that was intended to protect it. 
The ideology of hannony that was directly responsible for the establishment of the 
ESOP, had created new levels and types of conflict within the group. More 
importantly, this ideology precluded these tensions from being aired openly and 
thus resolved. Instead, the protection of the collective identity of the ESOP-led 
informal NurseryCo network called for conflicts to be essentially covert, indirect 
and therefore largely unresolvable. Consequently, the ESOP was in danger of 
engineering its own failure. 
Therefore, incidence of network form, formal and informal, influences the types 
of conflict found in organisations. While the formal network may be more 
influential in a conventionally owned and organised firm, in the employee-owned 
and controlled firms studied, the inforinal networks possessed high degrees of 
organisational influence as a direct result of conversion to ESOP form. 
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4.2 Conflict and Network Pattern 
In the case studies, the increased influence of the informal networks, as a 
consequence of conversion into ESOPs, meant that conflict between employees 
had become more prominently a product of social network forces. However, this 
situation differed between the two organisations. While the literature suggested 
that it was principally within highly centralised networks that a reduction in group 
harmony would occur - through the isolation of peripheral members or the 
trapping of information within a clique - however contrary to expectations, 
conflict was apparent in both dispersed interaction networks examined. 
BusCo 
The network structure of the CNC's dispersed interaction network at BusCo was 
the principal source of its conflict expressions. The equally distributed influence 
between the leadership of the various TGWU Branches that made up the network 
produced internecine conflicts within the CNC. These conflicts arose directly 
from the power struggles between the Branches for control of influence and 
identity within the union group. While the new ESOP-led identity became 
incorporated into these conflicts, it was the actual pattern of the network that 
produced the internal tensions associated with identity conflicts within the group. 
The principal axis of conflict within the CNC was between the City and the 
Weston Branches. This main schism also incorporated the other Branches, with 
Southton aligning itself with City and the others with Weston. In this respect, the 
balance of influence between the leaderships was maintained - influence was at 
all times equalised within the CNC dispersed interaction network. However, the 
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incorporation of the ESOP representatives, the Worker Directors, into the 
negotiations framework had seemingly unbalanced the formal CNC network 
pattern since both Worker Directors were members of non-City TGWU Branches. 
Dan was a member of the Weston Branch and Chris a member of the Easton 
Branch. In an effort to maintain the equalisation of influence within the network 
pattern of the CNC, the City Branch effectively removed the Easton Worker 
Director and replaced him with a representative from the City Branch. Thus the 
conflict-generation produced by the equalisation of influence within the CNC 
network was maintained and protected by the network itself. Therefore, the 
trapping of influence within equally balanced cliques was the basis for the type of 
conflict expression observed within the CNC. 
NurseryCo 
In the NurseryCo dispersed influence network, the existence of numerous 
subgroups, and principally the existence of isolates, created new tensions 
associated with the influence of the informal dispersed network in the leadership 
of the organisation. 
The pattern of the dispersed interaction network included a number of leadership 
positions associated with various subgroups of equalised informal influence. 
However, unlike BusCo, the conflicts observed at NurseryCo were not between 
the equally balanced leaderships and subgroups, but between core leadership 
positions and network isolates. As a result of her peripheral informal network 
position, June experienced a relative lack of network support that made her the 
easiest target for the expression of network tensions. The equalisation of 
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influence between the dispersed interaction network leaderships meant that June's 
one connection - to Gill, one of the subgroup members and leader of the formal 
network - was useless in protecting her from the conflicts generated by her 
dispersed network peripheral position. Within the dispersed interaction network, 
Gill possessed influence equal to many other members and therefore not sufficient 
to change the conflict expression form without running the risk of creating 
conflicts between the subgroups. Therefore at NurseryCo, the incidence of 
conflict through the isolation of peripheral members was occurring within the 
dispersed interaction network and not within a concentrated interaction pattern as 
predicted by the literature. However, the more covert conflicts found in this type 
of dispersed interaction networks are less amenable to measurement and this may 
therefore account for their being overlooked by much of the literature. 
Consequently, while the literature suggests that if information flows unobstructed 
in all directions it is easier to dissipate tensions, the evidence from this research 
suggests that dispersed interaction networks experience as much conflict as 
concentrated interaction networks, although the conflict may be of a different 
type. 
4.3 Conflict and Network Context 
However, the large part of the network analysis literature contains no 
consideration of the context or wider social forces that may operate on the group 
and its means of expressing conflict. Yet, it was clear from the case studies that 
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the size of the organisation and its workforce influenced the type of conflict found 
in these firms. Principally, this resulted from the different network forms and 
patterns that had been established in the organisations. As NurseryCo was a small 
workforce, its networks (both formal and informal) were able to operate along 
direct contact lines between network members. However, the size of the BusCo 
workforce and its division between different occupations and locations meant that 
direct communication between all network members was an impossibility. 
Therefore, network communication at BusCo had developed along the lines of 
representative participation within and between the networks. In addition, the 
BusCo ESOP also possessed more than one of each form of network, its formal 
communications for example were divided between the management, union and 
ESOP formal networks, while NurseryCo exhibited only one formal and one 
infonnal network. 
These differences accounted for much of the difference in forms of conflict 
expression. While direct conflict expression was rare in NurseryCo, the small size 
and lack of diversity of its networks can account for this. Direct conflict 
expression under this network situation ran the risk of escalation into whole- 
network involvement and thus into entire network disharmony, which was counter 
to the ideology of the group. However, in the larger BusCo workforce with its 
formal divisions between networks, direct and overt conflict expression was the 
norm. Here, the organisational experience of established adversarial relations, 
coupled with the lack of direct informal relations between most of the parties 
involved in a conflict, facilitated this forin of conflict expression. The networks at 
BusCo, while also retaining an ideology of harmonisation, were aware from 
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experience that direct overt expressions of conflict would not involve whole- 
network conflicts - they were principally conflicts between networks not within 
them. However, these learned expressions of conflict also carried over into intra- 
network tensions, and direct overt conflict expression was used within the CNC 
itself 
4.4 Conflict and the Degeneration Thesis 
In the two case study ESOPs, the experience of both a continuation of established 
conflicts, and the generation of new conflicts as a direct result of conversion to 
employee ownership and control, would therefore appear to support the 
degeneration thesis presented in the literature. 
NursetyCo 
At NurseryCo, the rationale for the conversion to employee ownership and control 
had been the creation of a harmonious environment, however it was this very 
ideology itself that was threatening the success of the exercise by generating new 
conflicts within the group. 
BusCo 
The degeneration thesis appears to be supported by the BusCo ESOP's inability to 
act as a democracy of employee-owners. Yet the BusCo experience diverges from 
the class identification alterations predicted by the Webbs, in that those attitudes 
and identities that were influenced and altered by employee ownership and control 
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proved susceptible to reversal to established class identities. In the BusCo 
example, the ESOP had produced unanticipated changes within the workplace 
networks. The maintenance of the status quo between the two formal networks at 
BusCo had been challenged by the existence of employee ownership and control. 
The rise in importance of the organisational informal networks with the advent of 
the ESOP had impinged on, added to and threatened the formal relationships at 
BusCo. While the formal networks continued to exist and interact in a 
recognisable collective bargaining sphere, the employee buy-out could be said to 
have achieved its goal of protecting the status quo at BusCo. However, the 
purpose of the ESOP was also to protect the established spheres of influence 
between these formal networks and here the growth in authority of the informal 
network was threatening the authority of the formal networks. As a result of the 
conversion, the Worker Directors had attained positions of considerable informal 
influence within the collective bargaining sphere and had managed to alter the 
framework and identities within which the formal networks negotiated. The 
conversion to employee ownership and control had therefore brought with it new 
tensions and areas of conflict that were threatening the established status quo 
within the organisation. In this respect, and in common with the NurseryCo 
experience, the ESOP at BusCo was achieving the opposite results to those 
intended by both management and unions. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
From the evidence presented from the two case studies it is possible to conclude 
that employee ownership and control had produced conflict, both between 
employees and management and among the employee groups themselves. As a 
consequence of conversion to employee ownership and control, where formal and 
informal, concentrated and dispersed influence positions and networks overlapped 
in one organisation, conflict was the result. 
In both ESOPs studied, unanticipated conflicts were therefore directly associated 
with the conversion to employee ownership and control. Given the incidence and 
importance of alternative authority structures and the influence derived from 
alternative social forces in employee-owned and controlled flrms, the ESOPs had 
thus provided the scope for the unequal distribution of influence. This alternative 
distribution of influence within these organisations gave rise to conflicts based on 
socially derived status and membership of networks. 
Yet, conflict expression was notably different in the two ESOPs, with NurseryCo 
exhibiting more covert and suppressed conflict and BusCo more open and direct 
conflicts. The research therefore suggested that there was a link between network 
form, pattern and type of conflict experienced by the ESOPs. While both conflict 
experiences at NurseryCo and at BusCo were a product of the increased influence 
of the informal networks within the organisations as a result of the conversions to 
employee ownership and control, the different expressions of conflict were a 
result of the different network forms and patterns within the two ESOPs. 
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Employee ownership and control had therefore resulted in some employee attitude 
changes in the two organisations studied, but significantly not in the direction 
expected by theory. Rather than increasing harmony, an unanticipated 
consequence of conversion to employee ownership and control had been the 
increasing disharmony within the ESOPs. 
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5. Networked Collective Identities 
What was obvious from the observed conflicts at both NurseryCo and BusCo was 
that employee ownership and control had played a significant role in the 
generation of organisational conflicts. However, what has not been explored or 
answered so far is the process by which employee ownership and control had 
created organisational conflict. In both case studies, the dynamics of the 
relationship between the ESOP and conflict was found to be the existence, 
formation and influence of networked collective identities. At NurseryCo, the 
commonly held ideology of harmony was itself the genesis and perpetuator of 
many of the observed conflicts between network members. BusCo, on the other 
hand, possessed anumber of different collective identities - management, union, 
and ESOP. The tensions between and overlaps between these different networks 
and their collective identities were the principal origins of observed conflicts 
within the collective bargaining sphere at this organisation. 
5.1 Attitude Alterations 
While both ESOPs presented their employee buy-outs as resulting in a more 
harmonious working environment, this was achieved via different mechanisms. 
At NurseryCo, there was little evidence of attitude changes from within the 
network itself - the ESOP had therefore not impacted on the established identities 
of the network members. What the employee buy-out had achieved at NurseryCo 
was the removal of those elements that had been obstructing the perceived 
382 
harmonious environment - the harmonious relations between those members who 
remained within the network had apparently always existed. Therefore, employee 
ownership and control had apparently liberated the group to work together in 
harmony, a harmony that had previously been submerged under more hostile 
relations with the organisation's former owners and employers. 
At BusCo however, the employee buy-out was represented as the mechanism by 
which attitudinal. changes had been wrought. In this case, the previous formal 
network relations within the industrial relations structures had apparently been 
adversarial and acrimonious, yet employee ownership and control had seemingly 
reversed these relationships and resulted in a more harmonious industrial relations 
atmosphere within the organisation. In both ESOPs therefore, employee 
ownership and control was represented as the means by which harmony had been 
achieved. 
5.2 Attitude Changes with Employee Ownership and Control 
However, the means by which the ESOPs' workplace environments had been 
altered was different. NurseryCo claimed that the ESOP had liberated previously 
suppressed harmonious attitudes and tendencies among the network members, so 
that any claim for an attitude change associated with the employee buy-out was 
not made. However, BusCo did claim that the employee buy-out had altered the 
I 
attitudes and identities of the fonnal networks, towards a position where they 
possessed common goals and understandings. However, the identity alterations 
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claimed were contested from within the ESOP. While senior management 
maintained that harmony had been created by union attitude alterations, the ESOP 
representatives made claims for the alteration of both management and union 
attitudes. 
Therefore, employee ownership and control was claimed to have achieved 
harmonisation through two different means. In the first instance by removing the 
physical sources of conflict by altering the workplace network form and pattern. 
In the second case by altering the collective identities and attitudes of the 
networks without greatly influencing their formal fonns and patterns. 
Therefore, employee and management identities in the ESOPs examined were not 
as malleable as the literature suggests. This was due in part to the influence of 
socio-historical (collective memory) networks. It was also due to the rationales 
for the ESOPs, where both were established to protect the influence and identity 
status quo within the organisations and their networks. 
The reversal of the attitudinal influences of the ESOP at BusCo can be attributed 
to the socio-historical network memberships, both internal and external to the 
organisation. What employee ownership and control at BusCo could not achieve 
was the formation of its workplace network identities through organisational 
influence and changes alone. The claims for harmony had therefore ignored the 
macro-enviromment within which the BusCo ESOP was situated, and 
consequently the efforts at harmonisation had been flawed from the start. 
BusCo's macro-cnvironment remained a firmly capitalist economy and culture, 
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thus retaining the inherently adversarial relations between labour and capital. 
While conversion to employee ownership and control had removed the division 
between capital and labour at BusCo and created organisational networks 
populated by employee-owners, what it could not do was remove these employee 
owners from their macro-cultural environment and the identity formation forces 
that it exerted over BusCo's social networks. The creation of a single 
organisational ESOP and the changes to the ownership of production that it 
generated were insufficient alone to alter the wider enviromnent, characterised by 
conventionally owned and organised finns and thus by inherently adversarial 
relations between capital (and its representatives) and labour. As the identities of 
BusCo's workers and managers were also formed by this wider environment, the 
conflicts and identities established through these wider cultural memberships (e. g. 
the national labour movement) continued to exert an influence over relations 
within the ESOP. 
5.3 NurseryCo Collective Identity 
NurseryCo apparently matched the unitarist assumptions held in much of the 
employee-ownership literatures, from all perspectives, that employee ownership 
and control would result in employees representing both capital and labour and 
therefore in the homogenisation of organisational identity and thus in 
organisational harmony. At NurseryCo, the limited size of the workplace 
network, the limited differentiation between job roles and responsibilities, the 
implicit policy of local, female recruitment from within established social 
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networks, and the relatively homogenous occupational structure of the enterprise 
pennitted a unitarist organisational identity. The rationale for the employee buy- 
out had been to establish a unitarist collective identity by removing the alternative 
values and attitudes of the original owners and, furthennore, the policy of the 
ESOP was to maintain this homogeneity. For this reason, new recruits were 
carefully selected from members' established social networks, and consequently 
all staff lived locally, shared similar life situations and expectations and moreover 
they were all female. 
However, while the employee buy-out at NurseryCo had been successful in 
achieving this unitarism, the ensuing homogeneity of the workforce had not 
resulted in organisational harmony. In fact, the very success of homogeneity itself 
had created many of the tensions evident within the network. The collectively 
held belief among the NurseryCo members, that the removal of heterogeneous 
elements from the workplace network naturally resulted in organisational 
harmony, prevented the alternatively derived tensions that arose as a result of 
network form and pattern from being resolved. Consequently, these tensions were 
suppressed and indirect but remained a constant factor of network relations 
between the members. Therefore, the collective ideology of harmony that was the 
rationale for the NurseryCo ESOP was actually blocking communication within 
the network. While it permitted harmonious interactions between network 
members, it also disallowed direct conflictual interactions. This obstacle to 
communication was not therefore a product of the network's form or pattern but 
of its collective identity. 
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Collective identity thus imposes a boundary on the reach of problem-solving for a 
network. Understandings and meanings attributed to events and information by a 
network therefore operate by blocking certain possibilities for action. In the case 
of NurseryCo, this was to block the possibility of overt, direct conflict expression 
or resolution. 
5.4 BusCo Collective Identities 
The unitarist expectations of employee ownership and control were also apparent 
at BusCo. Management's expectations associated with harmonisation through 
employee ownership and control principally involved moving employee identities 
away from class-consciousness and towards individualised corporate 
identification. In this manner it was assumed that the employee body would 
become committed to achieving the profit maximisation goals of management. 
This economic rationale assumed a direct link between single-organisational 
ownership and control and employee identities, with the ESOP resulting in a 
unitarist organisation. However, this movement to unitarism was anticipated to be 
entirely along the lines of management's unaltered collective identity. 
However, management's expectations of employee ownership and control were 
not the only ones contained within the BusCo ESOP. The harmonisation 
expectations of workers, while not necessarily opposed to management's, were 
significantly different. Employees' expectations were for improved ease in 
securing control over terms, conditions and working enviromnents, in other 
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words, a more social rationale. Yet, while this harmonisation was also expected to 
result in a unitarist organisation, this was along the lines of an unaltered 
union/worker collective identity, with management's attitudes altering to 
accommodate those of the workers. 
Therefore at BusCo, both management and union expected harmonisation to occur 
with employee ownership and control, and both expected this to occur through a 
movement to organisational identity homogeneity. However, the management and 
union expectations of routes to harmonisation through employee ownership and 
control differed significantly. 
Furthermore, both management and union expectations of identity alterations were 
at variance with the assumptions of identity convergence held by the ESOP 
representatives, the Worker Directors. This ESOP-led rationale, while also 
resulting in a unitarist organisation, was to be achieved through the creation of an 
entirely new organisation-wide identity. While the ESOP-led organisational 
identity also forecast organisational identity homogeneity, this new collective 
identity would involve changes to both management and union attitudes and 
beliefs. 
At BusCo, as with NurseryCo, the established collective identities operated as 
boundaries on the reach of problem-solving. The introduction into the 
negotiations of the alternative ESOP-identity, represented by the Worker 
Directors, allowed the ESOP to adopt a different identity and therefore a different 
approach to problcm-solving. 
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5.5 Employee Ownership and Control and Organisational Identities 
However, analysis of the literature has demonstrated that, apart from the very 
small firm, organisations do not possess just the one collective identity but many. 
While NurseryCo, as a small ESOP, demonstrated little variation in employee 
identities, the evidence from the BusCo ESOP supported this multi-identity thesis. 
As meanings and understanding attributed to events, information and experiences 
are contextual, and this context is due to a network's history and socio-economic- 
political context, an organisation is likely therefore to accommodate a number of 
networks, each with differing contexts, forms and patterns. Identities are therefore 
formed via a number of allegiances and a network's collective identity (work 
identities and behaviours) is therefore embedded in wider social networks and 
forces - the macro-cultural environment. For example, at BusCo membership of 
the labour movement proved more important in the creation of a collective 
identity for many of the CNC members than membership of a single employee- 
owned and controlled organisation. 
Consequently, while an employee-owned and controlled organisation may 
demonstrate a dominant unitarist organisational. identity, such as NurseryCo, not 
all employee-owned and controlled organisations are necessarily unitarist 
organisations with one common goal or identity. Therefore the unitarist 
assumptions of management, worker and ESOP ideologues is fractured by 
alternative collective identities associated with employee ownership and control. 
These alternative and multiple identities in employee-owned and controlled 
organisations are produced both by the networks' collective memories of 
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traditionally divergent worker-management identities, and also by the alternative 
influence sources and structures created by employee buy-outs. 
The belief that employee ownership and control will result in homogenisation of 
organisational identities and thus in organisation harmony is therefore misleading 
and the unitarist, harmonisation goals of management, workers and employee- 
ownership gurus are essentially false since both case studies demonstrated that 
employee ownership and control actually created new areas of tension within the 
organisations. 
5.6 Identity Divergence 
To allow employee-owned and controlled organisations to function, competing 
collective identities must be able to communicate and operate together within the 
organisation. Shared expectations and routines therefore link competing identity 
networks within organisations. A common framework of understanding must 
exist to allow them to understand if not to agree with each other. However, the 
explicit evidence from this research is that differences in collective identities 
between (or within) networks produce and exacerbate conflicts through 
misunderstandings of information and communications. 
The significantly different expectations of the routes to unitarism and 
harmonisation at BusCo meant that what the organisation had believed to be a 
shared expectation of harmonisation was in fact false. A framework of 
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understanding between the three identities that comprised the BusCo ESOP, 
management, worker and Worker Director, had not therefore been established. 
What resulted was a framework of misunderstanding that exacerbated and 
emphasised the established mistrusts and conflicts between the formal networks. 
Consequently, far from creating a unitarist organisational identity, employee 
ownership and control resulted in the reinforcement of separate, divergent 
network identities through the failure to meet their divergent expectations. 
5.7 Identity Dissonance 
The conversion to employee ownership and control had therefore involved 
alterations to the collective identities of the networks observed. At NurseryCo, it 
had resulted in the consolidation of the employee's identity network with the 
ousting of the former owner's divergent attitudes and beliefs. With BusCo it had 
involved the creation of new structures associated with a new ESOP-identity. 
These conversions and associated identity adjustments had resulted in 
organisational conflicts. The conflicts observed were a product of identity 
dissonance within and between the networks, which was occurring as a result of 
the alterations to collective identities - between the old and the new identity 
frameworks. The very nature of the changes associated with conversion to 
employee ownership and control means that these dissonance-associated conflicts 
are a natural and fundamental aspect of the conversion process. 
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Identity dissonance in individuals arose when they received divergent role 
expectations. At NurseryCo this resulted from the dissonant expectations of 
harmony and the lived experience of conflict. At BusCo, dissonance ran in a 
number of directions. First, unlike NurseryCo, dissonance existed between the 
established collective identities of management and union and the new ESOP-led 
identity. Secondly, dissonance was experienced by the representatives of this new 
identity, the Worker Directors, who received divergent role expectations from 
both management and the union to act differently and to hold different identities. 
Furthermore, the conversions to employee ownership and control had resulted in 
newly created overlaps between organisational networks of differing forms, 
patterns and contexts within the case study ESOPs. Therefore, network members 
were receiving differing and divergent interpretations of information and events. 
These differing interpretations created identity dissonance in the ESOP 
organisation's networks. 
Yet, while both ESOPs in this study experienced identity dissonance, the effects 
of identity dissonance were notably different between the two ESOPs. Since the 
principal rationale for the NurseryCo ESOP was to protect the single collective 
identity of the workplace network, identity dissonance between competing 
collective identities was not a significant generator of conflict. However, the 
observed tensions between the explicit ideology of harmony and the experience of 
conflict within the network were evidence of dissonance. The BusCo experience 
of identity dissonance was somewhat different, given its lack of identity 
homogeneity. The conflicts experienced in this ESOP were largely those created 
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by identity dissonance between the established network identities, embodied in the 
management and union formal networks, and the imposed and influential ESOP- 
identity, typified and carried by the informal network. 
Therefore, membership overlap between established and newly created networks 
in cmployee-owned and controlled organisations will result in tensions created by 
identity dissonance. Where the collective identities of networks which overlap 
(i. e. share personnel) are not compatible, tensions will therefore arise. In addition, 
where unitarism has been successfully achieved, the case study evidence 
demonstrates that dissonance had arisen through the incompatibility of a network 
ideology of homogeneity and lived experience of differences between members, 
resulting from different network positions. This is the case, for example, where 
informally influential individuals are peripheral formal network members, but 
formal leadership may perceive them as a threat (Worker Directors). The 
existence of network overlaps highlights the importance of an understanding and 
discussion of leadership and followership in the comprehension of conflict in 
employee-owned and controlled organisations. 
The evidence presented from the two case study ESOPs suggests therefore that 
employee ownership and control is inherently conflictual. Consequently, any 
scheme that assumes otherwise is mistaken and likely to experience unpredicted 
and unexpected consequences of conversion. 
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6. Network Followership and Leadership 
The nature of employee ownership and control in both BusCo and NurseryCo 
meant that the employees represented both organisational. followership (workers) 
and leadership (owners), thus differentiating the networks observed from the 
existing literature on the role and influence of followership. While the existing 
literature assumed a less symbiotic relationship in conventionally organised and 
controlled firms, in the ESOPs - due to the dual role of leadership and 
followership - it was hypothesised that a dynamic relationship would be apparent 
between the followerships and leaderships in such employee-owned and 
controlled organisations. 
Despite the differences observed between the two case study ESOPs and their 
nctworked relations, in both instances the importance of the relationship between 
the followership and leadership to an understanding of collective identities and 
organisational conflict was evident. This relationship constituted an integral 
network dynamic, particularly in the study of harmonisation and conflict 
generation. 
6.1 Leadership Influences over Collective Identity 
The evidence from the case studies suggested that the more network influence an 
individual (or subgroup) possessed, the more influence they had over the 
interpretation of experiences and information within the network due to their 
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control of the communication of meanings within the network. Therefore, position 
relative to others in a network detennined how and to what level that individual 
(or clique) participated in the construction of meaning for the network. 
Consequently, possession of informal influence, for instance, did not mean that an 
individual could influence meanings and understandings (i. e. the collective 
identity) of a fonnal network in which they occupied a peripheral membership 
position. 
The concentrated interaction networks at BusCo comprised both the informal 
ESOP network and the management formal network. Meanwhile at NurseryCo 
the concentrated interaction network was restricted to the formal workplace 
networks of both day-to-day management and statutory ESOP organisation. 
Within these centralised groups, the network pattern provided a focus of 
information and communication on the leadership, which disadvantaged the 
followerships and thus weakened their influence over collective identity fonnation 
and decisions taken within their network's identity and ideology. Consequently, 
the followerships did not have access to full information needed to make a full and 
informed diagnosis of the situation, experience or data, or therefore to produce an 
independent interpretation thereof. Therefore they had to rely on the 
interpretations of their leaderships. Thus the leadership had disproportionate 
control over network collective identity. In terms of the concentrated interaction 
network that was the ESOP-led informal network at BusCo, this meant that 
influence over collective identity was concentrated in the hands of the Worker 
Directors. At NurseryCo, both the daily management hierarchy and the formal 
395 
ownership structure concentrated network leadership principally in the hands of 
Gill and Sarah. 
These concentrations of leadership within the ESOPs were also partially 
influenced by the networks' historical context. At BusCo, the Worker Director, 
Dan, had been an integral part of the original employee buy-out group that had 
decided upon and established the BusCo ESOP. While he was able to bring to this 
group his wider contacts within other ESOP organisations throughout the UK', in 
addition, he had also held the one worker director position under the previous 
public ownership form of the company and therefore had experience of non-union 
employee representation both within and outwith BusCo. 
However, while at NurseryCo the informal network displayed a dispersed 
interaction pattern (and therefore influence was more diffuse), there remained a 
distinctly influential role for the founding members of the group in collective 
identity formation, through their influential formal and informal network 
positions. At the time of the employee buy-out, the collective aspiration of the 
founding members had been the harmonisation of the working environment at 
NurseryCo. Yet, this ideology and collective identity had been maintained as the 
network doubled in size, and this was due to the maintenance of the early 
member's influential network positions. In the formal concentrated interaction 
network, both Gill and Sarah occupied the two most influential positions as Chief 
Officer and Deputy Chief Officer, while Dot occupied a minor position as Nursery 
Tullis Russell paper mill, Fife, Scotland 
Tower Colliery, South Wales 
Baýd Partnership, England 
Scott Bader Connnonwealth, Eneand 
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Assistant. However, in the fonnal ESOP structure of NurseryCo, the three 
employee-owners occupied the leadership position and controlled the direction of 
the ESOP. In the organisation's informal network, Gill, Sarah and Dot 
represented an influential subgroup, with Gill also occupying a leadership position 
within this dispersed interaction network. The other leadership position was 
occupied by Fay, who was also involved by the employee-owners in strategic 
organisational. decision-making. The combined leadership influence of the early 
members allowed the core group of employee-owners to have established the 
collective identity of the group and also to maintain that identity over time. The 
desire to retain control over this identity could account for the core group's 
reluctance to create new employee-ownership positions for the majority of the 
network followership. 
Therefore, the collective identity and the associated image of harmony of the 
NurseryCo work group was maintained through the maintenance of the 
concentrated interaction network of the formal ESOP leadership's hold over the 
collective identity of the group and through the overlap of this influential trio into 
an important subgroup of the organisational informal network. 
Yet, as the leadership experience at NurseryCo demonstrated, relative leadership 
and followership network influence was not as clear-cut as the Conceptual 
Framework hypothesised. The significant overlaps between networks of different 
forms and patterns in both case studies, (i. e. the overlap within the same 
population of concentrated and dispersed interaction networks and formal and 
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informal networks), strongly skewed and affected the influences of leadership and 
followership within particular network structures. 
Since the informal ESOP network and the formal CNC network at BusCo shared a 
significant population, the concentrated leadership positions of the Worker 
Directors' were carried over into the formal negotiating arena. Therefore, the 
strong leadership of the Worker Directors was also somewhat transferred into the 
formal CNC network and over its own collective identity. In this respect, the 
Worker Directors achieved influence over the collective identity of the CNC and 
managed to broker a new style of agreement between management and union. 
6.2 Followership Influences over Collective Identity 
The importance of recognising the role of the followership in identity formation 
was demonstrated in Chapter Two, where the conceptual framework illustrated the 
relationship between followership influence and network pattern. It hypothesised 
that a weaker followership influence would be evident in concentrated interaction 
networks due to the lack of direct interactions between the leadership and the 
majority of the followership. However, in dispersed interaction networks, the 
followership would demonstrate greater autonomy through a greater incidence of 
direct interactions between the leaderships and the followership, and thus the 
followership would exhibit more influence over the network's collective identity. 
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Furthermore, the analysis of the literature suggested that employee-owned and 
controlled organisations would demonstrate a greater incidence of dispersed 
interaction networks and, in this respect, that the followerships in the ESOPs 
would exhibit more autonomy and influence over the leadership. This would 
therefore mean that conversion to employee ownership and control would provide 
the followership with a greater opportunity to influence network collective 
identity. However, the relative influence of the followerships within the different 
network forms and patterns observed in the two case studies resulted in differing 
forms and levels of influence over network collective identity formations. 
Followership and Network Overlaps 
In all of the network overlaps observed, the importance of the followership to 
collective identity formation and to maintenance of leadership influence was 
crucial. While the influence of the informal network at NurseryCo had been 
elevated through the founders' philosophy of harmony, the more autonomous and 
influential informal followership also had an important role to play in the 
reformation of this collective identity of harmony. In this respect, it was 
significant that the newer members had all joined NurseryCo due principally to its 
reputation of harmony and equality, and were willing to conform to the group's 
established norms of behaviour. Therefore, the formal leadership continued to 
represent the aspirations and goals of the influential informal followership, while 
this followership also provided self-regulation of overt conflict within the group. 
Consequently, the formal leadership had little occasion or need to engage in overt 
control of the membership -a network feature which led to the development of 
covert forms of control within the NurseryCo networks. 
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A further commonality between the two ESOPs studied was the incidence and 
experience of network overlaps. The formal and informal networks at BusCo 
overlapped considerably, thus sharing the same followerships - the informal 
network of the worker directors encompassing both the formal negotiating 
networks of management and CNC. However, the outcomes of these overlaps at 
BusCo were in significant variance to the experience at NurseryCo. The regard 
and recognition that the Worker Director, Dan's, informal leadership abilities and 
values were held in by the formal CNC network (a followership that was matched 
by the informal network) was illustrated when the CNC invited Dan to lead the 
formal negotiations for them. The willingness of the formal union network to 
recognise Dan's informal influence was indicative of the common followership's 
belief in Dan's ability to secure the followership's goals and ideals. 
The fact that the followership was in some respect manipulated by the Worker 
Directors at BusCo also indicates the importance that was attached to the support 
of the followership for the leaderships. The importance attached by Dan to the 
use of language in interactions with the common informal and formal union 
followership was indicative of the influence that the followership wielded over the 
direction of their collective identity. The Worker Directors emphasised the 
integral role of the followership with their leadership, and thus ensured that the 
followership felt in control and unthreatened by the imposition of their informal 
leadership. Dan frequently used neutral and unthreatening word formations, such 
as "I'm only trying to help" and "it's ideas already floated round the table" to 
underplay his informal influence over the common followership in the formal 
sphere. These rituals of interaction distanced him from overt conflict with the 
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formal leaderships and thus maintained his informal influence over their common 
followership. Consequently, with the consent of the union group, he was able to 
adopt a temporary concentrated leadership of the CNC followership network 
during the latter stages of the negotiations. In this respect his infortnal, 
concentrated leadership influence was transposed onto the formal, dispersed 
interaction network of the CNC through their commonality of followership 
members. This allowed the Worker Director to override the formal influence of 
the CNC leaderships and adopt an overt leadership of the negotiations. This 
transposition of informal concentrated leadership onto the CNC network was 
prompted by the critical situation of the negotiations, where the formal groups 
alone were unable to progress the negotiations. In this respect, the formal 
leaderships alone were unable to advance or to meet the goals and aspirations of 
their followerships. The informal leadership of Dan was adopted by the CNC 
network in the belief that he was the only leader who could achieve the 
followership's aims and ideals. The followership had no formal or contractual 
compulsion to support Dan's leadership, but did so as he was seen as the only 
leader within the organisation who was capable of realising the goals and 
aspirations of the union group. In support of this followership view, the Worker 
Directors' alternative proposal was presented as the manifestation of the ideas 
already held within the CNC group, but which the established negotiating tactics 
of the CNC had been unable to unleash. However, the influence of the 
followership was not consistently hidden. On the occasions when it appeared to 
the CNC that the Worker Directors were unable to deliver on their promises of 
achieving the union's goals 2 within the negotiations, the leadership influence of 
2i. e., when the Worker Directors appeared unable to persuade management to alter their 
collective identity and to accept the Worker Directors' alternative proposal. 
401 
the Worker Directors within the formal sphere was abruptly, yet temporarily, 
terminated. 
The manner in which the Worker Directors' alternative proposal was presented to 
the formal networks provided the Worker Directors with the appearance and the 
elements of empathy with both formal followerships, since the new proposal was 
designed to allow both groups to achieve their goals and aspirations. Management 
was able to cut costs, while the CNC was able to consolidate its union influence 
within the organisation. However, the subsequent rejection by the shopfloor 
union membership of the Worker Director brokered agreement demonstrated how 
the influence of such a centralised leadership within a concentrated interaction 
network could be used to achieve goals that were not necessarily in line with the 
followership's identity or goals. In this instance, the collective identity alterations 
within the CNC had been prompted by the concentrated influence of the informal 
network and the overlapping memberships of both formal CNC and informal 
ESOP networks. However, the overlap between the memberships of the Worker 
Directors' informal network and the union formal network, i. e. the same 
population of workers, meant that the greater autonomy of the followership within 
the CNC's dispersed interaction network could overturn the imposed agreement. 
6.3 Conflict and Network Overlaps 
Network overlaps not only skewed the relative influence of followership and 
leadership within the single networks observed, but also created areas of conflict 
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within and between networks through the dissonance in both influence distribution 
and collective identity within populations. In this respect, leadership clashes were 
apparent due to overlaps between networks with different influence structures and 
collective identities, yet which shared a common followership. 
FormallForinal Network Overlap 
While at BusCo the overlaps created by and through the ESOP between the two 
formal networks of management and workers created conflict due to the transfer 
of traditional management control, at NurseryCo the overlap between the formal 
management structure and the formal ESOP-ownership structure did not result in 
tensions. At NurseryCo, while a considerable amount of traditional management 
control and authority had been transferred with the conversion into an employee- 
owned and controlled organisation, this transfer had been both to the new 
employee-managers and to the new employee-owners - and both comprised the 
same individuals. Having removed the established holders of management 
authority and control at NurseryCo - the previous owners -, the conversion into an 
ESOP also prevented the introduction of new owners who did not belong to the 
employee group. Consequently, the ESOP maintained a level of homogeneity 
within the workplace network. 
However, the introduction of formal employee networks into organisational 
governance at BusCo had significantly different outcomes. In this instance, the 
established management authority group had not been removed with the 
conversion, and so this group was now in a position of sharing control with their 
former adversaries, the union network. However, while new conflicts had not 
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resulted within the newly combined organisational. governance group itsele, the 
creation of an organisational governance team comprised of both management and 
worker representatives had in effect moved conflicts down a tier within the 
organisation. The principal seat of discontent within the organisation was now 
situated on the shopfloor and with middle management. This tension was 
expressed in two ways, first as established tensions between workers and their 
management, i. e. that employee ownership and control had not changed the work 
experience for the shopfloor worker or for their immediate management. 
Secondly, employee ownership and control had created new tensions. These 
existed between the average worker and their union representatives, as the 
workers felt that the ESOP experience lived by their ESOP and union 
representatives was dissimilar to their own work experiences. They also arose 
between middle management and both the union representatives and the worker 
directors, directly as a result of management's loss of traditional influence to these 
employee representatives. This relocation of tensions within the organisation 
created a future problem for the BusCo ESOP leaderships, in that the majority of 
the workforce, both shop floor workers and middle management, did not associate 
their working realities and experience, and therefore their collective identities, 
with the ESOP. In this respect, the management and employee representatives 
were increasingly representing the identity of the ESOP and not of their larger 
followerships. This dissonance between followership and leaderships was storing 
up tensions for the future, assisted by the workers' growing apathy about 
communicating with their representatives over their goals and aspirations, tensions 
which would have to be resolved through a wider process of identity consolidation 
within BusCo's networks. This wider dissonance impacted on the final 
I Although this group had maintained some established management/union conflicts. 
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negotiations as the City Branch reacted to the identity shift within the CNC and 
realigned itself with the collective identity of the wider BusCo union membership 
- who supported the City Branch's rejection of the final agreement between the 
CNC and management. Other management, not involved in the identity 
conversion process of the negotiations, also felt that the management negotiating 
team had moved too far from management's established collective identity. 
FormallInforinal Network Overlap 
Conflict was also created where networks with differing forms shared the same 
population, such as the overlap of members at BusCo between the Worker 
Directors' informal network and the formal network of the CNC. With 
conversion to employee ownership and control, authority had been redistributed 
and relocated into new (ESOP) structures. The tensions this created were clearly 
seen at BusCo, where the Worker Director, Dan, leader of the informal network, 
was criticised for "overstepping the mark" by both senior management and the 
union formal network. 
The network overlap between the infonnal network of the Worker Directors and 
the formal network of the CNC thus created the anxiety over identity convergence 
within the union group due to the strongly influential informal leadership of the 
worker directors and the strong overlaps of population between the two networks. 
However, this conflict was not simply the product of differing network forms, but 
of the overlap between networks with differing patterns and influence distribution 
mechanisms. 
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Con centratedlDispersed Interaction Network Overlap 
The overlap between concentrated and dispersed interaction networks within the 
union membership at BusCo created conflict between leaders from the differing 
networks. While the common followership belonging to both the dispersed 
interaction network of the CNC and the concentrated interaction network of the 
Worker Directors had encouraged the Worker Directors to assume a concentrated 
leadership of the CNC network during the latter part of the negotiations, this was 
not without its inherent tensions. Principally, tensions were evident between the 
leadership of the City Branch and the assumed leadership of the Worker Directors 
within the negotiations. Apart from direct confrontation during CNC meetings, 
the City Branch leadership also indirectly opposed the leadership of the Worker 
Directors over the CNC by diverging from the CNC's agreed negotiations 
approach in their formal negotiations with management - where they knew that 
the Worker Directors had less authority to intervene. 4 
This overlap at BusCo also created conflict over leadership succession. As the 
influence of the City Branch within the CNC dispersed interaction network was 
not sufficient to influence the collective identity of the union group, the City 
Branch aimed at leadership of the Worker Directors' informal yet concentrated 
interaction network. A leadership representative in this informal network would 
provide them with a higher degree of influence over the common followership and 
with more leadership autonomy to achieve their goals within and for the CNC. To 
secure this informal influence, the City Branch used the insecurity of informal 
" During official meetings with management, Wilf adopted a new specification for 
progression to the senior rate of pay - one that had been rejected as a negotiating stance by 
the CNC under the leadership of the Worker Directors. 
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leadership tenure against the Worker Director, Chris. Since, in an informal 
network, influence depends on the personal not contractual relationships between 
the leader and their followerships, if the leader disappoints or falls out with any of 
these relationships then leadership status may be lost since that line of 
communication has been damaged or removed and because the leader no longer 
has the trust of the followership to meet their goals and aspirations. What 
occurred at BusCo was the scapegoating of Chris - where the City Branch 
represented him as failing to work towards achieve the goals of the union 
followership (but of expressing the aims and ideology of management instead). In 
this way, Chris lost the support of his informal followership, their empathy and 
their readiness to believe in his methods and ideology within the negotiations 
sphere. The support of the followership was then transferred to the City Branch's 
candidate, Wilf. 
Identity Dissonance 
Identity dissonance occurred within the networks at BusCo since the different 
network leaderships represented different followership identities, yet the 
followerships overlapped. The Worker Directors for example represented the 
'ethos of the ESOP', the culture and identity of individual employee share-owners 
at BusCo, while the CNC network - with a followership that overlapped with the 
Worker Directors' informal network - represented an ideology of BusCo 
employees as workers with collective needs. Such dissonance between the 
collective identities of the overlapping followerships resulted in tensions which 
had to be resolved through a process of identity stabilisation. The replacement of 
Chris with Wilf thus also indicated a move by the common formal and informal 
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network followerships (i. e. the union members) to reduce the individualist 
influence over employee identity and to increase the representation of collectivist 
employee concerns and interests. In this respect, the followerships embodied the 
central values of the networks to which they belonged and thus played a crucial 
role in the identity formation of both the formal, dispersed CNC network and of 
the informal yet concentrated interaction network of the Worker Directors. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The evidence from these two case studies fails to support the relationship 
contained within the social network analysis literature between multiplex 
networks and a reduction in conflict. Consequently, the assumption that a high 
level of interaction in different contexts, i. e. in overlapping networks, promotes 
harmony is not supported. In the organisations studied, the conversion to 
employee ownership and control had resulted in the overlapping of discrete 
influence structures and this membership of overlapping networks frequently 
resulted in tensions and conflicts within the ESOPs. Therefore, far from easing 
communication, producing robust networks able to withstand internal conflict, or 
promoting conformity or common values (and thus decreasing the incidence of 
conflict), overlapping networks within the ESOPs actually created new areas of 
organisational conflict. 
The case studies demonstrated that interactions between network members were 
the principal means by which meanings and understandings of information and 
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events were constructed and communicated. However, different network 
communication patterns and forms also influenced the form of these networked 
interactions. Therefore, network forrn and pattern were significant factors in how 
members interpreted experiences and information and therefore in how networks 
constructed realities and collective identities. Consequently, the role of the 
leadership and followership in the creation and maintenance of network identity 
were significantly different in networks of differing form and pattern. 
Furthermore, leadership and followership within the ESOPs, both formal and 
informal, were therefore highly reciprocal. At BusCo, reciprocity in the formal 
union group was maintained by its dispersed interaction pattern, where the 
autonomy and influence of the followership was high. In the Worker Directors' 
informal network, reciprocity was established through the importance of the 
maintenance of personal relationships between the leadership and the 
followership. At NurseryCo, the close overlap between the formal and informal 
networks meant that leadership and maintenance of the collective identity was 
also highly reciprocal. Consequently, while the leaderships relied on the support 
of their followerships, the followerships were empowered by the successes that 
the leaders achieved on their behalf. Control within the ESOPs was therefore a 
reciprocal arrangement and a network process. Leadership, followership, 
collective identities and conflict were all therefore interlinked through network 
dynamics, and can therefore be conceptualised as network phenomena. 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1 Contested and Disproved Assumptions 
The comparative analysis and discussions presented in this chapter permit a 
number of the assumptions presented by the literatures to be contested. 
Principally, the analysis highlights the limitations of the causal and directional 
assumption, contained in much of the literature on employee participation, that 
employee ownership and control will engender harmonious working relationships. 
The evidence from the case studies suggests that, while harmony may be apparent 
in these organisations, this is either a transient situation or a surface construct. 
I The data presented has demonstrated that apart from the organisations' claims for 
harmony, direct evidence from and observation of organisational members 
suggests the opposite. Established conflicts both continue to exist with 
conversions to employee ownership and control, and new conflicts and tensions 
arc generated by the very structures and processes associated with employee buy- 
outs. Therefore, in direct contradiction of much of the established literature, the 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that there is no causal link between 
employee ownership and control and organisational harmony. Whatever 
employee attitudinal or behavioural changes might be observed, these are not 
associated with employee identity changes and therefore the causal assumption 
that employee participation achieves harmonisation through employee attitude and 
identity changes is also cast into serious doubt. 
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While the case study evidence does indicate that employee ownership and control 
can in some situations generate employee attitude and identity changes, these are 
not necessarily in favour of management goals and identities and therefore it 
cannot be concluded that employee ownership and control only achieves 'positive' 
attitude and behavioural changes among employees. In fact, the BusCo evidence 
suggests that employee ownership and control, while successful in altering 
identities within the CNC network, only served to entrench established and 
adversarial divergent identities. Therefore the identity alteration was a movement 
away from management's goals and ideologies. 
The literature also suggests that employee ownership and control achieves 
employcc attitudinal changcs without changing managcmcnt attitudcs, goals and 
identities. The evidence from BusCo further suggests that, without commensurate 
alterations in management identities, employee attitude change towards 
harmonisation with management is unlikely. Where employee behavioural 
change is observed (such as the CNC's alteration of collective bargaining 
behaviours during the initial ESOP period), commensurate employee identity and 
attitudinal changes will not be forthcoming unless management also demonstrates 
a willingness and ability to jettison their established ideologies and behaviours. 
Therefore, given the evidence first from the BusCo CNC's altered collective 
bargaining behaviours without any alteration in their attitudes towards 
management or in their collective identity as unionists, and secondly from 
NurseryCo, where the overt demonstration of harmony was underlain by evidence 
of constant conflict and tensions within the group (and therefore of the continued, 
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yet changed, existence of tensions within their working environment), the 
assumption that employee attitudinal changes are directly associated with 
employee behavioural changes is disproved in these two cases. Likewise, the 
opposite assumption, that employee behavioural change is a result of employee 
attitudinal change is also disproved. 
The evidence also contests the assumption that employee-owned and controlled 
organisations necessarily demonstrate a unitarist mono-culture, directed by a 
managing or leadership elite. The BusCo ESOP for instance possessed a number 
of organisational subcultures. While the established management and union 
cultures remained unaffected by conversion to employee ownership and control, 
yet that very conversion had also created a new culture - that of the ethos of the 
ESOP, the individualisation of employees as shareholders. NurseryCo presented, 
on the surface, a more expected outcome of the homogenisation of identities and 
ESOP membership. However, the conversion to employee ownership and control 
had increased the influence of the dispersed interaction and informal workplace 
network, and in this respect it cannot be said that the culture or identity of the 
group was entirely directed by its managing elite, but also by its followership. 
Finally, the evidence from the case studies suggests that, contrary to the 
expectations expressed in the literature for employee ownership and control, work 
identities and behaviours cannot be formed solely within the environment of the 
firm. 
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7.2 Accepted Hypotheses 
The case study evidence suggests that in the smaller ESOP studied, the 
assumptions and predictions made by the literature appear more accurate. The 
NurseryCo ESOP demonstrated a unitarist and homogenous series of workplace 
networks with an overt semblance of organisational. harmony. In addition, 
alternative sources of influence, i. e. its informal network, wielded considerable 
organisational influence. This infonnal network was also a dispersed interaction 
network and therefore the association of alternatively derived sources of influence 
in employee-owned and controlled organisations is supported by the NurseryCo 
evidence. 
However, to rely on this evidence alone would be misleading. The rationale for 
undertaking two case studies with different network patterns and forms was to 
ascertain whether there were any generalisable influences of employee ownership 
and control across differing conditions and enviromnents. The BusCo case study 
did not support the homogenisation, unitarist thesis, and also demonstrated overt 
conflict. While its infonnal workplace network had also risen to considerable 
organisational influence as a result of the conversion to employee ownership and 
control, this network was a concentrated interaction network and therefore did not 
establish a more equitable distribution of influence within the ESOP. 
There were however, a number of generalisable effects of employee ownership 
and control. Neither case studies demonstrated organisational harmonisation as a 
result of their employee buy-outs. Conflict continued to be an inherent aspect of 
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the two ESOPs, and this conflict was also frequently directly associated with 
employee ownership and control. Conflict can therefore be seen as a direct 
product of employee ownership and control, since the identity and network 
alterations observed in the case studies were only achieved through conflict 
(between old identity and new, between old structure of control and new etc. ). 
Furthermore, the incidence of network patterns and forms and principally the 
incidence and extent of overlap between differing networks with common 
followerships has been found to influence the type of conflict found in employee- 
owned and controlled organisations. It is possible to conclude on this evidence 
that conflict is therefore a network property and that network processes are the 
essence of and also generate conflict. 
Therefore conflict is constant within networks, either covertly or overtly. This 
conclusion is adequately demonstrated by both the ESOPs studied, which 
exhibited continued and new areas of networked conflict, both unaffected by the 
ESOP, and also tensions produced as direct outcomes of the conversion process. 
The influential role of the informal workplace network in both ESOPs supported 
the assumption that socially derived sources of influence would become 
increasingly important and influential in employee-owned and controlled 
organisations. Yet, the homogenisation of these organisations was not 
generalisable, with BusCo remaining a collection of competing identity networks - 
through the very process of employee ownership and control and the network 
overlaps it generated. 
414 
However, in both case studies, the existence of a dynamic relationship between 
followership and leadership was supported. The followership and leadership of 
networks were found to be part of the same influence process in employee-owned 
and controlled firms - where employee-owners were both followers and leaders. 
In this respect, followership and leadership were observed to be parts of the same 
force or entity, the social network, and therefore, power and resistance are part of 
the same network process of influence distribution. However, the means and 
outcomes of operation of this networked influence process differed between 
network forms and patterns. As predicted, in the dispersed interaction networks 
observed, followership control over network identity and actions was significant. 
In contrast, in the concentrated interaction networks in the ESOPs, it was the 
leadership who maintained significant control over network identity and actions 
not the followership. Yet, where leadership control was apparent, this could take 
different forms depending on the form of the network. While formal leadership 
was dependent on the occupation of an influential network position based on 
contractual relations with other network members, informal leadership was 
dependent on the maintenance of interpersonal relations. 
From the case study evidence it is also possible to conclude that it is through 
network processes that collective identity is formed, yet these processes are not 
restricted to relations within the confines of the employee-owned and controlled 
Organisation. The social network is therefore a significant source of identity 
expression for its members and for the achievement of their collective aspirations. 
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However, it was clear from both ESOPs that significant overlaps between 
networks of differing forms and patterns had been the result of the organisations' 
conversion to employee ownership and control. While these conversions had 
increased the influence of the informal networks, these networks now overlapped 
with the formal organisational networks, blurring the boundaries of leadership and 
followership influence in the ESOPs. Whereas in BusCo, this overlap increased 
the followership influence within the ESOP, at NurseryCo, while followership 
influence was detectable, it was largely harnessed to the ends of the founders' 
collective identity aspirations. 
The thesis thus demonstrates that, far from the harmonisation hypothesis 
presented in much of the literature, conflict can be found even within high-level 
employee-owned and controlled organisations. This conflict is a product of other 
social factors - such as external social networks, internal network forms and 
patterns, and internal/external economic influences - which intrude on the 
relationship between, on the one hand, employee ownership and control and, on 
the other, employee identity and attitudinal changes . 
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Appendix 
Density 
Density is measured using the formula: D= 200 a/n (n-1), where a refers to the number 
of links recorded between network members, and n refers to the number of network 
members (Mitchcll, 1969: 18). The density ratio obtained from this calculation is a 
measure of the total number of links that do exist out of the total number that could exist, 
and is therefore a measure of the possibility of communication within a social network. 
Degree 
Degree is a measure of the "average number of relations each person has with others in 
the same network" (Boissevain, 1974: 40), and is calculated by the formula: d= 2Na/n, 
where n refers to the total number of network members and Na refers to the total actual 
number of relations. 
Centrality 
This is "an index of the degree to which a person is accessible to the persons in a 
network" (Boissevain, 1974: 41), and is calculated using the equation: 
sum of the shortest distances from every member to every other member 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sum of the shortest distances from Ego to every other member 
443 
Central network positions are associated with power and influence, due to their access to 
information. Centrality has also been called 'closeness' and 'betweeness' (Wassermann 
and Galaskiewicz, 1994). 
Reachability 
Reachability measures the ease of communication within a network. 
Intensity 
Intensity of transactional content is a measure comprised of three components: frequency; 
content; and duration of the interaction. These can be used to measure the value an 
individual vests in the relationship 
Multiplexity 
This is a measure of the diversity of linkages in a network, where each individual is 
46 Sometimes in touch with the same people in different capacities" (Boissevain, 1974: 29). 
A measure of multiplexity can be gained by dividing the number of multiplex 
relationships in a network by the total number of all relevant relationships. If the score is 
high it indicates that the members know each other in many different contexts. Multiplex 
networks are assumed by the literature to be more robust and able to withstand conflict 
than single-stranded relationships (Boissevain, 1974: 30). 
Direction 
Direction measures the reciprocity of relationships. 
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